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Abstract
This dissertation assesses how liberal theories of justice balance the ideas of 
choice and circumstance and why these explanations fall short. This dissertation will 
show how we can progress naturally from libertarian intuitions about moral agency 
through to a developed liberal account of justice. 1 will work through the theories of 
Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin and Philippe Van Parijs. By assessing 
these theories, 1 will argue that liberal justice can balance the concern for individual 
choice and circumstance appropriately but that this requires specific developments of the 
liberal position. I will argue these developments are an understanding of fair shares in 
the prefaced but necessary market present in liberal theories in order to honor individual 
choices. This argument will lead us to endorse a specific conception of taxation based 
upon resources rather than end-results. The second development I argue for is the 
implementation of the Principle of Just Access to respect the moral agency of the 
handicapped. I will show that liberal theories have utilized a concern for individual 
circumstance, which is not detailed enough. This has caused them to under-represent the 
valid moral agency of the handicapped. I will argue that in order to honor the choices of 
the handicapped properly, an account of liberal justice must prioritize compensation 
through a Principle of Just Access. The dissertation will conclude by asserting the 
potential validity of some of Van Parijs’ institutional claims. I will show that although 
Van Parijs presents an incomplete liberal argument, we can defend many of his positions, 
particularly his arguments for universal basic income and resource rents, through a 
properly developed account of liberal justice. I present this account and show why a 
conception of fair shares within the market and the Principle of Just Access make this 
account unique and necessary.
Acknowledgements
A thesis dissertation is much like the creation of a sculpture. In order for the 
project to come to fruition, there must be a great deal of support for the sculptor. My 
wife and family have encouraged me at every turn to pursue the production of this 
dissertation. For their support, comfort and sacrifice I am truly thankful and forever 
indebted. For my friends and contemporaries, Camilla, Sarah, Gavin, Claire, and Mike, 
your help, advice and distractions that helped me finish this project without succumbing 
to mental and physical fatigue that has accompanied this process, I extend to you my 
deepest gratitude. To Mike, I am particularly indebted for his advice, encouragement and 
willingness to listen to my liberal prattle. My sincere thanks to Mr. Bill Frymire who 
generously agreed to allow me to use his image “Justice for All” on the cover of this text. 
I feel it encapsulates the clear impartiality device present in liberal justice, yet how 
blurred the weighting and balancing of issues can be as we attempt go about our 
judgments and actions in a fair and impartial way.
With the support for the labor provided, the sculptor undertakes his training. For 
me, I am deeply thankful for the many professors I have been fortunately enough to have 
met and been tutored by while at Cardiff University and Wheaton College. I am grateful 
for the support of Dr. Boroviak, Dr. Trevino and Dr. Weiskamp who have lent their 
support throughout my academic career and are aiding in my preparation for the 
American academic environment. I am especially grateful to Dr. Dworetz who saw in me 
what few did and whose persistence and encouragement ultimately fueled this journey. 
Cardiff opened its doors to me when so many others were unwilling to extend the help I 
needed to make my goals a reality. When things have not been their brightest, the school 
has always acted on my behalf without hesitation. To Dr. Roberts, Dr. Haddock, Dr. 
Sutch and Dr. Boucher I am particularly indebted in this regard. I would also like to 
thank Dr. Cole, Dr. Widerquist, Dr. Steiner, Dr. Van Parijs, Dr. Garrard and Dr Pateman 
for their assistance, advice and attention over the past 4 years. You have all made me the 
scholar I am today and I am sincerely grateful.
The sculptor then is handed the task at hand, to create a product of merit. Words 
cannot begin to express the ways in which Dr. Roberts and Dr. Haddock have helped in 
bringing this document into existence. When it was little more than a lump of unmolded 
ideas, they could see the potential. When it was a roughly chiseled outline, they 
highlighted what needed to be more distinctively articulated. When it was a complete but 
unpolished visage, they were able to show me where to shine and work to make this 
document worthy of submission. At every turn, they were there with encouragement, a 
critical eye and a vision for moving the project forward. They always delivered their 
ideas and concerns with consideration, professionalism and a smile. This work truly 
would not have happened without you, gentlemen and I feel honored to have had you as 
my guides through this process. I hope to do you proud should I be fortunate enough to 
have a chance to be a career academic.
Balancing Choice and Circumstance 
Fair Shares and Just Access in Liberal Justice
Table of Contents - Page
Introduction 1
Chapter 1 - Nozick, Justice and the State 12
1.1 Rights, Entitlement, Patterns and the Minimal State 14
1.2 Critiques of the Entitlement Theory 34
1.3 Conclusion 51
Chapter 2 -  Rawls, Circumstance and the Welfare State 54
2.1 Rawls and A Theory of Justice 57
2.2 Institutionalizing Distributive Justice: The Difference Principle in Detail 68
2.3 Moving from the Welfare State to a Property Owning Democracy 83
2.4 Conclusion 90
Chapter 3 - Dworkin, Talents and Ambition Sensitivity 94
3.1 Dworkin’s Critique of Rawls 97
3.2 Talents, Handicaps and Distributive Justice 115
3.3 Conclusion 142
Chapter 4 - Van Parijs and Real Freedom 146
4.1 ‘Real Freedom for All’ and the Unconditional Basic Income State 149
4.2 Ambition Sensitivity, Choices and Amending Property Rights
4.3 Endowment Insensitivity, Circumstance and
176
Instituting ‘Undominated Diversity’ 195
4.4 Welfare, Contributory Negligence and Equality 211
4.5 Conclusion 226
Conclusion -  Developing Liberal Justice 230
Bibliography 243
Introduction
This year marked the 20th Anniversary of the Americans with Disabilities Act in 
the United States.1 This was an anniversary touted through a memorable televised 
Presidential Public Service Announcement campaign prior to the mid-term elections of 
2010. This act is the high water marie for civil rights for the handicapped and disabled 
within the United States. It has been challenged, amended and clarified over the last 20 
years but the legislation still represents the recognition that handicapped and disabled 
individuals in society required greater protections in order to enjoy equally valued social 
privileges than had been recognized previously. This makes the handicapped and 
disabled one of the last groups in American society to receive recognition as a 
systematically under-represented group in need of greater civil rights protection. The 
ADA represents a move toward the kind of equality that our liberal societies strive for. 
The goal of the ADA is to afford individuals with handicaps and disabilities rights to 
access and enjoy the benefits of our interwoven society. It is intended to ensure that 
society does the best it can in providing social equality to handicapped individuals in a 
reciprocal and fair way.
However, the last 20 years have pushed and pulled the ADA in many different 
directions. There have been numerous court cases and amendments to the legislation that 
have both eroded and strengthened parts of the document.2 Issues with a decline in 
employment numbers for those with disabilities and with professional enforcement 
mechanisms3 are well documented and expose the troubling ineffectual nature of the 
ADA. Other critics suggest that the ADA may actually compensate some who do not 
deserve compensation because of the vague or in some cases arbitrary classifications of 
handicaps. Treatment of the same handicaps can also vary greatly from State to State due
1 See - http://www.ada.gov/ The Americans with Disabilities Act website, maintained by the Department of 
Justice.
2 See Footnote 1 and Stapleton, David C & Burkhauser, Richard V.; The Decline in Employment o f People 
with Disabilities: A Policy Puzzle ; (W.E. Upjohn Institute; Kalamazoo, Ml; 2003)
3 Vierling, Lewis E.; “Proving Disability Remains Difficult”; The Case Manager - January 2004 (Vol. 15, 
Issue 1, Pages 25-29)
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to particular state mechanisms and classifications. Though refinement is to be expected 
with a new piece of legislation, the ADA represents the most basic protections a State 
which values equality can provide, in this case access to society. It is an emancipatory 
law much like historical legislation addressing gender, racial, and ethnic minorities. 
However, unlike these minorities, the handicapped and disabled have no heterogeneity 
and as a result, no historical collective social grouping or collective culture. They will 
continue to face inequalities that require positive actions by government in perpetuity. 
They cannot be made equal simply through the removal of barriers and are a difficult 
group to define from the outset. This leads to a confused hodgepodge of laws that have 
been ineffectual in addressing both sides of the problem adequately. Though this is best 
seen through the movements of the legislation to patch together an approach to disabled 
people, the existence of these needed movements orchestrates a much deeper issue.
There is a clear obligation for assistance but without a clear and comprehensive picture of 
what this obligation is, approaches to it are going to be inappropriate in some manner.
Our ideas of what the fair treatment of these individuals ought to be is based on a 
conception of what a fair and reciprocal concern for distributions of goods, social and 
natural/physical, require of our systems of justice within a State. We are charged with 
deciding what people are fairly owed given their unchosen circumstances and their ability 
to make choices that lead to unequal outcomes. Without an account of what our duties to 
access are given our unequal physical dispositions, our laws will continue to meander in a 
troubling and ineffective way.
Accounts of liberal justice have attempted to show how to treat this issue within 
an account of distributive justice. These accounts show the effect physical endowments 
have on social outcomes. They explain how we ought to address them within principles 
of justice. They attempt to show us how we can be obligated to one another in specific 
ways and what these obligations mean for our treatment of one another given our unequal 
physical characteristics, shared physical environment and the value of philosophic 
equality. These theories themselves offer us very different accounts of what our 
obligations and institutions ought to be. These theories illustrate the push and pull
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between our elements of distributive justice. The value of moral agency, choices and the 
limited role of government on one side and the redistributive and outcome based social 
equality arguments on the other. The latter of these, particularly Rawlsian Liberalism, 
has clearly influence the move in policies we can see through the ADA in the United 
States and other policies elsewhere.
The reason we have these conflicted accounts arising in our political processes is 
that our very basic accounts of how to balance these issues and attribute for them fairly is 
incomplete. This implies the solution will have to come from a development in our 
philosophic approach. In this dissertation, I will explore what this commitment ought to 
be, what developments of our liberal thought are necessary to reconcile these ideas and 
what institutions they ought to endorse. I will show how we ought to balance our 
considerations of individual choices and their validity with our legitimate concern for the 
unchosen physical circumstances that befall individuals in our society. I will show that in 
order to provide for the handicapped and disabled coherently, we must develop the idea 
of handicap comprehensively. I will show how this leads us to develop a Principle of 
Just Access in order to account for discrepancies in physical condition appropriately.
I will show that this is needed to attribute for the valid moral agency (the ability 
of individuals to make choices and accept consequences) of most of the individuals our 
account of justice would attribute as handicapped or disabled. I will show how this can 
be done and how it does not undermine particular aspects of market devices, which are 
associated with classical liberal approaches to justice and equality. By asserting what a 
fair market must do, particularly in terms of fair shares, I will show what is needed in 
order to provide a system of choice sensitivity and the individual freedom that comes 
from use of a market device. By working through liberal accounts of justice, I will show 
how important the idea of a market that formalizes choices can be. 1 will explore the 
underlying commitment to fair shares and why this must be taken seriously. 1 will also 
show how a proper consideration of disability leads us to a greater development in our 
principles of conditional redistribution and the institutions that can live up to these 
commitments.
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To do this the dissertation will begin with an inspection of the argument for 
libertarian justice presented by Robert Nozick. Nozick represents the classical 
liberal/libertarian approach. Though Nozick is not the sole standard barer for the 
libertarian argument, his argument is important as it is posed as a direct critique of the 
work of John Rawls and Political Liberalism. Nozick is also valuable as his argument 
shows how choices can have legitimate outcomes if individuals are presumed to have 
equal moral agency.
Nozick’s argument is a defense of the power of choices and consequences that 
result from our natural rights and individual moral agency. It proves an important 
starting point in asserting the power and problems of a solely rights-based equal agency 
argument. I will show that Nozick fails to account for inequalities in natural endowments 
that have a direct effect on moral agency. I will also show that within his argument there 
are presuppositions that require market systems to provide fair shares of resources in 
order for individual agency to be equally valuable over time.
Rawlsian Liberalism asks us to move away from this approach to justice and I 
will show how this can come about more naturally than it seems from a classical liberal 
approach. However, in analyzing the libertarian approach of Nozick, I will show how we 
can still defend the kind of market device Nozick advocates for. In fact, I will argue we 
require such a device if people do have agency and can make choices which are equally 
valuable.
By working through Nozick’s position, we can conclude that if individuals have 
agency that we must protect, the market device will serve a subordinate but needed role 
in preserving this agency. 1 will do this by presenting the critique of Nozick offered by 
the analytical Marxism of G.A. Cohen. Cohen works as a rigorous counterpoint to 
Nozick to show the strengths and weaknesses of Nozick’s position. It is in examining 
these positions that we see the need for a different approach, which splits the difference 
between stark rights protection and collective universalism. I will outline the importance
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of fair shares within a market device. I will show how this can be obtained through a 
secular proviso, the Fair Shares Proviso. I will also highlight the distinct problem of 
natural endowment issues within a Nozickean account and show how the balance 
between choice and circumstance needs refinements that Nozick does not give even if a 
market device can be defended as requisite if appropriately conceived and qualified.
This moves us toward the liberal account of John Rawls. Rawls uses a 
hypothetical approach to consider justice and produces, over the course of several books, 
articles and lectures, an account of justice, which has been a benchmark in contemporary 
political philosophy. Rawls is important because his theory explores how we can 
introduce and balance claims of circumstances/natural endowment and choices/moral 
agency, within an account of distributive justice. Rawls asks us to utilize a hypothetical 
thought device from which we can create fair principles of justice. He does this through 
the original position and the veil of ignorance, which are utilized to create the appropriate 
impartiality needed to create principles that are fair for absolutely everyone. For Rawls, 
this leads to principles of justice that equally value liberty through ensured opportunities 
and a maximin redistribution of social primary goods.
However, Rawls has his own issues that his many critics have raised over the 
almost 40 years since the initial publication of A Theory o f Justice. For the purposes of 
this text, 1 will focus upon the distributive aspects of Rawls theory. The predominant 
assumption concerning maximin redistributive obligation is based upon the argument that 
the least well off are assumed to be naturally deficient or handicapped in some 
meaningful way. Because of this, the results of the choices individuals make are on some 
level always unchosen as they are the result of unchosen circumstances and could befall 
us all. This leads Rawls into a level of redistribution (maximin) and account of why we 
act this way that does not allow choices to mean what they ought to mean. This is 
because Rawls does not take seriously the legitimate moral agency those with 
deficiencies in natural endowment have or that equally endowed individuals may make 
decisions that lead to disproportionate disparities in condition. This leads to maximin 
redistributions that are not choice sensitive to an appropriate level and as Such, do not
Balancing Choice and Circumstance -  Fair Shares and Just Access in Liberal Justice 5
balance our considerations of handicap/natural endowment with the importance of 
individual choices.
Even if the outcomes and operations of the difference principle are troubling, 
Rawls gives us an account of justice that provides a device for coming to principles of 
justice and an account of these principles that intends to balance them against each other. 
Nevertheless, a further development is needed, which is why we move onto the work of 
Ronald Dworkin and Philippe Van Parijs. These two authors work in unique ways to 
develop the thought project of Rawls into an appropriately sensitive account of justice 
and the principles and institutions, which follow from this account.
I will establish our need to develop Rawls thought. However, this development is 
extremely important theoretically and institutionally as it further stipulates how we 
appropriately balance choices and natural circumstances that cause the problems with 
Rawls thought. Dworkin and Van Parijs treat these problems in different ways each of 
which I will argue adds something to our consideration of the problems at hand. These 
theories both form arguments as to what level of compensation and access are 
commensurate with our obligation to address unchosen natural circumstances. They also 
argue how we are to ensure people have fair shares that allow them to formalize choices 
equally. They form accounts of what is needed theoretically in developing liberalism and 
in the institutions it would support in accomplishing the needed development of Rawls.
The dissertation will first address the account of Ronald Dworkin. Dworkin will 
be addressed first because his theory develops Rawls account in a needed way due to our 
concerns of balancing choices and circumstances within an account of distributive justice. 
However, 1 will show that Dworkin does not work his position all the way through and 
ultimately settles, uncomfortably on an outcomes similar to Rawls. I will show that 
Dworkin gives us needed theoretical developments of Rawls that allow us to deal with 
choices and the redistributive constraint of reciprocity in a fair account of distributive 
justice. Dworkin argues for the use of an auction scheme to make distributions of goods 
choice sensitive. He further stipulates that we should institute a collective insurance
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scheme to ensure that distributions/outcomes are endowment insensitive. These are 
undertaken through a modified veil of ignorance that allows in knowledge of talents but 
not their value (individually or socially). This allows distributions to be fair as no one 
could rationally envy the distributions of others. If they have a legitimate argument for 
an unfair distribution, Dworkin allows the auction to be re-run in order to ensure that 
distributions become legitimate. As a result, Dworkin develops Rawls to deal with 
choices better but rules out accessibility accounts because he argues they end up like 
Rawls maximin/difference principle account. Dworkin also does not work through 
choice legitimacy into institutions beyond this point because he ultimately argues these 
are indiscernible in ideal terms.
Philippe Van Parijs, who will be the focus of the following chapter, develops 
institutions that fulfill our considerations about the market, choices and freedom. Van 
Parijs wants us to be concerned with the real opportunities people have because these 
formalize the freedoms, liberties and choices available to citizens. He also sees the need 
to develop Rawls given the arguments Rawls largely presents in developing his own 
work in light of criticisms posed toward A Theory o f Justice. However, Van Parijs rejects 
large parts of Dworkin’s theory and places a rather troubling account of Rawlsian justice 
as an alternative development. This development largely undermines his desired 
institutional practices. Van Parijs does not develop Rawls in a way that supports his own 
institutions. We are left to resolve the intuitions motivating his systems or alternatively 
to accept his development o f Rawls and undermine these systems. I will show how his 
systems can be endorsed by a proper development of our arguments about balancing 
choice and circumstance and how this will drive our theory closer to Dworkin.
The need 1 will assert for the theoretical development I will pose in terms of 
disability commitments can be seen most starkly through the problems in the arguments 
of Dworkin and Van Parijs in attempting to tackle compensation. Dworkin and Van 
Parijs develop this part of Rawls project in different ways. Dworkin rules out 
accessibility principles due to the assumption that these have to result in maximin 
reasoning. Van Parijs also offers an alternative account of addressing natural inequalities
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to that of Rawls through his use of undominated diversity. Unlike insurance, this system 
works as a form of inverse envy in that individuals are compensated based upon no one 
rationally wanting a given lack of endowment. This position has some rather serious 
conceptual problems such as lone objectors and the belief that if the position is seriously 
considered, it has to end up at Dworkin’s account. I will show how Dworkin* s use of 
insurance makes more sense.
However, both of these accounts are insufficient in the same way. They only 
work out an account of handicaps/disability in part and as a result are insufficient because 
they do not treat handicaps appropriately. I will argue that handicaps only remove 
opportunities rather than impugn the validity of the choices that are made our 
commitments have to respect these choices and outcomes. Complete handicap (total 
incapacity) is only one kind of natural endowment problem we need to consider when 
discussing compensation. This is only a small part of the people we would classify as 
handicapped and disabled. These individuals are largely capable of making choices, 
having expensive tastes, and having talents, which they would, even in ideal 
circumstances, desire. 1 argue this description better describes most people we need to 
consider and constitutes most handicapped people in question.
As a result, their ability to make equally valuable yet constrained choices is an 
aspect of their moral agency we ought to work to protect. On one hand, their ability to 
make choices and be well off does not remove their right to compensation. On the other 
hand, compensation does not) if left unstipulated, provide a reciprocally appropriate 
account of their access to bundles or choices. I argue we need another layer of 
refinement to make our liberal theories work given these considerations. Developments 
of liberalism take us far in getting to an argument as to why we are obligated to act based 
upon inequalities in natural endowment. Nevertheless, our consideration as to how we 
act best to protect the moral agency of the handicapped, while only obligating social 
redistribution to an appropriate level, requires greater articulation. This is the problem 
the ADA and other policies have stumbled across in that the arguments pulling them in
Balancing Choice and Circumstance -  Fair Shares and Just Access in Liberal Justice 8
either direction do so because our intuitions about what handicaps mean tug in different 
directions.
We are compelled to reciprocal compensation but for handicapped and disabled 
individuals to have their moral agency honored (those who are able to make choices) the 
compensation must act first to make opportunities available so that these choices can be 
made and count (in terms of consequences) equally. It is only after exhausting the first 
option due to cost that we would begin to work through the idea of monetary 
compensation. This would be apparent through the modified veil and so it must be 
present in our post-veil institutions/principles of justice. Liberal accounts lack this 
crucial development, and without it, society is left with a confused obligation to act in 
ways that may not actually honor choices equally or provide opportunities appropriately 
which is reflected in the policies we see today.
This is why we need the Principle of Just Access. The principle simply stated is 
an obligation to provide Y and Z to do A if Y and Z are equal to or less than the 
insurance amount. It is only when Y and Z exceed the amount of insurance that we move 
onto priority B, which is monetary compensation. This prioritizes the insurance payment 
based upon our consideration of valuing choices equally in light of unequal distributions 
of natural endowments. The idea of compensation may be assumed to provide 
accessibility. However, compensation can only do this if it is stipulated in an ordinal 
fashion based upon the choices/agency we are acting to protect in a conception of justice. 
We must act to value these choices and their consequences first to the degree this is 
possible. This only happens through the institutionalization of a principle that puts these 
values first. Such a principle will have profound consequences on how we conceive our 
institutions and policies. It does the best we can do to reciprocally provide the choices 
that really matter to people. It does so in a way that makes it a principled account which 
can be reflected in policies, political structures and can avoid forms of compensation that 
do not work to assure accessibility due to their medium (like cash)
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It is only after this added development that a theoretical argument can properly 
support the freedom/choice institutions that Van Parijs argues for. These institutions 
formalize what comes out of our Fair Shares commitments. The work in developing 
Rawls leads us to endorse Dworkin given the specific development I pose. However, at 
this point we return to the market and its role in formalizing the choices of individuals, 
including handicapped/disabled individuals. Van Parijs gives us a unique system of 
political economy that formalizes the commitments that we uncovered when initially 
inspecting the market device.
This is where our working through Nozick’s position of agency and its 
consequences does work in coming to structures like Van Parijs’. Our need for fair 
shares, as asserted by the Fair Shares Proviso, drives us towards Van Parijs systematic 
suggestions, but only after we have asserted the optimal amount of agency and 
compensation through our principles of justice/redistribution. This allows us to respect 
choices and outcomes while addressing inequalities in natural endowment that were out 
of balance in the institutions of justice we have inspected.
However, to do so, and to balance the issues of choice and circumstance 
appropriately, we need to add the requisite ideas of the Principle of Just Access and 
utilize the Fair Shares Proviso in our accounts of liberal justice. Concerns about how we 
balance the issues of choice and circumstance lead us toward a Rawlsian account of 
justice which attempts to balance the issues rather than ignore handicaps. Problems with 
the balance of these issues present in Rawls cause us to develop the position and move 
toward Dworkin. In working Dworkin through and understanding the complexities of 
handicap better, we are led to a further development of Dworkin’s position in the 
Principle of Just Access. Once this is accomplished, we have a fair and reciprocal system 
that takes the moral agency and the consequences of this moral agency seriously for the 
handicapped and disabled. We then can then legitimize the market device as it 
formalizes these choices when we cash out how we need to do things systematically. The 
market serves a vital role in providing a device through which moral actors can make 
equally valued choices in respect to everyone’s equal standing in the process. However,
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to do so, the market must adhere to the Fair Shares Proviso, as this is a presupposition of 
justice in transfer through a market device. The Fair Shares Proviso drives us towards a 
system like Van Parijs* that utilizes a market and formulates a way in which people can 
be endowed with equal initial capital. These represent added layers in liberal thought, 
which have implications for how we approach institutions, principles and policies in a 
just society. They are needed in order for our account of choices and circumstances to 
take these commitments seriously and treat them comprehensively for all individuals in 
society.
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Chanter 1 - Nozick. Choices and Procedure
Introduction
Van Parijs will argue that an Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) system fulfills 
the commitment of “Real Freedom”4 he adopts in developing liberal justice. A UBI does 
this by utilizing an “impure” capitalist system. Van Parijs will argue that his position is 
friendly to the rights, freedom and liberty aspects of justice that are the cornerstones of 
the libertarian argument. To understand this claim we must discuss the moral 
justifications behind a libertarian state as our starting point. Our understanding of these 
ideas and commitments will be important in ascertaining a precise commitment to justice 
that treats our choices and circumstances appropriately. It will be Van Parijs1 claim, that 
the “real libertarian”5 approach is the perspective that a coherent libertarian ought to 
adopt. He argues it undertakes actions of distributive justice first before allowing the 
procedural claims of the choice driven market. An account of what we will refer to as a 
“pure” capitalist system of justice is presented by Robert Nozick in his text Anarchy,
State and Utopia. It is through the inspection of libertarian justice that we will be first 
introduced to the benefits, problems and inconsistencies of libertarian claims. I will show 
through a consideration of libertarian justice how this account leads naturally to the 
liberal accounts of justice to come and why these subordinates the claims of the market as 
they do.
These arguments and subsequent critiques will be one of the key elements in 
analyzing the two aspects I believe drive a greater development of liberal justice, choices 
and circumstances. Libertarianism boils down to an argument about how government
4 Van Parijs, Philippe: Real Freedom for All, What (if anything) can Justify Capitalism, (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1995), p. 21
5 IBID, p. 5
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should operate if we can assert a robust level of moral agency to individuals. I will show 
libertarianism does not do enough to ensure moral agency through the legitimate actions 
of the state before legitimizing the actions of the market. We will assess what the 
libertarian argument needs to do in order to say something about our distribution of 
external resources through the market. The market is the apparatus through which we 
enact our choices about external resources. It will be my claim that libertarianism has 
something powerful to say about how we conceive a market that honors the choices 
individuals make. To do this, we move naturally to accepting redistributive measures and 
to accept what I call a Fair Shares Proviso. The Fair Shares Proviso works to provide a 
fair market given the needs associated with just acquisition and entitlement after equally 
valued moral agency is attained. It is with these needed developments of the claims of 
libertarianism that we can defend the market and private property from various critiques. 
These developments will give us important ideas that we need to retain when considering 
the fair operation of a market device. I will show how this is a subordinate but important 
claim about the role of the market in honoring our choices within a conception of justice. 
The subordination and qualification of the market results from the distinct weaknesses the 
libertarian account has as a complete account of justice. I will show that libertarianism 
needs to address internal endowments and the resource needs associated with moral 
agency to legitimize the actions of the market. Because of this, the libertarian argument 
does not take seriously enough the consideration of individual circumstances.
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1.1 -  Rights. Entitlement. Patterns and the Minimal State
Nozick starts his project by addressing the primacy of individual rights and how 
these rights can be legitimately secured through the State. Nozick wishes to take 
seriously the concern for individual rights postulated by anarchical moral arguments and 
counteract the more invasive forms of the state presented by welfare liberalism, socialism 
and utilitarianism. In particular, Nozick is focused on the conception of justice and the 
role of redistribution in John Rawls seminal work, A Theory o f Justice.6 He accomplishes 
this by asserting that rights are of primary importance and form important constraints on 
the state. These constraints limit the scope of state action but do not prohibit the state 
from being a just institution in all conceivable circumstances as anarchical theory claims. 
This fundamental commitment to rights is clear in the opening of the Preface, 
“Individuals have rights and there are things no person or group may do to them (without 
violating their rights).”7
It is Nozick’s distinct account of natural rights that leads him to interpret the role 
of the state as merely a “night watchman”8. For Nozick, these rights are naturally present 
in all individuals no matter their physical disposition. The state can coercively prevent 
actions that violate these rights by actors against each other. The rights to life, health, 
liberty and possessions9 do not imply a positive obligation on the part of individual actors 
aside from the minimal security apparatus of the state. As such, the obligations 
individuals hold in providing justice are negative in nature.
A negative obligation to the security of life seems intuitively straightforward. 
Individuals can be restrained from killing each other. As Nozick puts it, “my property 
rights in my knife allow me to leave it where I will, but not in your chest.”10 The liberty 
to act in any way is natural but the license to act in certain ways is not. This highlights
6 Rawls, John: A Theory o f Justice, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971) p. 17
7 Nozick, Robert: Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. IX
* IBID, p. 25
9 IBID, p. 10
10 IBID, p. 171
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Nozick’s ongoing relationship to Locke, as it is a similar line of reasoning to what Locke 
provides in his Two Treatises o f Government.11 Though Nozick is not saying we are 
obligated by natural law, rather some other somewhat vague conception of obligation to 
autonomous rights. As unarticulated as this commitment is, the idea appears to work well 
in Locke’s general context. The latter obligations of health, liberty and possessions 
eventually make the unique topography of Nozick’s theory. A negative obligation to a 
right to health implies that individuals cannot harm each other’s health and can be 
refrained from doing so by the state, but there is no legitimate obligation to ensure the 
health of others beyond this. This is an idea we will return to in discussing property 
rights later in this chapter, but it is important here to understand the negative obligation at 
work. Understood in this context, individuals are permitted to do whatever does not 
violate the rights of other formally equal individuals. The actions of the state can only be 
to prevent or correct injustices caused by violations of these formal rights and nothing 
more.
Nozick offers us a critique of why a Rawlsian position violates these individual 
rights. In Rawls’ particular case, Nozick takes issue with the reasoning behind the 
“original position” argument. Rawls uses the “original position” as a hypothetical equal 
bargaining point that compels actors to make decisions about principles of justice under a 
“veil of ignorance”.12 Rawls argues that in such a position actors would agree to ensure 
egalitarian distributions and policies of subsequent redistribution in creating social 
institutions given their inability to ascertain where in the social order they would fall.
Nozick argues that Rawls theory violates the legitimate exercise of individual 
liberty granted by natural rights. This is because Rawls redistributes from the outcomes 
that result from the legitimate exercise of individual liberty. Nozick argues the actions 
taken by the Rawlsian State are motivated by end principles. These end principles in turn 
are used to undermine procedure. In doing so, the rights of individuals, particularly to 
property, are not protected appropriately. The result is Rawls is enforcing a pattern of
11 See - Locke, John; Two Treatises o f  Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, Second Treatise, 
Chapters 2 & 3, Sections 4-20. Nozick borrows many conceptions from Locke and this is one of them.
12 IBID, p. 19
Balancing Choice and Circumstance -  Fair Shares and Just Access in Liberal Justice 15
distribution rather than allowing just procedures to result in just outcomes. The patterned 
principles Nozick argues Rawls invokes do not allow individuals to do what they ought to 
be able to do freely through the exercise of their rights. This is because the patterned 
principles dictate a pattern of distribution that the liberty of individuals would inevitably 
disturb. As a result, the state must work to preserve the pattern, rather than secure natural 
individual rights and liberties.
To illustrate how the exercise of liberty disrupts patterns, Nozick offers the 
example of Wilt Chamberlain being given a quarter from every ticket sold at home games 
to watch him play basketball.13 Because the individuals purchasing the tickets consented 
to giving a quarter to Wilt to watch him play, the fact that he ends up with a 
disproportionate amount of money does not mean his comparative wealth is illegitimate. 
The procedure that yielded the material inequality was just as it was the result of 
individual choices. Attempts to redistribute Wilt’s quarters would violate the legitimate 
claim he has to this income. Such an arrangement would violate Wilt’s legitimate 
property rights. Nozick believes that patterned states (states that redistribute resources 
between individuals) cannot avoid violating the legitimate operation of individual liberty. 
Patterned states cannot provide justice respective of individual rights because they do not 
uphold the natural right to property these individuals hold.
Nozick argues that for property rights to be upheld we need a conception of 
justice that is historical and unpattemed.14 Our concern becomes creating just procedures 
that honor the legitimate distributions that result from the exercise of people’s rights. If 
occurring through just procedures, the resulting distributions of wealth will be just no 
matter how lop-sided. Nozick argues that the objects in the world today arrived through 
individual labor. Entitlement to these objects transferred, in ideal terms, justly through 
procedure over time.
13 IBID, pp. 160-164
14 Nozick, Robert: Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 157
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In order to secure individuals rights, Nozick emphasizes the need for an 
entitlement theory. Nozick argues an entitlement theory works in the historical and 
unpattemed way necessary to secure individual rights. The exercise of these rights 
creates the material inequalities of the world. This part of Nozick’s argument becomes 
particularly important in assessing liberal arguments, which will allow material 
distributions to be determined by a market device. Given Van Parijs’ freedom-based 
approach, it is important to engage with what aspects of our choices are secured through 
market transactions and how these claims are routed to the idea of individual autonomy. 
Inequalities will occur in market practices, so it is important to understand why these 
inequalities can be legitimate.
In order to defend extensive property rights and unequal material distributions, 
Nozick has to define the parameters of what constitutes property, a just entitlement, and 
why individuals are at liberty to act as they wish with them. Nozick states the operation 
of an entitlement theory in three parts,15
4 1. How things not previously possessed by anyone may be acquired;
2. How possession may be transferred from one person to another;
and
3. What must be done to rectify injustices arising from violations of (1) and (2)’16
Nozick argues that objects that are unowned can be legitimately acquired 
privately. Upon their just acquisition, they become property when an individual uses 
their labor to improve, sustain or utilize the resource. As individuals own their labor, 
their use of this labor with the resource creates a legitimate property right. This is a 
position that mirrors that of Locke and creates a way in which acquisition can be 
legitimized and yield naturally derived property rights.
l5Nozick, Robert: Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp. 174-183. Please refer to footnote 4 for more information.
16 IBID, p. 151
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Locke and Nozick are careful not to allow the idea of acquisition to stretch too 
far. To illustrate how thorny the issues of acquisition are when examined, Nozick 
explores the actions required to claim an entitlement. Nozick works through the 
acquisition of Mars, actions of fence making and aerial reconnaissance as examples of 
actions that cause us to question what kinds of labor count and what sorts of entitlements 
follow from this labor.17 Nozick explains how Locke uses the Lockean Proviso to avoid 
such problems by prefacing and limiting acquisitions. Locke states the proviso ensures 
third parties are not left worse off from an acquisition. They must be left with as much or 
as good of common resources.
Locke’s proviso is categorized by Nozick as strict, in that it works to ensure 
individuals are not made fundamentally worse off from an acquisition, “.. .first, by losing 
the opportunity to improve his situation by a particular appropriation or any one; and 
second, by no longer being able to use freely (without appropriation) what he previously
I ftcould.” Nozick argues that this kind of proviso is in fact too strict if interpreted as 
follows,
‘Consider the first person Z for whom there is not enough and as good left to 
appropriate. The last person Y to appropriate left Z without his previous liberty to act on 
an object, and so worsened Z's situation. So Y's appropriation is not allowed under 
Locke's proviso. Therefore the next to last person X to appropriate left Y in a worse 
position, for X's act ended permissible appropriation. Therefore X's appropriation wasn't 
permissible. But then the appropriator two from last, W, ended permissible appropriation 
and so, since it worsened X's position, W’s appropriation wasn't permissible. And so on 
back to the first person A to appropriate a permanent property right.’19
Nozick argues the potentially strict interpretation of the Lockean proviso is 
problematic as it could completely negate private acquisition. Individuals could continue 
to demand compensation for their diminished opportunity sets. Nozick argues instead for
17 IBID, p. 174
'•IBID, p. 176
19 IBID, p. 176
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a different and weaker proviso henceforth referred to as the Nozickean Proviso. The 
Nozickean Proviso is stated as “enough and as good.”20 Nozick argues this interpretation 
is necessary in order to avoid the paradox created by a strict interpretation of the Lockean 
Proviso. Nozick argues his weaker proviso in examining the previous example would,
‘.. .exclude the second way, though not the first. With the weaker requirement, 
we cannot zip back so quickly from Z to A, as in the above argument; for though person 
Z can no longer appropriate, there may remain some for him to use as before. In this case 
Y's appropriation would not violate the weaker Lockean condition. (With less remaining 
that people are at liberty to use, users might face more inconvenience, crowding, and so 
on; in that way the situation of others might be worsened, unless appropriation stopped 
far short of such a point.) It is arguable that no one legitimately can complain if the 
weaker provision is satisfied.1 21
The respective provisos are doing a great deal of work in legitimizing the theories 
of Locke and Nozick. This is because the role these provisos play in legitimizing the 
market is immense. The provisos determine what can be appropriated, transferred and 
what requires compensatory action. For Nozick, the Nozickean Proviso is not a 
comprehensive attempt to fix Locke’s theory of acquisition as much as it is a vehicle to 
show how a theory of transfer can be constructed and grounded. Nozick’s proviso is 
intended to show that a “ ... process normally giving rise to a permanent bequeathable 
property right in a previously unowned thing will not do so if the position of others no 
longer at liberty to use the thing is thereby worsened.” The Nozickean proviso ensures 
that individuals have access to “enough or as good” of the original resources. This in 
turn legitimizes the property rights that follow and removes the problem he sees Locke’s 
strict proviso. Nozick wants to allow complete resource acquisitions that he feels Locke 
will not allow.
20 IBID, p. 176
21 IBID, p. 176
22 IBID, p. 178
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This is where Nozick begins to go awry. Locke’s proviso and theory of 
acquisition more broadly may have problems because Locke’s proviso is coupled 
theological/natural law obligations.23 These discuss individual’s obligations to each other 
outside of the State structure and explain why certain actions of charity will happen 
within this context. These acts of charity work to ensure compensation to those with 
discrepancies in natural endowment (amongst other things) and work to affirm their 
diminished but important moral agency. Locke’s use of these obligations underlines the 
need for compensation for natural inequalities if moral agency is going to be equally 
valued. Libertarianism needs it to be equally valued because if choices are not 
philosophically equal, the market will not yield just outcomes given the rights projected 
on individuals. The liberal theorists who follow will work to formalize this commitment 
through the state. Locke and Nozick deal with the issue of natural endowments outside 
of the State realm. However, this does not mean they intend to ignore them or that they 
do not realize the role these unchosen circumstances have in conditional outcomes. They 
simply treat them as happening in an arbitrary way, which is unfortunate, but something 
we should not be systematically concerned with when considering the State and justice. 
Rights are projected onto individuals regardless of their physical constituency. This is 
the State’s duty and any others must be realized by individuals. The assumption is that 
these obligations are to be met. However, because this requires some robust account of 
individual obligation, Nozick needs to assert it and does not. As a result, it appears to be 
a state matter in considering individual equality and the value of their moral agency, 
which opens the door nicely for a liberal account of justice.
This use of a strict account of formal rights has a clear effect, particularly in terms 
of property, on the conception of the state that Nozick has. As we move through the text,
I will show that natural endowments are a factor that a conception of distributive justice 
will need to address if we are to balance the claims of choice and circumstance 
appropriately. For now, it is important simply to look at the external/natural resource 
aspects of the provisos and leave this large potential issue to the side. It is important
23 Locke, John; Two Treatises o f  Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, Second Treatise, 
Chapters 2 & 3, Sections 4-20
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instead embrace this argument as simply speaking to resource distribution and the 
operation of the market after our concerns about justice and circumstance are met. The 
market is how we act out choices. If individual moral agency can be equally valued 
(which I will show it can through a properly developed account) private property and a 
market device follow from such a claim. This is because individuals have a relationship 
with the tactile world that is inescapable and grants them these claims and the ability to 
make choices in an account of justice. Conceptions of the market therefore must be 
mindful of this relationship and honor these choices appropriately. There is clearly work 
that needs to be done to legitimize the market going forward but I will show this can be 
done. How the market works to make our choices realized and count (for better or 
worse) is important to retain if we are to have our choices matter in a fair way. On this 
view, we can talk about the proviso within this specific frame of reference, what makes a 
market just and how this leads to outcomes that are disproportionate but legitimate. This 
is because we 1. assert the areas that are of concern in such an account and 2. work to 
address them through a liberal account of justice in subsequent chapters. What we are 
left with is the remaining market, constrained but still doing work for our conception of 
individual agency due to the importance of being able to make choices fairly.
On these terms alone, Nozick makes a jump that is a bridge too far in stating the 
problems with Locke’s proviso. It is true that “as much or as good as” does cause vast 
re-visitations of acquisitions over time. Party after party revisits the conditions previous 
acquisitions left them in and in turn demands compensation and rectification of injustices 
in acquisition. However, the prospect of this aspect of Locke’s proviso does not negate 
potentially legitimate ownership, as acquisition is still possible. It rather says something 
about the extent of resource acquisition.
Nozick argues that Locke’s proviso negates the project of property rights. This is 
not true. It does negate the possibility of a complete property right in all of a given 
resource. Nevertheless, this is far from every conceivable property right. What Locke’s 
proviso does do is limit the amount of a resource that can be legitimately held from an 
initially unowned resource. The implication here is very different. It opens up the door
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for compensation and re-visitation of acquisition as Nozick fears it will. As we will see, 
Nozick backs into this position as well. However, it does not place every acquisition 
under scrutiny or subject to a compensatory claim. It only applies to those acquisitions 
that were disproportionate given every individual has an equal claim to their share of the 
resources given to man, by nature or god, in common. Nozick writes,
“It is important to specify this particular mode of worsening the situation of 
others, for the proviso does not encompass other modes. It does not include the 
worsening due to more limited opportunities to appropriate (the first way above, 
corresponding to the more stringent condition), and it does not include how I "worsen a 
seller's position if I appropriate materials to make some of what he is selling, and then 
enter into competition with him. Someone whose appropriation otherwise would violate 
the proviso still may appropriate provided he compensates the others so that their 
situation is not thereby worsened; unless he does compensate the others, his appropriation 
will violate the proviso of the principle justice in acquisition and will be an illegitimate
»»24one.
Nozick’s amendment of the Lockean proviso into the Nozickean proviso allows a 
total property right to all of an originally unowned resource. However, Nozick uses the 
amendment to accomplish something he argues is vital in considering justice in transfer, 
which is removing potentially endless objections and claims for compensation in initial 
acquisition. Nozick argues that the weaker nature of his proviso specifies more correctly 
and precisely the kinds of worsening that should count in our accounts of acquisition and 
restitution.
Nozick provides a tangible example of how a proviso like the Nozickean Proviso 
ought to constrain acquisition through labor. Nozick uses the idea of dumping a can of 
tomato juice into the sea to illustrate how this action does not constitute the ownership of 
the entire sea.2S Nozick does this by arguing that the action of acquisition cannot harm
24 Nozick, Robert: Anarchy, State and Utopia„ p. 178
25 IBID, p. 175
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the ability of others to have enough or as good of that same resource. The complete 
ownership of the sea that dumping the juice into it could allow would worsen the 
condition of all other individuals as they would be unable to utilize “enough or as good” 
of this resource. Still, Nozick argues that if the rights of others are not harmed or their 
share of enough or as good made worse by an acquisition, the acquisition of the unowned 
object is legitimate.
The result for Nozick is there are property rights that are legitimate and must be 
protected by the state and that these are more expansive than Locke allows. Therefore, 
we need to take Nozick’s example to the next level of abstraction. Imagine an individual 
added a can of tomato juice to a bucket of seawater to create some kind of tomato brine 
or “delicacy”. This acquisition would be legitimate as the share of the resource used, the 
seawater, would not harm anyone else’s rights to enough or as good of the common 
resource. Others would be able to acquire a bucket of seawater after the acquisition in 
question, thus the acquisition left “enough or as good” for others. This legitimate 
acquisition gives a property right to the individual who made the tomato brine and thus 
we need an entitlement theory to ensure this right is secured. As a result, the goods or 
services bartered from exchange of the tomato brine to the fool or connoisseur willing to 
exchange for it, would also be legitimate entitlements of the seller and so on.
Nozick is concerned that any mode of worsening is subject to the actions of the 
Lockean proviso but this again is not what a proviso (as a thought idea) has to do. A 
proviso like Locke's, that enforces a baseline standard of as much or as good, has only to 
compensate those who have their appropriation condition worsened from an initial non­
appropriation standpoint. To place this idea into our bucket example, the Lockean 
proviso equally adjudicates the just acquisition of the seawater based upon the ability of 
everyone else to do the same. It is only if this level of reciprocal acquisition is violated 
that a condition of worsening is entered. Locke’s proviso does not prevent this kind of 
proportionate acquisition. Instead, it constrains it based upon reciprocal proportionality.
It uses a different measure of legitimization than Nozick.
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To put it bluntly, Locke and Nozick differ as to at what point the size of your 
bucket matters. Nozick’s proviso is permissive of a far larger bucket. Nozick’s proviso 
also proportionally constrains acquisition but only if there is not “enough” or “as good” 
left. Thus, his proviso is considerably more permissive because the threshold of 
worsening is harder to reach. On the other hand, Locke’s proviso wants your bucket of 
seawater to be an equal size to everyone else’s. The taking of a bucket of seawater is 
only a concern for the Nozickean proviso if it prevents everyone else who wants to from 
doing the same rather than projecting onto them a share regardless of whether they chose 
to acquire it like Locke does. Therefore, the worsening caused by acquisition is not as 
comprehensive as Nozick or later Cohen will argue. The conditions of worsening that 
count are constrained to these circumstances and against the benchmark of the resources 
available prior to acquisitions having taken place.
This requires using Locke’s language for the proviso while removing much of the 
context in which Locke proposed it, as Locke would place other clauses upon acquisition 
and the obligations of individuals to each other. However, given Nozick’s project of 
exploring the plausibility of something Locke-like, I argue we can take this liberty in 
considering a proviso. 1 will henceforth call this a Fair Shares Proviso as I will ask you 
to consider just the resource distribution principle posed by Locke, as much or as good, 
without the clauses Locke would place on individuals even prior to such a proviso. We 
will effectively place these clauses on our consideration of justice, but it will be my 
argument that liberal justice does a far better job of doing this, properly developed, than 
Locke’s natural law account. This means the Fair Shares Proviso stands alone, as what is 
required to make a market, however developed or constrained, work justly over time.
To put this into Nozick’s Z and Y example, we come to a different conclusion. Z 
and Y divide the land under the constraint of a Fair Shares Proviso, as we have just 
described it. X shows up and claims that his condition is worsened by the appropriation 
of the land and demands compensation. What a Fair Shares Proviso does here is give X a 
claim that Nozick does not want X to have (with the exception of some specific 
circumstances discussed later in this chapter). The scale of this issue is not nearly as big
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as Nozick argues it might be if strictly interpreted. All a Fair Shares Proviso asks us to 
do is compensate X with a share of the resource or in lieu of that being possible, 
compensate him/her proportionately for its unavailability should a share be 
unrecoverable. Z and Y still have a property right, just one that is conditional and 
proportional to the equal acquisition rights of others. Z and Y are entitled to their share, 
however large or small, and what results from this share. The other forms of worsening 
that Nozick fears, simply do not count given the Fair Shares Proviso parameters we have 
stated. The claim of a Fair Shares Proviso does not dictate that property rights are 
undermined by a conditional standard of worsening.
A proviso, as an idea, is essentially a trump that operates before the actions of the 
market can be legitimized. It works in tandem with our concerns and provisions for 
moral agency in ensuring the actions of the market are legitimate. It subordinates the 
market and each of the following theorists, including Van Parijs will do much the same 
only in ways that are more robust. Nevertheless, it will be vital in assessing whether 
these accounts act properly given what this chapter will assert is needed prior to the just 
operation of a market. This consideration is not intended to ensure individuals are not 
materially worse off for an acquisition, in fact, they can be. Z or Y might do quite well 
with even their adjusted share given the presence of X and eventually W which may 
mean they are more materially affluent. A proviso is intended instead to protect the 
ability of others, with equally projected rights and agency, to acquire or use their fair 
share of resources. This requires that some acquisitions are off the table due to the claims 
we will make about justice in the coming chapters and that all others are constrained by 
proportional share. It is important to note here that I will eventually include in this 
account resources that are not naturally occurring but rather provided through social 
cooperation but we do not need to have this argument here. All that is important here is 
why the language of our Fair Shares Proviso is superior to that of Nozick regardless of 
what we will eventually place in its privy upon reconstituting it. It is intended to prevent 
or, in lieu of that being possible, compensate individuals with equally valued rights and 
agency for being disadvantaged initially in what they can acquire.
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We move more naturally than Nozick admits to a liberal position even if the 
claims of a just market remain important. This is best seen by continuing to work 
through Nozick’s position and will bolster Van Parijs’ claim that a coherent libertarian 
ought to be a supporter of his left-libertarian approach. Nozick notes it is important to 
forbid the total acquisition by some of resources fundamentally needed for the basic 
natural rights of others even in cases where these resources were initially acquired justly. 
Nozick states,
‘ A theory of appropriation incorporating this Lockean proviso will handle 
correctly the cases (objections to the theory lacking the proviso) where someone 
appropriates the total supply of something necessary for life.... A theory which includes 
this proviso in its principle of justice in acquisition must also contain a more complex 
principle of justice in transfer. Some reflection of the proviso about appropriation 
constrains later actions. If my appropriating all of a certain substance violates the 
Lockean proviso, then so does my appropriating some and purchasing all the rest from 
others who obtained it without otherwise violating the Lockean proviso. If the proviso 
excludes someone's appropriating all the drinkable water in the world, it also excludes his 
purchasing it all. (More weakly, and messily, it may exclude his charging certain prices 
for some of his supply.)’26
This is a potentially massive caveat beyond the constraints of the Nozickean 
proviso. Nozick argues that this sort of caveat to his proviso is required by our 
consideration of justice. Although Nozick does not express it as such, it is an admission 
that resources are needed to ensure the moral agency of individuals so that their rights, on 
some basic level are equally valued. Nozick needs this caveat because his changing of 
the proviso has opened the door to total resource ownership. He runs the risk of 
individuals acquiring some of the initial resources that are necessary to ensure the kind of 
moral agency he projects on individuals. Nozick now needs to take some items off the 
table in terms of acquisition. However, Nozick is quick to assert this caveat, “(almost) 
never will come into effect; the more someone acquires of a scarce substance which
26 Nozick, Robert: Anarchy, State and Utopia, pp. 178-179
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others want, the higher the price of the rest will go, and the more difficult it will become 
for him to acquire it all.”27 Nozick argues that the very small amount of resources that 
might fall under such a caveat will be the extreme exception. Even in the case of their 
existence, very rarely will a situation arise in which state action is needed to enact the 
caveat, as the market is likely to prevent a singular monopoly on such a resource. This is 
essentially the role of “enough” in Nozick’s proviso. “Enough or as good” only requires 
that the state ensure access to an acquirable amount of the resource needed to ensure the 
formal rights of others are not harmed.
Necessity for particular resources may change in certain circumstances; hence, 
these kinds of entitlements can warrant state intervention but this does not follow from 
the Nozickean Proviso itself. The proviso does not derive from the right to life even 
though it appears to be part of formalizing individual moral agency. As Nozick states,
“ ... a right to life is not a right to whatever one needs to live; other people may have 
rights over these other things. ... At most, a right to life would be a right to have or 
strive for whatever one needs to live, provided that having it does not violate anyone 
else's rights.”28 Nozick is simply using the proviso as a way to ensure access to resources 
that occur naturally and exist without labor rather than those that come forth from labor. 
The latter are not the resources that Nozick wishes to give people access to but the former 
are.
As an example of how Nozick conceives his scheme of acquisition and property
90rights to work, he uses the acquisition of a state’s only water source as an example. He 
argues that such acquisition is a violation of the entitlement theory. Items whose 
possession would fundamentally violate the rights and moral agency of others are not 
legitimate forms of property. However, this example is quite limited because it is 
contingent upon the resources available initially and not the eventual lack of such 
resources. By Nozick’s account, although state action may be warranted in the case of 
the only initial water source, it is not the same if it became the only water source later on.
27 IBID, p. 179
28 IBID, p. 179 (See asterisk footnote)
29 IBID, p. 179
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If the water source was initially abundant, for instance, everyone could acquire one, the 
water sources could come to be legitimately owned. If over time, one water source of 
these became the only water source, Nozick argues the stewardship of this resource gives 
the owner a legitimate title claim over the water source. This is because the owner 
ensured the longevity of the water source. The needs of others who squandered their 
water sources are not a relevant consideration in redistributing the water source and 
relinquishing the owner's title. Given these explicit conditions, if the water source is to 
be used the owner has to be compensated or otherwise consent, even though Nozick is 
willing to concede there is likely to be an individual moral duty that the owner ought to 
adhere to without state intervention.
This distinction is made even clearer when we inspect Nozick’s argument about 
obligation in relation to labored goods, which result from acquired resources. Nozick 
believes that legitimate acquisition and labor give individuals title over the produced 
product. Nozick articulates the importance individual labor plays in defining an 
entitlement in spite of its potential social or individual utility. As Nozick writes, “[t]he 
fact that someone owns the total supply of something necessary for others to stay alive 
does not entail that his (or anyone's) appropriation of anything left some people 
(immediately or later) in a situation worse than the baseline one.”30 To articulate this 
further Nozick continues, “[a] medical researcher who synthesizes a new substance that 
effectively treats a certain disease and who refuses to sell except on his terms does not 
worsen the situation of others by depriving them of whatever he has appropriated.”31 It is 
Nozick’s point that the researcher and the diseased had the same opportunity to acquire 
the resources for the creation of the substance. The researcher’s labor has made the 
substance. Although the substance could save the diseased person’s life, the diseased 
person could have (given the proper talent and labor) made the substance themselves 
given they had equal access to the initial resources needed to create the substance. If the 
researcher did not make such a substance through his/her self-owned labor, the diseased
30 Nozick, Robert: Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 181
31 IBID, p. 181
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would still not have the medicine to use. As a result, the diseased was not made worse 
off by the acquisition compared to the baseline/pre-acquisition condition.
There is no consideration of discrepancies in the natural attributes possessed by 
supposedly equal moral agents in a society by the state. There is also no concern that 
individuals may need things, originally acquired by others, in order to ensure their moral 
agency and that this cannot be a concern left to individual charity. As Hillel Steiner 
notes, not all individuals have the same ability to acquire resources, as time progresses, 
yet these individuals are still required to abide by the property rights granted to the 
preceding individuals. These critiques show there are developments in conceiving 
justice that have to take place before we can legitimize the market at all. It is the needs of 
individual moral agency, which will drive the deeper and more expansive commitments 
to justice and resource distribution seen in the liberal authors to follow. This is because 
liberalism takes seriously the claim that individuals need to have the resources required to 
maintain their moral agency and the choices they make through it equally and fairly. We 
then move naturally from libertarianism to liberalism because libertarian justice requires 
moral agency. Market equality may be the access to resources available but there is more 
to the story. The requirements of moral agency that are needed to say these individuals 
can participate in the market equally are far more robust. The inequalities of the 
distributions that follow from a libertarian account of distributive justice require that the 
individuals in question be placed in the same initial conditions. Natural internal 
distributions, circumstances, and the resources required by everyone to sustain 
themselves given their right to a fair share are plainly relevant to legitimizing a market 
and property rights. These must be addressed for an account of justice to be coherent.
Unbundling the proviso reveals a far more complicated set of commitments than 
Nozick’s theory appears to have. This, however, does not remove the value of inspecting 
Nozick’s thought and what he has to say about market claims in respect to how liberal 
justice treats them. Nozick places this market argument against Rawlsian liberalism, 
which is why it is so important. Our changes and considerations of Nozick cause us to
32 Sec - Steiner, Hillel: ‘A Libertarian Quandary’ in Ethics, (Vol. 90, No. 2; January 1980), p. 257
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move naturally toward a liberal account of justice. Nozick shows us how autonomy and 
choices cause us to question the paternal market practices advocated by Rawls and the 
developments made from this position by Dworkin and Van Parijs.
The Wilt Chamberlain example brings up a key aspect of how individuals earn 
entitlements through their labor and talents. We are not all clones of Wilt Chamberlain, 
so we must consider if his talents are a legitimate factor in gaining entitlements. This 
issue will be explored in more detail later in this text as it will become central in the 
development I ask us to make in the liberal argument. However, the overarching point is 
important in assessing Nozick’s argument against Rawls. Nozick argues that talents are 
arbitrarily endowed to human beings and incontrovertibly self-possessed by these human 
beings. As a result, their exercise is wholly a matter of consensual individual choice 
because they are controlled completely by individuals. The possession of a talent may be 
arbitrary and uneven but the choice to use what you have been endowed with is the same 
for everyone.
As a result, Nozick argues this aspect of human agency can yield legitimate 
inequalities. The exercise of talents is a matter of individual liberty. Taking individual 
autonomy and the choices we make as individuals seriously requires that these factors, 
which are or could be present in everyone, are allowed to determine discrepancies in 
material outcome. If redistribution were to dictate the reward for labor, the state would 
be “enslaving the talented”33 to provide for other equal individuals in society. For 
Nozick, taxation of this type is unjust because the state is asserting ownership over the 
labor used to produce what is taxed. These things would not exist without the use of 
labor and as such, the taxation of them places an obligation on the producer that is 
paternal and unjust. If individuals own themselves and own their labor then, Nozick 
argues, they surely own the product that comes from these attributes. As we have 
discussed, redistribution through taxation is going to be necessary if we are to fulfill our 
pre-conditions to a market device. Nevertheless, Nozick does allude to a position about
33 Nozick, Robert: Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 152
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our labor and how it is realized that it will be important to reference as we continue 
through our development of liberalism and how we conceive our systems of taxation.
Nozick is opposed to the kind of paternalism he perceives in redistributive states. 
Nozick believes these states deny individuals the freedom to make choices and undertake 
actions that their natural rights afford them. Nozick argues that it is not that individuals 
cannot enter into all sorts of voluntary constraints and behaviors. In fact, Nozick argues 
this is not only plausible but also likely. However, he urges it cannot be the role of the 
state to ascribe what these voluntary actions and associations are. Nozick argues that 
“using or threatening force for the benefit of the person against whom it is wielded’ ,M is a 
clear violation of individual rights. Such a system ascribes or coerces the choices of 
individuals that they should be free to make as individual moral agents.
Nozick argues that a full libertarian constraint “will prohibit sacrificing one 
person to benefit another.”35 Nozick argues that paternalistic structures may appeal on 
some intuitive levels but that these structures ultimately violate the separate and 
inviolable rights of individuals. Nozick argues, “one must focus upon the fact that there 
are distinct individuals, each with his own life to lead ”36 Nozick’s objection to 
paternalism runs throughout his critique of Rawls. Nozick’s argument boils down to the 
point that people ought to be free to make their own choices about their lives in keeping 
with their natural individual rights.
In Rawls’ later writing, he clarifies the original position to the point it is perhaps 
better thought of as an abstract point from which to discern principles of justice.37 This 
conception eventually concedes a role for the market but no a priori claims to it (see 
Chapter 2). The removal of the specifications placed upon original position device and/or 
the veil of ignorance for a different construction of impartiality can still yield Nozick’s
34 IBID, p. 34
35 IBID, p. 34
36 IBID, p. 34
37 Sec - Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 28 and 
Rawls, John: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2001), Part 1, Section 10, 
pp. 29-31
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general rights primacy objection. Nozick perceives this important objection to his 
argument for an entitlement theory. He writes,
‘It might be objected to our argument that Rawls' procedure is designed to 
establish all facts about justice; there is no independent notion of entitlement, not 
provided by his theory, to stand on in criticizing his theory. But we do not need any 
particular developed historical-entitlement theory as a basis from which to criticize 
Rawls' construction. If any such fundamental historical-entitlement view is correct, then 
Rawls' theory is n o t’38
Nozick argues here that an entitlement theory precludes a system of justice as 
Rawls posits it. Our discussion of the proviso and lingering consideration of natural 
endowments calls this conclusion into question. However, Nozick’s criticisms, properly 
qualified and reconstituted, raise a potential area of concern Rawlsian conceptions of 
justice. The paternalism that we have said Nozick must let into a theory of distributive 
justice is still limited and comes prior to market claims. Once the groundwork is laid for 
the market, Nozick’s points about liberty and distribution still hold power. Nozick does 
not take into account properly what is required to get people to this baseline condition, 
the starting line if you will, but if we can do this, Nozick is telling us something about the 
market. This is because our considerations of justice prior to the market ought not to 
subvert the claims we can make upon reaching the market stage if we take the role of the 
market in formalizing our choices seriously. Our market account needs the Fair Shares 
Proviso to work but with this needed development, we must consider how we describe 
and operate the market very carefully going forward. All of our liberal authors will claim 
to do just this, but it will be my contention that Rawls, Van Parijs and to a degree even 
Dworkin do not take the validity of parts of this procedural/market argument and the 
choice sensitivity it represents seriously enough.
38 Nozick, Robert: Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 202
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Nozick’s objection to patterning raises interesting considerations in addressing 
Rawls’ theory of justice. Nozick is arguing that this form of paternalism is incongruent 
to protecting individual rights and freedom. To understand the importance of our Fair 
Shares Proviso, the role it has to play in our market, and the implications of this upon the 
liberal conceptions to follow, we must explore critiques of Nozick. Nozick uses 
procedure to show that disproportionate outcomes are legitimate. We need to take our 
Fair Shares Proviso and see if it can stand up to criticism of the market and private 
property. This criticism will come from G.A. Cohen in the next section and his strong 
argument that patterns uphold, rather than subvert, individual liberty. If our developed 
and qualified libertarian claims can stand this scrutiny, they will place constraints on the 
development of the liberal argument even if we have established the legitimacy of 
qualifying the market as liberalism does.
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1.2 Critiques of an Entitlement Theory
In the several decades since Nozick first published his libertarian objection to the 
redistributive liberalism of Rawls, it has sparked many insightful critiques. We have so 
far embraced Nozick on his own terms and highlighted some of the issues his perspective 
raises and some necessary amendments it clearly requires. Though Nozick has many 
conceptual issues, his insights about the just operation of a market device retain power 
against certain kinds of redistribution. These claims are subordinate but important in 
asserting the power choices ought to have in a fair society. G.A. Cohen realizes the 
power of Nozick’s argument and attempts to counteract it systematically. Van Parijs will 
ultimately be sympathetic to some of Cohen’s arguments about resource justice and will 
argue that his model is one that should be attractive to liberal socialists such as Cohen. 
Van Parijs’ argues we should follow a liberal path located between the positions of 
classical libertarians like Nozick and liberal socialists like Cohen. However, Cohen’s 
argument has some conceptual problems, which come to light when we frame it against 
our Fair Shares Proviso. It will be through our qualified market and Fair Shares Proviso 
that we will see the importance of private ownership and a market in affirming moral 
agency and the choices that come with it.
G. A. Cohen attempts to lodge a comprehensive argument against Nozick. This 
critique, which spans several different articles and books,39 is motivated by a profound 
concern over the power of Nozick’s argument. Cohen argues, contrary to the position of 
Nozick, that patterned theories preserve individual liberty rather than violate it.40 
Nozick’s account of justice argues for an entitlement theory in order to protect individual 
rights. The outcome of the resulting distribution is dictated by procedure and frequently 
lop-sided. The talented, having a natural advantage in the application of labor, can and 
frequently do become more affluent than other individuals even under our stricter Fair
39 Sec Footnote 40
40 Cohen, G.A; ‘Robert Nozick and Wilt Chamberlain: How Patterns Preserve Liberty’ in Erkenntnis 
(Volume 11, Number 1,January 1977), pp. 5 -  23. See also Cohen, G.A.; Self-Ownership, Freedom and 
Equality, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 29-37
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Shares Proviso. Nozick illustrates through the Wilt Chamberlain example how this is 
acceptable and justified. Cohen asks us to examine Wilt’s wealth not wholly as the result 
of procedure but for the power his disproportionate wealth affords him over other equal 
individuals in society.
Wilt has earned money for his skills as a basketball player but this money affords 
him liberties other individuals do not have. Cohen urges that if individuals are subject to 
the power this money affords Wilt over them, they are unequal to him in society in a 
troubling way. This inequality is beyond material as it implies a political and social 
power that threatens the equality between political equals. The disproportionate 
distribution of wealth accrued by a minority in society, such as Wilt, has direct effect on 
the conditional equality of everyone else. Cohen’s concern grows deeper when we 
inspect the results of the transactions that created Wilt’s wealth. These arrangements of 
economic liberties that benefit Wilt are visited upon individuals who did not enter into 
the transactions directly. Cohen argues that individuals who did not pay to see Wilt are 
directly affected by his accrued wealth. They did not consent to his proportional gains 
and hence they could not consent to the added power this wealth affords him in the 
society.
Cohen argues that the patterning of outcomes that egalitarian forms of state create 
act to ensure that individuals have proportional liberty and equality in society. These 
redistributed resources provide freedom and preserve liberty by ensuring that individuals 
who did not participate in transactions are not made worse off for them having taken 
place. The consideration of disproportionate power in society legitimizes these actions 
due to the need for individuals to be equal and avoid exploitative practices within the 
market structure. The protection of rights is important but the liberty to act in an 
uncoerced manner requires the state to scrutinize the conditions market practices leave 
certain individuals in.
Cohen argues that “to have money is (pro tanta) to have liberty. The richer you 
are, the more courses of action that are open to you, which is to say that you are freer
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than you would otherwise be.”41 The citizens that Wilt hypothetically represents are 
disproportionately advantaged socially and politically. If we take equality seriously, 
Cohen urges we must look at the permissions disproportionate wealth allows particular 
people. Cohen is arguing that it is important to consider individual liberty in a way 
Nozick’s rights primacy does not allow. Issues of liberty are related to rights security in 
that having secure rights is a pre-requisite of being able to act freely in society. However, 
the constitution of the rights Nozick projects on individuals and the protection of these 
rights, does not allow the state to act on Cohen’s intuition about freedom. Van Parijs will 
be very sympathetic to this point and uses it to show how the commitment to rights 
security and self-ownership are not nearly as expansive as Nozick claims.
Nozick’s answer to this critique would be that all individuals, including these 
third parties, are capable of undertaking what Wilt has undertaken to gain his wealth. 
They are all equally conceived (philosophically speaking) moral agents. They have 
control over their individual actions through an equal and absolute protection of their 
rights. Ergo, they can all pick up a basketball and become a basketball player should 
their talents allow. These rights comprise the inalienable aspects of human beings. The 
protection of these rights assures that individual actions are undertaken without fear of 
having these rights breached without their consent. With these conditions set, they are 
capable of entering into transactions just as Wilt did. They are capable of utilizing their 
talents in the same way Wilt did. Wilt’s rights dictate he can determine the compensation 
he desires for exercising his talents and labor just like everyone else. The transactions 
that created his wealth were consensual and procedurally justified. Individuals can enter 
all sorts of transactions on their own or in collective associations that can yield them 
greater market share.
As we discussed, the entitlement theory is not quite so straightforward. The 
condition individuals must be in before market transactions can occur justly is paramount 
to the project. This places redistribution to address certain issues and a Fair Shares
41 Cohen, G.A.: 'Back to Socialist Basics' in The New Left Review, (Issue 207, September- 
October 1994), pp. 3 - 16; p. 6
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Proviso into our considerations about justifying the market. Cohen spots this as a weak 
point in Nozick’s theory. If the power relations from end results impugn Nozick’s 
assumption of initial condition, then Nozick’s consideration of self-ownership being 
preserved simply through his set of formal rights and procedures is not enough. Cohen 
argues that Nozick’s consideration of the proviso is not expansive enough. Cohen 
mirrors the strict interpretation critique that Nozick had of Locke, which we discussed in 
the previous section. Cohen argues that if we consider the issue of worsening, a proviso 
will cause us to negate private property rights or at least subordinate them from the 
primacy Nozick gives them.
Cohen argues that individual property rights should not to be considered as vital a 
formal freedom as the rest of the Nozick’s rights. One’s property need not include a 
claim to resources, even labor added resources, with the same indomitable attributes that 
say life and health morally engender. Cohen claims it is this stringent and comprehensive 
understanding of property rights role in self-ownership that lends force to Nozick’s 
argument. The “minimal” state relies on justice in transfer, which assumes that 
individuals’ acquisition of and use of labor with resources, under a proviso, give them 
entitlements over the products. Cohen argues that if we take the idea of worsening 
present in the proviso seriously, it could be argued that private property may not be 
legitimate at all. Some individuals in society are likely to have been made worse off by 
most every acquisition.42 Changing circumstances, the available resources over time and 
the conditional decisions of individuals given their talents would yield plenty of 
legitimate claims which result in the conditions of some becoming worse than the pre­
acquisition baseline condition.
Cohen notes private property claims require a conception of just acquisition. As a 
result, arguments like Nozick’s and Locke’s depend on resources being unowned and 
available for private acquisition as opposed to being collectively owned. Collective 
initial ownership would place different restrictions and considerations on legitimate 
ownership and entitlement. The collective ownership baseline, Cohen argues, provides a
42 Cohen, G.A.: Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, p. 133. See also, chapter 3, pp. 67-91
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better baseline condition than a private acquisition baseline allowed by any proviso. 
Cohen urges that Nozick’s argument for an entitlement theory lacks the consideration of 
the proviso that would uncover this profoundly troubling aspect of the argument.43
Cohen argues that private appropriation worsens the conditions of all because of 
the loss of liberty that a lack of resource control creates. This is a condition of worsening 
that no material distribution can alleviate appropriately. The reference in Locke that 
Nozick uses to describe the validity of private appropriation out of common use is 
commonly referred to as the “Tragedy of the Commons” argument.44 This argument 
discusses how individual appropriation can be justified if the acquisition does not worsen 
or improves the condition of all subject to the acquisition by the private ownership of the 
resource. By allowing private acquisition, the material condition of all is better, or not 
made worse, by not having access to the acquired resource publicly. Individuals in a 
sense have their conditions improved and as such are compensated for allowing the 
disproportionate acquisition as their share is made better or at least no worse than having 
left the resource sitting unused. Cohen argues this improvement in condition is 
superficial. Locke argues that private ownership, construed in this way, assures that 
common resources are used to their maximum potential instead of languishing in 
common use, provided that all privy to the acquisition are left with “as much or as good 
as”45 of the resource in keeping with the Lockean proviso. The baseline condition must 
be determined based upon the conditions individuals would find themselves in had no 
one acquired the resource in question. The relevant point for the baseline is the condition 
that existed before acquisition of any sort versus the condition that exists after private 
ownership and presumably use or trusteeship.
The fear for Locke in allowing public ownership is that the resources will either 
be wasted or at least not maximized. Locke has this concern for private property as well 
and includes waste clauses, including adverse possession, to ensure the ‘proper’ use of
43 IBID, p. 84
44 Locke, John: Two Treatises o f Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, Second Treatise, 
Chapter 5, Sections 28-35
45 See Footnote 21
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resources.46 Locke’s belief is that resources are given to man in common by god but that 
man has a duty to cultivate and utilize the earth. This right, ordained by god, allows the 
unowned resources to pass into private ownership. Though these aspects of Locke’s 
natural law argument have some dubious historical precedents,47 it does place another 
obligation on the idea of acquisition. Acquisition is a matter of rights, but these rights 
have another corollary obligation in how these acquired things are to be used. The 
acquirer has a duty to himself or herself in that god has property in them, but this is 
tempered by the obligations they have to others. This seemingly qualifies further what 
our worsening standard is going to look like and perhaps further drives home our need for 
liberal justice prior to considering the market. It is difficult to say if Nozick’s flirtation 
with Locke runs this deep or how a Kantian argument could arrive at a similar yet secular 
conclusion. However, this is how Locke uses the proviso to legitimize private acquisition 
and shows the nuance lacking in simply addressing the proviso as a singular 
presupposition justifying acquisition and the operation of the market. Nozick does 
clearly share the position that individual rights, be they from god or otherwise justified, 
allow acquisition of resources to occur within the fulfillment of a proviso.
Cohen argues that the private acquisition assumptions of Locke and subsequently 
of Nozick, fail to be compelling if the condition of ownership originally facing
J O
individuals is not one of no ownership, terra nullius , but rather joint collective 
ownership. Individuals are worsened through private acquisition because their joint right 
is violated. If the baseline condition is collective ownership, Cohen believes individual 
conditions will be harmed in a meaningful and incontrovertible way by private 
acquisition. To articulate this point, Cohen shows how Locke and Nozick’s argument for 
just private acquisition is flawed by working through the logic of Lockean acquisition in
46 Locke, John: Two Treatises o f Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, Second Treatise, chapter 
5, Section 36
47 See Pateman, Pateman, Carole and Mills, Charles: Contract and Domination, (New York: Polity Press, 
2007) and Boucher, David: ‘Property and Propriety in International Relations: the Case of John Locke’ in 
Classical Theory in International Relations ed. Beate Jahn, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2006), pp. 156-177
48 Locke, John; Two Treatises o f Government and a Letter Concerning Toleration, Second Treatise, 
Chapter 5
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a two-person world.49 Cohen explores this by framing this A & B world with the 
aggregate conditions of individual vs. individual & individual v. joint (common) 
ownership. In this model, Cohen posits that A & B are the only individuals and both 
need the resource, land, to survive. Cohen contends that individuals may not be made 
worse by private appropriation in comparison to each other but may be worse off in 
comparison to their own pre-appropriation condition if the pre-appropriation condition is 
one of joint ownership.
Cohen suggests we consider the following scenario. Persons A and B both use 
the land harmoniously to produce a product. This aggregation is not a problem and 
appears to work under a proviso in the vein we have discussed. Cohen argues that only 
one scenario that is acceptable under a proviso. Cohen states that the acquisition of all 
the land is also feasible. Cohen argues that if A appropriates all the land and gives B a 
wage that improves B’s condition, B is better off or at least no worse than the baseline 
condition. Cohen urges that this appearance could be deceiving. He asks us to consider 
the possibility that B could have been better off appropriating the land but this outcome is 
not discernible due to the appropriation of the land by A. Cohen states that B might have 
done better than A if B had appropriated the land and thus B’s position is made worse off. 
B is better than the baseline, no ownership, but is in a worse condition than his condition 
would be if the assumption of no-ownership were replaced with joint ownership. Cohen 
argues a proviso allows this because the calculation of what makes someone worse off is 
not comprehensive enough. Cohen states that A & B, realizing these potential issues 
should then agree to joint ownership as a baseline condition. Cohen argues that a joint 
ownership baseline ensures individuals are better off than the baseline conditions allowed 
by a proviso and private appropriation. Cohen argues that Nozick (like Locke) in 
choosing no ownership/terra nullius as the baseline condition fails to account for 
alternative conditions of appropriation and how these may affect the aggregate condition 
of all. This leaves a socialist or collective ownership answer to property rights as 
favorable.
49 Cohen, G.A.: Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, pp. 79-87
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Cohen rejects the self-ownership thesis as Nozick propounds it. Cohen argues 
that Nozick’s position that the protection of natural rights ensures self-ownership simply 
does not ensure individuals are free from coercive, unfair and unjust inequalities. Nozick 
claims that these rights are inviolable in order to ensure that individuals can act in 
anyway they have license to act. The lack of rigidity in property rights, such as that 
proposed by Cohen, could license the state to violate natural rights as Nozick sees them. 
Nozick would likely argue that this does not take individual autonomy seriously enough 
as the claims of others in how one disposes of their labor and the fruits of this labor 
would be relevant criteria in determining their actions. Actions that Nozick would argue 
they have clear license to undertake and enjoy the benefits of undertaking.
Cohen argues alternatively that certain redistributions can be rejected based on 
claims of individual autonomy.50 Cohen argues that this removes the fears that Nozick 
had of redistributive measures violating the atomistic rights of individuals. This 
construction of what amounts to an alternative self-ownership argument rejects the 
extensive property rights aspects of Nozick without presumably violating individual 
autonomy as an ideal. Cohen grants individual rights and use of resources but not the 
private ownership that entitlement theories advocate.
This is a troubling critique of Nozick given his defense of extensive property 
rights. If individuals are worse than the baseline condition through acquisition and 
private ownership then a coherent proviso dictates we enact collective ownership rather 
than private appropriation and ownership. Cohen is arguing that our conception of 
worsening must be sharper than Nozick or Locke allows, and if we take this criterion 
seriously, we end up at a collective ownership baseline. If Nozick is arguing as Cohen 
claims, that the entire world is “up for grabs”51, then the consequences of this will always 
result in a lower level of baseline condition that can leave individuals worse off compared 
to another plausible account of the baseline, the joint ownership baseline. In this light, a 
strict reading of the proviso puts Nozick’s defense of entitlement in a tenuous position.
50 IBID, p. 102
51 IBID, p. 84
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Cohen’s reading of Nozick’s property rights argument is not an unfair one but crucially 
misses an argument that Nozick himself does not fully articulate in his work.
Cohen’s claims about total acquisition are salient against the Nozickean proviso, 
but as we have discussed, a proper proviso ought not to be as permissive as Nozick’s.
This “messy”52 subject is not worked out properly in Nozick’s theory. If it were, it 
would lead to our qualifications of the market and a Fair Shares Proviso in order to allow 
acquisitions after we have secured moral agency through redistribution. If our 
considerations about circumstances related natural endowments could be satisfied, this 
conception of the proviso still holds power and still works to justify private ownership. 
Nozick does not elaborate on the idea that a proviso may bring into conflict core aspects 
of his need for moral agency. Cohen’s critique poses a problem for Nozick but we must 
consider if Cohen’s critique this is a problem for our Fair Shares Proviso. Cohen thinks it 
is as powerful a critique against any proviso that accepts the worsening of condition as a 
criterion. Cohen believes these will collapse in on themselves because if we consider a 
joint ownership baseline, such a condition will always leave individuals better off. 
However, this is only the case if we accept joint initial ownership as operating in the way 
Cohen says it will. To explore this, we have to revisit and expand upon Cohen’s 
argument.
Cohen’s exposition does not elaborate enough on the aggregate conditions. In 
Cohen’s model the outcomes of A & B assume co-operation, namely that A & B can 
decide on a division of labor or at least use under a collective ownership baseline. What 
if under collective ownership they do not agree? It is assumed that A & B under 
collective ownership will, in the absence of consensus, be free to continue their use of the 
land as they had originally intended, wheat farming and moose milking respectively.53 In 
this scenario, A and B can continue their activities even if one or the other decides to do 
nothing and starve. However, if we take seriously the collective ownership baseline, any 
use of the resource, in this case the land, must respect A & B’s equal right to the whole
52 Nozick, Robert: Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 185
53 Cohen, G.A.: Self-Ownership, Freedom and Equality, p. 79
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resource. If they cannot come to an amicable arrangement of the activities each wishes to 
use the land for and/or compensatory measures in the case of mutually exclusive aims, 
one individual has a trump on the other to prevent the use of the land. The individual 
worsening of the baseline condition could be extremely high and in fact, much worse 
than a private appropriation baseline if the intended use is a legitimate pursuit that does 
not harm the other individual or worsen their condition beyond losing their veto.
For example, let us say A wanted to do something needed to survive, in Cohen’s 
terms, harvest wheat. B hated A and wheat so no matter what A offered or tried, B would 
not let the action take place on the jointly owned field. Let us further assume that A’s 
wheat harvesting would not affect B’s ability to use the resource to milk his moose or do 
anything else for that matter. B’s joint ownership right still trumps A, and Cohen has to 
argue this is ok because it is B’s individual privilege to do so if no agreement can be 
reached to allow A to harvest wheat. It is hard to see how A’s condition in this scenario 
is better than the baseline one if our Fair Shares Proviso provides as a baseline an equal 
initial share of resources that neither A nor B can refuse from each other.
Cohen could claim that such a scenario would never occur due to the mutual need 
to survive. However, this would be a dubious argument on both a theoretical and 
practical level. Instead, Cohen’s claim of autonomy has to kick in here and do all the 
work because otherwise A can prevent B from milking moose and B can prevent A from 
harvesting wheat. As a result, they will both die due to each other’s claim rights, which 
is clearly the worst baseline condition conceivable. However, this assertion of autonomy 
comes in direct conflict with Cohen’s operating assumption that A and B have joint rights 
in all resources being used for both of these activities. A can stop B and B can stop A as 
they both have equal claims on all of the land in question. This is what leads to the 
bargaining and sharing of production that Cohen argues is extrapolated from this 
collective ownership position. If these conditions persist, we are left to wonder why does 
B have a right to trump A’s legitimate use of the resource in one regard but not another 
and is this truly a better baseline than our private ownership baseline. Cohen has to give 
us some expansion on this idea or a consciousness/sociability argument in order for us to
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make sense of what takes priority. Moreover, this explanation has to be compelling for 
us to come to the decision he has, that the baseline condition of shares and private 
ownership allowed by our Fair Shares Proviso is lower in some cases than the stalemate 
we just uncovered in a joint ownership scheme.
Cohen argues that claims of autonomy can act to ensure violations of individual 
rights and liberties do not occur. In joint ownership, we have just seen that B can have a 
say in the direct actions of A in every aspect of A’s interaction with the tactile world 
except those protected by claims of autonomy. Cohen’s right to autonomy encompasses 
one’s own body but arguably not the ground on which it stands or the air which it 
breathes. Cohen would not deny the right to either of these privileges, but it appears if he 
is to do so he has to come to an uncomfortable position. Individuals have to have use, in 
keeping with their own needs, of natural resources. In order for this use to be fair and 
equal, the shares must be equal and the use must allow A to self-authenticate the 
legitimacy of the resource use. This is in effect a private property right and similar if not 
identical to the threshold our Fair Shares Proviso represents. If Nozick failed to articulate 
a proviso adequately, Cohen may be equally as guilty of not working through individual 
autonomy adequately. If claims of autonomy can legitimize individual private use of a 
common resource, then surely this implies property rights must be a primary aspect of 
autonomy.
If we take individual autonomy seriously, then individuals must be free to do what 
they have license to do based upon such a claim. The ability to use an equal share of 
resources is an inescapable part of such a claim. Our egalitarian concerns about 
measuring such a share must stem from calculations of impact/worsening upon political 
equals including their ability to utilize their share. Nevertheless, our autonomy must 
extend to a claim on the resources of the tactile world, or else it is a term with no 
constituency. A and B are autonomous individuals who can choose how to dispose of 
their labor to produce the products in question that were impossible to produce without 
the land. This means the permission between them needs not to be one of absolute 
individual veto or approval.
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A claim that Cohen also raised was that a proviso, if expansive enough like 
Locke’s, can be a reason to prevent conceptions of private property ownership altogether 
in much the way Nozick feared. Taking the Lockean proviso seriously, which is 
something Nozick does not do appropriately, requires that in the A & B scenario the 
complete ownership of the land by one or the other is illegitimate given the land’s 
fundamental role in individual rights and assuring agency. The share has to be projected 
on A & B or even C, D or Q who show up later. With this scenario removed by our Fair 
Shares Proviso, the worst baseline liberty objection it poses is adequately defused from 
Cohen’s initial critique. Furthermore, the equal share solutions are only troubling if the 
result is complete individual ownership of a rights providing resource. Such an outcome 
is incoherent with the qualified way we have arrived at the Fair Shares Proviso as 
individuals have to be left “as much or as good” and be assured, through resources, of 
their moral agency. Therefore, there may be a way to conceptualize a proviso without 
having it meet the extreme end Cohen says it must arrive at.
Cohen’s argument then brings us to an important conclusion about property 
rights. It is not that things are privately acquired but what things and how much of them 
are acquired that matters for individual freedom and rights. The state must respect rights 
bearing individuals equally. These rights require resources, but do not give individuals a 
right to all of something or to some of everyone’s product. It is in this light, that we can 
see where liberal conceptions such as Van Parijs’ have fertile territory to place their 
claims in the area existing between accounts like Nozick’s and Cohen’s. It becomes a 
matter of where the priority is placed in treading a path between these positions.
Cohen allows the reciprocal relationship of choices between individuals to be too 
expansively drawn. Though our Fair Shares Proviso takes us away from his conclusions, 
we may be able to support them in some respects if our consideration of circumstances 
leads us to question property claims. If choices are given too much space to count, they 
could have unjust outcomes. So we must inspect Cohen’s argument about why individual 
circumstances and natural endowments cause him to advocate for collective ownership.
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The A & B objection is only one of Cohen’s concerns with capitalist justice. 
Cohen argues that the “inequality of condition”54 is more than simply a discussion of 
external resources. He urges that these inequalities justify actions of redistribution and 
collective ownership. Cohen is concerned that market processes do not take seriously 
enough the conditions that face some individuals, in particular those with fewer talents or 
natural endowments. Cohen explores the idea of talents and disproportionate individual 
wealth in his “able” and “infirm” argument.55 In this two-person world, these two 
autonomous individuals have unequal abilities but equal property in the world of natural 
resources. Cohen’s concern is that individuals, who have a lack of talents or in even 
more troubling bodily circumstances, are unable to use resources. As a result, 
philosophically equal individuals will not be able to use their share of resources under an 
arrangement like our Fair Shares Proviso. As we have discussed, Nozick and Locke 
require individuals to acquire and use resources autonomously, as their approach is 
purely negative. The fact an individual is unable to use a resource to achieve the needed 
moral agency is beyond the distributive discussion pertinent to the state, even if neither 
author would deny the individual moral duty to help others in such a situation. Cohen 
argues these individuals will be unequal due to unchosen circumstances, namely their 
lack of certain natural endowments.
These individuals have a claim to autonomy that Nozick’s purely negative 
obligation does not address. Cohen explains that through the collective ownership of 
resources ensures that “able”, understood as the talent-laden individual and “infirm”, as 
the less or non-talented individual, would come to certain prescribed divisions of labor 
and product distribution. Cohen asserts that the distribution that “able” will receive in 
any scenario that assures they will both survive will yield “able” no more than an 
egalitarian outcome due to the equal material status of “infirm”. Since “able” is using a 
joint-share, he must produce enough resulting resources to sustain them both. They will 
share the product fairly in order to ensure “infirm” agrees to the ongoing use of the
54 IBID, p. 69
55 IBID, p. 94
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shared resource. “Infirm” is able to use their veto, either directly or through proxy, to 
ensure fair conditional outcomes. The talents of “able” are still exercisable but the fruits 
of this exercise must be sensitive to the resource use he is undertaking of “infirm’s” 
jointly held resource. If “infirm” demands too high a price for this use, he will not be 
able to convince “able” to utilize his talents and labor. Cohen believes this will result in a 
level of equilibrium between the two while providing an egalitarian outcome for those 
who are unable to use resources.
For Cohen this equilibrium can be maintained even if either individual has a 
particular aversion to the labor. An individual’s aversion to labor counts within this 
calculation but Cohen argues this is not troubling as this is a part of any calculation of 
undertaking a task. The inequalities in the division of the resulting product come solely 
from the use of labor and the preferences of the talented to undertake this labor. The 
willingness of a talented individual to apply their labor would then determine fair 
compensation from “infirm” to “able”. Since the difference in talents and yield between 
the two is not the attribute in question but rather the equal right to the jointly owned 
resource and “able’s” willingness to labor, Cohen believes any resulting inequality is 
likely to be small or at least relative.
Cohen’s argument is based on a relatively complicated set of bargaining 
assumptions on the part of “Able” and “Infirm”.56 However, the most important one for 
discussion here is the belief that the two individuals, understanding the disproportionate 
yield of one another, would agree to an egalitarian, unequal yet sustaining distribution of 
the resulting product.57 Cohen argues that due to the shared resource used, the product 
must be divided. The ownership of the product is not wholly owned by the individual 
producer due to the shared ownership in the resource used to make it. The decision that 
Cohen suggests is reached is a matter of balancing the claim of “infirm” to compensation 
and the affinity of “able” to undertake the labor. “Able” as the greater producer could
56 Sec IBID, pp. 94-101
57 IBID, p. 96
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legitimately negotiate a greater share of the product but he would have to provide 
something to “infirm” from his product.
Cohen’s example gives “infirm” and “able” ownership of themselves and 
ownership of their labor but never complete ownership of the product of their labor. Joint 
ownership still yields inequality as “infirm” and “able” are materially unequal based upon 
natural endowments and individual choices. Cohen argues this inequality is justified 
given the equal joint ownership in the resources used and the concern of autonomy. The 
question becomes whether our Fair Shares Proviso sufficiently defuses this critique. 
Cohen has already stated it cannot but his argument missed some key issues in coming to 
this conclusion, so we need to inspect this matter for ourselves
“Infirm” needs to get support from “able” in a way that is reciprocally fair to 
“able’s” self-owned labor. Cohen’s argument is that if private acquisition occurred, 
“infirm” would have one chance to strike a deal that secured his compensation. Joint 
ownership on the other hand gave “infirm” a trump that he could constantly pull out to 
revisit his compensation. In the process, Cohen argues “infirm” has secured conditional 
welfare in a way that still allowed “able” to be materially better off. This argument only 
holds if we continue to adopt a joint ownership baseline as Cohen has described it. 
However, his baseline is not coherent because Cohen does not work through his 
autonomy claims and how they legitimize private resource use. Therefore, the ability of 
“able” to provide for himself and only himself through a claim to autonomy and over-ride 
the use veto of “infirm” is never resolved. Any coherent working out of this paradox 
undermines much of Cohen’s argument. The result is that Cohen’s strong claim of an 
improvement for the welfare of “infirm” is no greater than the rent “infirm” could 
negotiate, directly or through a proxy, that a fair share of resources could yield through 
an appropriately drawn proviso like our Fair Shares Proviso. These projected shares are 
subject to abstract claims of worsening and this is true for everyone, including “infirm”. 
The market itself is operating in a subordinate place within our theory of justice because 
the projection of shares comes first. The rental value of a share can be revisited but this 
does not rule out private acquisition as we have shown in working through our Fair
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Shares Proviso, it simply qualifies these claims. The property claims exist if shares are 
provided but what individuals do with their shares from here is up to them if we have 
done what it takes to ensure moral agency. The choices of ‘Able” and “Infirm” have to 
be equally valued and to do this they need a share of resources, or the fair rental value of 
that share. This does not imply that they have a claim to the use of all of everything as 
Cohen implies. Without a worked out position on autonomy, Cohen is left in this 
position. Any working through of an autonomy claim will cause such a position to value 
use rights, which are in fact property claims that are not subject to the objections of 
others. This would undermine the joint ownership baseline.
As much as this poses a problem for Cohen, this critique shows a deep tension in 
the entitlement conception of justice. “Infirm” will be politically unequal in his property 
rights if through unchosen circumstances of natural endowment, he is unable to use or 
acquire his initial share of resources granted to him by our Fair Shares Proviso. Such 
considerations and redistributions must come first. This further illustrates our need to 
subordinate the claims of the market and why we move easily from our libertarian 
account to a liberal account of justice. We will revisit this problem throughout the text, 
as it is one that I will suggest no liberal author has wholly addressed properly. However, 
for now, let us assume that this problem is resolvable and focus instead on our resource 
and property argument as I have argued libertarianism has something specific to add in 
conceptualizing a just market.
Cohen’s critique of capitalism potentially yielding exploitative power relations is 
only true if the market is not placed in the proper context and if the Fair Shares Proviso is 
not in place. The Fair Shares Proviso ensures that individuals have claims to equal 
resources and can demand compensation from those who borrow/rent this share. The 
Fair Shares Proviso would yield private ownership and not the joint ownership bartering 
position Cohen forwards. However, it would allow the kind of rent and stewardship 
Cohen points out is needed. This is because air shares are granted to everyone and the 
concerns of liberal justice that we will argue must precede the actions of the market have 
taken place. Once we have fulfilled these commitments, allowing private ownership does
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not appear troubling. If individuals have a right to an initial share of resources, then 
surely it is legitimate for them to consume or use this portion in a way they see fit 
provided it does not harm other’s portions. Cohen’s need for an account of autonomy 
backs him into this same conclusion if we extrapolate his theory. Questioning how much 
individuals are entitled to of these resources over time and in different circumstances is a 
different concern from allowing private ownership and as such places different 
considerations on our conception of distributive justice rather than causing us to abandon 
the idea of private ownership altogether. Once resources are provided to ensure moral 
agency through redistribution and we project equal shares onto individuals, we are left to 
consider the market and how it works to distribute what is left. There ought to be little 
we can say about how individuals use their fair share if we take moral agency seriously. 
The joint ownership Cohen argues for fails to articulate this point.
Nozick’s failure to provide these key aspects of the self-ownership thesis does not 
revoke the potential legitimacy of the idea. It instead implies that a large part if not the 
overwhelming consideration of justice occurs through conceptualizing the material and 
political demands of the proviso and any other commitments of redistribution that happen 
prior to the market device. If pre-conditions like the proviso and the resources needed for 
agency are met in an ongoing way, the transfers that follow through acquisition and 
property claims of the market require protection in our state as these flows from 
autonomous individual actions. This is a massive move away from Nozick’s conception 
of procedural justice but retains a crucial element of his argument about agency and how 
we ought to honor individual choices. Libertarianism makes a large and inappropriate 
assumption about what it takes to ensure human individual agency but this does not 
undermine the argument completely. If we do what is needed to ensure this agency and 
justify the market through our Fair Shares Proviso, libertarian claims tell us there are 
actions in the market we need to protect because they are the legitimate result of the 
agency we have worked to secure.
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1.3 - Conclusion
The inspection of Nozick leaves us with some important ideas to consider moving 
forward. Nozick’s primary claim is that the state cannot violate individual rights 
legitimately. These rights form strict constraints on the actions of the state. Nozick 
argues that private property is one of these rights. For Nozick, the existence of these 
individual rights rules out the redistributive projects of Rawls and 
Socialism/Communism. We have also seen the power that aspects of arguments like 
Cohen’s have against the strict nature and formality of Nozick’s claims. These positions 
placed against each other show that there are conceptual problems with each that leave us 
requiring some other way forward through the ideas of choice, circumstance and 
distributive justice.
The theories approached in this chapter represent the unadulterated forms of 
capitalism and socialism, which form the ends of the political spectrum Van Parijs 
references in his development of liberalism. Van Parijs will take aspects of these 
positions seriously, which I have noted throughout this chapter. Van Parijs will attempt 
to weave them together as part of a broader development of the liberal project that 
legitimizes a UBI. However, we have asserted our own conclusions as to where these 
theories fail and what developments we truly need to make in order for us to develop 
liberalism appropriately.
We have worked through the libertarian argument to arrive at a subordinate but 
necessary role for the market. This understanding shows what must be addressed prior to 
market actions. Individuals must have shares of external resources through a Fair Shares 
Proviso. Redistribution must take place in order of individuals to have the resources 
required by asserting individual moral agency. There must also be some treatment of 
natural endowment inequalities in order for the moral agency of individuals to be fulfilled 
in keeping with the assumptions of the market argument. Nozick does not give us a way 
to work through these issues appropriately and this is why we must depart from his
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viewpoint. It also illustrates why we progress naturally into a liberal account of justice.
However, with these in place, the market appears to fulfill something important 
concerning our individual moral agency. The market fulfills our choices. These choices 
have to count in an appropriate way if the state is to take our agency seriously. Private 
property can be defended but requires specific commitments first. Our considerations 
open the door for liberal egalitarian commitments to distributive justice. The liberal 
authors that follow will need to deal with the claims we have asserted here about our 
markets, the developments we have argued they need to make beforehand and what they 
need to reflect in terms of formalizing individual choices. These claims will motivate, in 
part, the development of the liberal account of justice I will present.
The relationship between elements in our calculation of distributive justice may 
be “messy” but no one said justice was neat, easy or a concise process. The balance 
between addressing individual circumstances and honoring properly the choices 
individuals make within a fair political society is difficult. As we move forward, I wish 
to keep our Fair Shares Proviso in mind and what it tells us about a just market. It 
implies something specific about a just market on one end and ultimately I will argue 
tells us something about what counts when considering what measure we use to 
redistribute when we expand on the taxation argument in chapter 3. This is because it 
asserts what individuals are owed, in terms of redistribution even if the scope of these 
measures remains unclear. We now have to move into the Rawlsian liberal debate and 
work through what our commitments to individual circumstances and redistribution ought 
to be.
The problem we face going forward is considering and creating institutions that 
live up to the claims about the market and the needs of justice at the same time. Still, one 
might say that there is little that I am suggesting we take from Nozick directly aside from 
a core intuition about the importance of rights, the legitimacy of choices granted to us 
through moral agency and how these can support private property claims and the 
importance of the market. I do not feel this would be an unfair statement but as Nozick
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himself says, “Even the reader unconvinced by my arguments should find that, in the 
process of maintaining and supporting his view, he has clarified and deepened it.”58 
Nozick shows us how the market and its action serve an important role in affirming our 
moral agency, even if he fails to work this position out coherently. He moves us more 
naturally than it would first appear to adopt a liberal viewpoint. He shows us that taking 
choices too seriously can cause problems, as there are considerations of justice that 
clearly come first. We can reconstitute some of his core intuitions and use them as a tool 
in guiding our development of liberalism.
58 Nozick, Robert: Anarchy, State and Utopia, Basic Books, p. x
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Chapter 2 -  Rawls. Circumstance and the Welfare State
Introduction
Those familiar with the material scrutinized here may question why the material is 
arranged in this order. Nozick’s arguments were at least in part a response to Rawls 
system of justice presented in his earlier work, A Theory ofJustice. It will be Van Parijs’ 
claim, in developing his account of liberalism that a coherent libertarian ought to adopt 
his approach to justice and his state structures. This is why it is important to understand 
Nozick’s libertarian argument in detail and develop this position ourselves. Perhaps most 
importantly, our inspection of Nozick has yielded us what we should take forward from 
libertarianism, where we should place these claims and what commitments we need to 
undertake to make market claims coherent. The exposition of the previous chapter 
arrives at a different conclusion as to the validity of Nozick’s claims and how we can 
work through them than will be presented by other authors. Van Parijs will attempt to 
reconcile the claims of libertarianism with the liberal argument. It was paramount to 
assert what these libertarian claims ought to be before appraising how liberal arguments 
can or cannot be reconciled with the limited but valid aspects of this account. Rawls 
conception of securing fair institutions of political and distributive justice will be the 
cornerstone of the arguments to follow including Dworkin, Van Parijs and ultimately my 
own developed position.
The deep tensions I will show within Van Parijs account arise from his attempt to 
reconcile actions of choice with Rawlsian liberalism. We have shown that the 
development to a liberal approach is necessary in appraising libertarianism. It is how this 
development is accomplished that makes all the difference. It is only through the 
exposition of Rawls thought that we can understand how we ought to develop the liberal 
argument alternatively. Rawls account of justice and his rigorous progression to 
principles of justice will show how claims of liberal justice are needed prior to justifying
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the actions of the market. As a result, how we harmoniously reconcile liberalism and the 
power it has in dealing with individual circumstances with choices and market claims 
requires we inspect how Rawls treats these issues. How this move can be made will be 
illuminated in the chapters to come and underline why my proposed development of 
liberalism is so necessary.
Rawls provides us initially with an explanation of how the modem welfare state, 
with its redistributive measures, can be morally justified. Rawls provides a conception of 
how individuals should conceive of just processes and institutions. His thought has 
shaped much of the debate in contemporary political philosophy over the past several 
decades since the initial release of A Theory ofJustice. His account of justice is both 
compelling and contentious but perhaps unparalleled in its rigor. It is an argument that 
both critics and supporters have had to frame their opinions against. Rawls continued to 
expand and amend his theory of justice in his subsequent work.59 In turn, this has 
garnered even greater critique. The tome of literature that this ongoing academic process 
has amassed is so vast that I simply cannot embrace it all or even most of it sufficiently in 
the space I have available in this dissertation. Instead, I will provide a summary account 
of Rawls’ system of justice focusing primarily on the issues and conceptions Van Parijs 
and Dworkin embrace and/or critique in constructing their own political theories. This 
will begin with the account of political liberalism in A Theory o f Justice and some 
important amendments and elaborations Rawls provides through some of his subsequent 
primary texts. I will focus on the treatment of issues such as individual circumstance and 
choice within liberalism and the developments of these positions and devices over the 
course of Rawls career. I will also discuss Rawls use of the market and property claims 
in keeping with “justice as fairness”.60
After examining this argument broadly, we will move to the development of 
Rawls project presented by Ronald Dworkin in the next chapter. These two arguments 
articulate different extrapolations of Rawls’ hypothetical thought device and the liberal
59 Please refer to the works of John Rawls listed in the bibliography
60 Rawls, John: A Theory o f Justice, (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), chapter 1, pp. 3-53
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argument. Through a close examination of Rawls’ argument for distributive justice, I 
will set the stage for the issues to be raised in later chapters. One of the steps forward 
Rawls will take is to highlight the importance of natural endowments to external 
resources. This is one of the major failings of a libertarian account as we have discussed 
it so far. I will highlight the specific arguments Rawls presents about talents, 
disabilities/handicaps, choice and material inequalities. I will show how important these 
conceptions are to arriving at Rawls’ principles of justice before illuminating why they 
are so problematic in the next chapter. These will become a central factor in amending 
the liberal accounts of justice that follow. It is my argument that balancing the claims of 
choice and circumstance will form the center of the divergence between alternative 
conceptions of liberal justice that follow. I will show this is because Rawls will give us a 
specific and ultimately inappropriate weighting of these issues in our devices for creating 
principles of justice. However, we must first assess where the imbalance caused by 
Rawls concern with individual circumstance comes from and why Rawls treats it as he 
does. This will highlight why we require a development of the liberal argument, which I 
will forward.
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2.1 Rawls and A Theory of Justice
The aim of Rawls is to institute a fair state. Justice is derived from the fair 
treatment of equal citizens. Fairness implies political equality and Rawls wants to ensure 
these attributes of justice in an ongoing way. The project of justice for Rawls is a matter 
of creating a comprehensive political framework that allows individuals to pursue equally 
their various conceptions of the good life. For Rawls, the creation of justice should avoid 
intuitionist or comprehensive moral judgments. Rawls aims to create a comprehensive 
account of political justice that individuals justly obligated to through the coercive power 
of the state. Rawls project is to create “a theory of justice that generalizes and carries to a 
higher level of abstraction the traditional conception of the social contract. The compact 
of society is replaced by an initial situation that incorporates certain procedural 
constraints on arguments designed to lead to an original agreement on principles of 
justice.”61 The goal is to create a fair system that no individual, upon removed and 
reasoned consideration could deny even if they did deny such logic within non-abstract 
contexts. Coming to fair principles of justice requires that individuals abstract into a 
thought experiment that is necessarily removed from some of the conditions that face 
them. For Rawls, the goal is to find an impartial device from which to derive principles 
of justice that guide the political, social and economic institutions that follow. This is 
necessary to ensure the decisions that are reached about justice in such an experiment are 
not biased to particular outcomes. Rawls argues a thought experiment that is sufficiently 
representative yet sufficiently impartial will allow us to come to ex parte decisions about 
justice that can be applied and revisited.
Justice is secured by the fair arrangement of society. Individual equality is 
necessary in society to ensure individuals are treated as ends and not as means. This is an 
important perspective shared with Nozick. These core assumptions are not argued across 
the theories, rather how best to define, interpret and secure them. However, it is 
important to note the relationships Rawls sees between these ideas, as they are the engine
61 Rawls, John: A Theory o f Justice, p. 3
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for Rawls’ argument for “justice as fairness”. It is not that any of the theories wish to be 
unfair, rather that they have different interpretations of what is fair. Rawls argument is 
that fairness is an ideal that we apply out of our individual context and ignorant of certain 
cultural, social and individual particularities.
Rawls argues that disproportionate distributions of wealth in society lead to unfair 
power relations between political equals, as the liberties of some are more valuable than 
others. The uneven bargaining positions that follow lead to unfair and unjust political 
inequalities. Individuals are not free in this sort of context to pursue their conceptions of 
the good equally. Their freedom is dependant on accessing certain aspects of society that 
provide them with actual liberty to use or access ends. Without an initial set of liberties 
provided by resources, some individuals are not truly equal and as such, are treated 
unfairly.
To decide what is fair and just, Rawls argues that we are best served by using a 
hypothetical thought project that allows us a neutral initial position from which to reach 
decisions about justice. Rawls calls this the “original position’ and it is intended to 
give us a hypothetical impartial bargaining scenario. Rawls argues that the decisions and 
institutions that result in such context form the legitimate bipartite responsibilities 
between individuals in the state. To ensure a fair outcome, the original position features 
representatives intended to account for all the members of society. Rawls argues that 
using an original position argument will create the basis on which individuals can 
reflectively look at their decisions and institutions. This reflection will act to ensure their 
actions and institutions are just given the equality of everyone in such a hypothetical 
situation. Rawls urges that the device can be used to understand what individuals would 
agree to, being reasonable, had they been in such a hypothetical position. The device of 
the original position works to ensure the impartiality of the decisions and structures that 
follow from it.
62 IBID, p. 12
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However, this requires that the individuals in such a situation are not aware of 
their general conditions and context beyond the original position. If they were, the 
knowledge of certain aspects of their social and physical predispositions would color 
unjustly the resulting state. Rawls believes neutrality can be achieved by invoking the 
idea of a “veil of ignorance.”63 Rawls describes the veil thusly,
4... no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does 
any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his. 
intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their 
conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of 
justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance. This ensures that no one is advantaged or 
disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the 
contingency of social circumstances.’64
The veil of ignorance places parties arriving at the original position in 
circumstances where they are unable to determine where they stand in respect to one 
another in their shared environment. The veil of ignorance is designed to make 
individuals ignorant of many of the specific conditions of their existence. Rawls 
constructs the veil to remove individual knowledge of their class, social status, talents, 
abilities, aversion to risk, social proclivities, and even their individual conceptions of the 
good life.65
Rawls removes these attributes from the representatives in the original position to 
ensure that these factors do not prejudice the outcomes of justice. The goal is to show 
through the device how we can create principles that balance our legitimate choices with 
measures to address individual contingencies. Rawls uses the veil to screen out 
conceptions that should not be relevant to the pursuit of justice as fairness. Individuals’ 
knowledge of their class or social status could cause them to sustain economic relations 
that are unfair and politically unequal. Knowledge of their social proclivities or
63 IBID, pp. 136-142
64 IBID, p. 12
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conceptions of the good could cause the resulting system to bias these particular 
conceptions of the good rather than accept them all equally as legitimate ends.
Knowledge of talents, abilities and even one’s willingness to gamble on having these 
sorts of attributes could result in the legitimization of inequalities in the possession of 
natural endowments that are arbitrarily awarded. Rawls urges that the discussion of 
justice must leave these factors out of consideration when creating a system of fair 
mutual cooperation. Though these individuals are ignorant of certain aspects of 
existence, the veil is not to be construed as a blindfold. Just as important as what is 
screened out, is what is allowed in. Rawls allows individuals to know a great deal about 
the social, economic and physical sciences that inform the principles and decisions 
created in the original position.
We can see now the three aspects that make up Rawls’ account of justice. The 
first is a presupposition of equality and fairness, which is assumed in some sense by all 
the liberal authors appraised in this text. The second is a device to achieve neutrality that 
is represented by the original position. This impartial position is meaningless without an 
account of what attributes individuals in this position base their judgments on, and as 
such, the veil is working to achieve this necessary aspect of the project. The veil of 
ignorance is intended to be as the metaphor suggests an opaque view of what is in front 
of these original position representatives. Rawls states that individuals in the original 
position .. know general facts about human society. They understand political affairs 
and the principles of economic theory; they know the basis of social organization and the 
laws of human psychology. Indeed, the parties are presumed to know whatever general 
facts affect the choice of the principles of justice.”66 These individuals then have a robust 
yet limited knowledge of their situation. Rawls urges that they understand the relative 
scarcity of resources, the potential frailties and misfortunes that could befall them, and 
the relationship economic and social conditions have on political equality. Once these 
conditions are in place, Rawls walks us through the decisions they will make given their 
potential options.
66 IBID, p. 137
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The role the veil of ignorance plays in Rawls’ theory cannot be overstated. The 
selectivity of attributes that should be taken into account and those that should be 
removed is as important as the premise of fairness and the impartiality of the original 
position device in arriving at principles of justice. Each exclusion and inclusion needs to 
stand on its own as these make impressions on the principles that follow. They constitute 
the attributes of individual contingency that we will act to rectify given our lack of 
knowledge as to what we possess in terms of natural endowment and the relationship this 
will have with our choices in our society. To take issue with a principle of justice that 
follow requires some development of this impartial device. Rawls’ identification of 
principles of justice flow from these arguments and it is important to understand their 
crucial role in Rawls’ thought. The attributes that are perceived through the veil must be 
relevant to the discussion of justice and aptly accounted for. Those that are blocked by 
the veil must be illegitimate considerations in coming to principles of justice if we accept 
the equality, fairness and the impartiality ideas Rawls forwards.
Rawls believes the veil of ignorance will ensure a relative level of uncertainty 
across all the represented and equal parties at the original position. These individuals 
will not know where they will end up socially, economically or physically outside their 
veiled position yet understand how these factors and the complex inter-relations of 
various elements can yield certain outcomes outside of the veil. Rawls argues that from 
this point they will rationally choose specific principles of political justice, including 
distributive justice. It is the latter that will define the space the market and our choices 
within it are given. These principles and their demands on the structures of the state 
make up much of the institutional suggestions that Rawls posits. They are also vitally 
important in assessing Dworkin and later Van Parijs’ who undertake the general premise 
of the Rawlsian argument but develop it in certain ways.
Rawls argues that individuals, in such a position, will choose to ensure and 
protect a maximin set, the maximum minimum set, of “primary goods”67 in order to
67 IBID, p. 62
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preserve equality of condition. “Primary goods” are described as being more than simply 
material items. As Rawls explains,
4 As a first step, suppose that the basic structure of society distributes certain 
primary goods, that is, things that every rational man is presumed to want. These goods 
normally have a use whatever a person's rational plan of life. For simplicity, assume that 
the chief primary goods at the disposition of society are rights and liberties, powers and 
opportunities, income and wealth. (Later on in Part Three the primary good of self- 
respect has a central place.) These are the social primary goods. Other primary goods 
such as health and vigor, intelligence and imagination, are natural goods; although their 
possession is influenced by the basic structure and they are not so directly under its 
control. Imagine, then, a hypothetical initial arrangement in which all the social primary 
goods are equally distributed: everyone has similar rights and duties, and income and 
wealth are evenly shared. This state of affairs provides a benchmark forjudging 
improvements. If certain inequalities of wealth and organizational powers would make 
everyone better off than in this hypothetical starting situation, then they accord with the 
general conception.’68
Rawls intends primary goods to be a description of anything individuals need no 
matter what else they may want.69 This includes resources but also basic liberties, rights 
and associative protections. Rawls is careful not to describe these in specific detail. 
Leaving them broadly sketched affords the idea a level of flexibility as well as refraining 
from making decisions of the good rather than the right. Individual equality dictates the 
provision of these goods no matter an individuals physical or social attributes.
Individuals ignorant of where they will end up socially and/or materially would agree 
unanimously that it is in their individual interest to have more rather than less social 
primary goods. To ensure they all have fair value for their liberty, individuals will decide 
that no matter whom ends up where in the resulting state, all individuals will have an 
appropriate set of primary goods.
68 IBID; p. 62
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Rawls delineates primary goods into two different types. The first are natural 
primary goods.70 These are physical attributes of individuals such as talents, handicaps 
and other aspects of human embodiment. The second are social primary goods.71 These 
are institutionally provided rights and resources. Rawls believes rational individuals will 
act to ensure that they receive a fair and equal maximin distribution of social primary 
goods. Rawls explains, “[t]he term "maximin" means the maximum minimum, and the 
rule directs our attention to the worst that can happen under any proposed course of 
action, and to decide in the light of that.’*72 Rawls defends through relatively complex 
exposition on game theoretic philosophy, maximin reasoning. Individuals will, under the 
veil of ignorance, be unable to determine their preferences or propensities in the larger 
society. This ensures that no matter what their individual distribution of natural primary 
goods, individuals will safeguard themselves (and in the process everyone else) from a 
fundamentally unequal position in society. This is accomplished by distributing and 
subsequently redistributing a maximin amount of social primary goods. This resource 
equality ensures that all individuals will have equally valued liberty to undertake 
whatever their conception of the good may be.
For Rawls, this line of reasoning leads him to assert specific principles of justice. 
The first principle of justice is stated as “First: each person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of 
liberties for others.”73 For Rawls, this ensures that individuals have equal institutional 
rights and liberties in government and society. If this provision is not met, individuals 
will not be able to act equally in society. The resulting conditions of inequality will have 
direct and unacceptable political results. This places restraints on some excesses and 
actions. This first principle has lexical priority as a principle of “justice as fairness”. It 
requires that this concept cannot be subverted for gains in the principles to follow or for
70 IBID, p. 62
71 IBID, p. 63
72 IBID, p. 154
73 IBID, p. 60
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gains in economic efficiency. Rawls does this to avoid decisions of utility that might 
arise in assessing claims in society between the principles.
Second Principles of justice relate to the economic and material circumstances in 
society. These principles are motivated by equality, fairness and the importance of 
equally valuable liberties to individuals. However, simply stating the need for a fair and 
reciprocal arrangement of an equal set of primary goods is not enough. This account of 
primary goods needs to have some conception how distributions are realized. This is 
where the second principles of justice do their work. Rawls argues that upon reaching the 
first principle of justice, the second principles of justice, namely the “Fair equality of 
Opportunity” principle and the “Difference Principle”74, would follow. Van Parijs will 
lodge most of his critique of Rawls within the context of the difference principle. This 
illustrates precisely how deeply Van Parijs construes his project to be congruent to Rawls 
conception of justice. All the steps that have proceeded would need to be followed in 
some way to arrive at this point.
The fair equality of opportunity stipulates that individuals have the opportunities 
to act equally in government and society. Individuals being ignorant of where they 
would fall would further agree that all would have the equal ability, no matter their 
economic circumstances, to pursue conceptions of the good, obtain social positions and 
careers based upon merit as well as act in government/democratic processes equally.
This would affirm structures that remove economic decisions from governance and 
education that engender the political/social disparities between individuals that exist in 
modem societies due to economic conditions. This principle further motivates the 
actions of the difference principle and the set of primary goods it is intended to provide.
It is important to note here, that Van Parijs does not explore this aspect of Rawls thought 
in much detail although his commitment to opportunities is one of the three tenets of his 
theoretical framework. For Van Parijs, opportunities mean something slightly different 
and are perhaps better understood as being encompassed by Rawls nebulous set of 
primary goods. Van Parijs more closely associates resources to opportunities. However,
74 IBID, Chapter 2, pp. 54 - 117
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Van Parijs is likely to agree with the political overtones of this aspect of Rawls thought 
which as we will see in Chapter 4 places most of his criticism of Rawls on the difference 
principle.
The difference principle posits that inequalities in material wealth (the inequality 
of condition) are only just if they benefit the least well off. Individuals in acting to secure 
a set of maximin social primary goods will arrange society so that any material 
inequalities are only arrived at if they benefit those at the bottom of society in terms of 
the value of their liberties. Rawls argues that the difference principle still allows for 
varied distributions of wealth and proportional economic disparity arrived at through the 
market. The set of primary goods being distributed is simply an initial set of resources 
from which legitimate disparities may arise. This is justified because the least well off 
are rewarded for allowing these disparities in the society as these afford a greater 
maximin set of primary goods for everyone. Importantly, these material inequalities can 
only be legitimate if the least well off have benefited from it in this way.
Rawls argues this principle is the reasonable result of the original position device. 
Individuals would wish to protect themselves from the worst possible material and 
political/social outcomes. Rawls argues they would also understand that the ability to 
gain disproportionate wealth was in part the result of affirming a system of social 
cooperation. Rawls argues that individuals wishing to sustain their initial judgment about 
justice over the duration of their lives would then come to decisions about institutions of 
redistribution in keeping with the difference principle. The arbitrary ownership of talents 
or social proclivities ensures individuals would choose to protect themselves from the 
worst of these uncontrollable natural outcomes through principles that ensure equally 
valued liberties and redistribution. The principle of benefiting the least well off is then 
something everyone would agree to, as no one could be sure who was least well off 
outside the veil. Yet, these individuals would understand what the implications were for 
being in this position.
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For Rawls, these principles deductively resolve justice for all political actors. It is 
only at this point that the actions of the marketplace that reflect individuals’ choices are 
allowed to operate. For Rawls, this is because the constraints needed to address potential 
individual circumstances have been addressed and redistributed for by the actions of the 
difference principle. For Rawls, the representatives in the original position would work 
to guarantee these outcomes even if maximum outcomes could be achieved with 
violations of some of these principles or the structures they motivate. Economic 
efficiency is not to trump principles of justice. Rawls believes individuals possess the 
“two moral powers”, namely individual abilities for rational revision and the ability of 
these same individuals to accept and apply a system of justice.75 This is what makes up 
Rawls account of moral agency. In this way, individuals can be understood to hold vastly 
different cultural/moral views yet agree on the basic precepts of justice.
Affirming a basic structure in a fair way is for Rawls the ultimate aim of his 
project. Rawls describes the basic structure as, “ .. .the way in which the major social 
institutions fit together into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and 
duties and shape the division of advantages that arises through social cooperation. Thus 
the political constitution, the legally recognized forms of property, and the 
organization.”76 For Rawls, the basic structure comprises all of the major social 
institutions we might commonly associate with a modem society. It is only through these 
institutions that we enjoy the benefits of society and our mutual cooperation.
Property claims are one of these benefits rather than a natural right. Any given 
structure is then subject to the constraints of justice, including property and relative 
material wealth. As Rawls states, “Unless this structure is appropriately regulated and 
corrected, the social process will cease to be just, however free and fair particular 
transactions may look when viewed by themselves.”77 Unless these inequalities yield a 
greater maximin set of primary goods for the least well off, they endanger the fairness of
75 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), p. 19 & Lecture VIII, 
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the basic structure of society. Rawls argues that property is a right against the individuals 
who comprise society rather than the result of a natural claim an individual has. As such, 
disproportionate wealth and the actions of the market are subordinate to the claims of the 
principles of justice and the fair society they create. This is at the heart of Rawls’ 
argument against libertarian claims and is an aspect of his thought we will revisit as we 
proceed through the chapter.
These later amendments are very important in affirming Rawls’ claim that his 
theory of justice is a conception of the right rather than the good for political society. 
Rawls wishes to assume as little as possible of those within the state in order to 
encompass all the potential circumstances they face. The Rawlsian conception of 
determining political justice has distinct stages, which are important to understand 
separately in appraising his theory. The first is the conception of a fair arrangement of 
political equals as the goal of a just state. The second is that to derive principles that 
make this goal realized in society we need a neutral thought device, the original position. 
In order for the position to be impartial and yield fair outcomes, it must be a position of 
specific ignorance. In the third step, he uses the veil of ignorance to give his theory the 
neutrality he argues is needed to yield a just system. Individuals knowing little about 
what awaits them would work to affirm a basic structure through social cooperation that 
is fair to their potential conditions outside this ignorant state. Rawls insists this does not 
privilege any conception of the good. Instead, his theory of justice works to everyone’s 
benefit no matter who they are or what they might have or desire. Individuals are able to 
pursue any conception of the good equally. This is one of Rawls’ strongest claims and 
will be used by Van Parijs in justifying a commitment to basic income and “real 
freedom”. However, to ensure this, individuals must have certain conditional needs met 
in an ongoing way, given their potential shortcomings. This leads to the fourth step for 
Rawls, which are the principles of justice. With the conception of justice met Rawls 
believes that our conceptions of the good and our individual choices granted by our moral 
agency, can flourish.
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2.2 Institutionalizing Distributive Justice: The Difference Principle in Detail
The difference principle becomes the focus for discussions of distributive justice, 
the market and the space given to individual choice. The role it plays is crucial in 
developing the conceptions of justice to be assessed moving forward and why I will argue 
certain developments are appropriate while others are not. Van Parijs argues for a direct 
amendment to this part of Rawls theory. Dworkin will also argue for an amendment but 
one that stems from a systematic development deeper within the Rawlsian project. 
However, it is important to understand the arguments that Rawls uses to lead to the 
difference principle. Rawls’ argument is hard to critique in its own terms. Justice is 
creating a system of cooperation and basic social structure that is fair. Fairness requires 
that all individuals are equal. We can discern what fairness and equality in society are in 
working through an abstract thought project that detaches us from our bias. In this 
process, humans have initial conceptual equality. Equality in the political sense implies 
individuals need to have equal value for their liberty in order to follow our own desired 
path in respect of the equal rights and liberties of others. To ensure that we enact 
principles X, Y and Z in Q order we need to follow this prioritized path. These are just a 
progressive exercise to provide the just state that allows for legitimate conceptions of the 
good. In assessing Rawls’ argument in these terms, the intuitive appeal of his 
justification can be observed. It also illustrates why liberal conceptions are developed 
from this position rather than refuted in the theories that follow.
Rawls is using the difference principle to tread a very interesting path between the 
arguments for providing for individual circumstances and allowing the inequalities that 
result from our autonomous choices. Rawls offers a crucial distinction in aspects of 
liberty. Rawls argues that individuals need more than just formal liberties. They need 
the means to exercise these liberties in order to be equals in society.78 This is a powerful 
argument against the kind of position Nozick adopts. As we saw in working through 
Nozick’s position, this aspect of his theory is not worked out appropriately. In working it
78Rawls, John: A Theory o f Justice, p. 290
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out appropriately, we see how his position requires a Fair Shares Proviso, resources to 
ensure moral agency and actions to address discrepancies in natural endowments, which 
legitimize redistribution and subordinate the claims of the market. Although Rawls 
position appears at odds with Nozick, it is not at odds with what a working through of the 
libertarian position ought to have been. We establish the need for redistribution but 
Rawls further distinguishes how this will work. Rawls argues that the difference 
principle redistributes the resources needed to ensure a maximin set of social primary 
goods that are required for all individuals to exercise fair value for their liberties in 
society. The differences in material distribution it allows are relational to the set of 
primary goods afforded the least well off. They are only permissible if by their existence 
they raise the maximin conditions these individuals face. The redistribution is 
particularized in this way and Rawls asks us to accept something beyond just the needs 
we asserted in our inspection of libertarianism.
The focus of this section will be on some precise issues facing the difference 
principle. We will ask some important questions of the principle and the position used by 
Rawls to defend it. For Rawls, the difference principle is part and parcel of “justice as 
fairness”. Its role is integral to the exercise of providing a fair society. Nevertheless, the 
commitment to the difference principle needs to establish why his redistribution is as 
particular as it is. This discussion will give us the requisite background from which we 
can discuss the primary issues of contention between the liberal position and the 
operation of the market presented in the last chapter. For our discussion of Van Parijs 
and Dworkin, it will be particularly important to discuss what primary goods count in our 
calculations and why they are a maximin procedure. It will be from these arguments that 
we will see why development of Rawls liberal approach is necessary. It is vital that we 
inspect Rawls’ argument for the explanations of how principles of justice, in particular 
the difference principle, legitimize and determine the scope of redistribution.
The difference principle formalizes redistribution to the least well off, as they are 
owed a maximin set of social primary goods in keeping with the fair and equal 
structuring of society. Rawls argues the difference principle ensures that everyone has
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equally valued liberty even if some individuals have greater material assets and social 
standing within society. Unequal wealth in some material senses is allowed and even 
necessary for the operation of society but is always subject to considerations of fair value 
and the commitments of a fair basic structure. Rawls urges that the difference principle is 
subordinate to the assertion of the “first principle of justice”, but is equally necessary as it 
works with the other principles of justice to affirm the coherent application and operation 
of social institutions in a fair society. The difference principle provides the equality of 
condition that equal political actors would envision everyone would need in the original 
position.
The difference principle postulates a relative curve concerning resources but not 
where all individuals in society should fall upon it.79 Rawls believes that where they fall 
is a matter primarily of their choice but this is not troubling because the principles have 
ensured the primary goods necessary for everyone to determine where they wish to fall 
on the curve. Rawls wishes to articulate that the assessment of the difference principle as 
a political requirement of justice does not require economic growth, as the principle is a 
matter of reciprocity. Individuals are capable of attaining greater rewards provided these 
do not affect the condition of equally valued liberties for the less well off. Rawls urges 
that policies and institutions affirming the difference principle, including the market, will 
have to be subject to constant inspection and revision. However, Rawls argues this does 
not contradict the reciprocal formulation of the difference principle as a principle of 
justice as fairness.
Rawls' assertion that talents are a factor that must be screened out in a certain 
way using the veil of ignorance becomes crucial in arriving at Rawls’ difference 
principle. Rawls argues that differences in natural primary goods are morally arbitrary 
and undeserved. Rawls argues they are a result of a “natural lottery”.80 Talent (or the 
lack of a talent) is bestowed upon individuals arbitrarily and through circumstances they 
neither controlled nor chose. We are the owners of our arbitrarily assigned natural
Rawls, John and Kelly, Erin (eds.): Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
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primary goods, but their endowment to us is arbitrary. We have no role in choosing our 
parents. We have no role in choosing our assignment of genes or many maladies that 
may befall us. Because genetic predisposition is arbitrary, Rawls believes we should 
remove this factor from our thought project of deciding principles of social justice. No 
one is responsible for possessing talents, or conversely not possessing a talent.
Therefore, our challenge of finding the balance between choices and circumstances has to 
take the consideration of natural factors very seriously. Rawls believes that 
circumstances like natural endowment weigh very heavily in this calculation due to their 
arbitrary nature and the effect they have on material conditions. They effectively limit 
choices. Individuals in the original position are aware of this relationship and Rawls 
argues ought to choose to discredit them as a legitimate reason for allowing 
disproportionate wealth and in turn disproportionately valued liberties in the resulting 
society.
Rawls further urges that talents, understood as the application of natural primary 
goods, are as much about the development opportunities and environment that an 
affirmed just social structure provides. Ergo, talents are not just about our natural 
endowments but are a matter of having the appropriate social structures to realize them. 
Because they are dependent on these social resources, which are affirmed by the whole of 
society, we need to avoid making them the deciding factor in distributions of wealth. 
Rawls’ conclusion is that the wealth afforded by talents would affect exercisable liberty 
due to arbitrary and socially contingent factors. The talented then are treated fairly 
through redistribution as their possession of natural primary goods is arbitrary and their 
ability to exercise them is socially dependent on a fair system of cooperation. As Rawls 
writes,
‘We see then that the difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to 
regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of 
this distribution whatever it turns out to be. Those who have been favored by nature, 
whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the 
situation of those who have lost out. The naturally advantaged are not to gain merely
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because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education and for 
using their endowments in ways that help the less fortunate as well. No one deserves his 
greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society. But it does 
not follow that one should eliminate these distinctions. There is another way to deal with 
them. The basic structure can be arranged so that these contingencies work for the good 
of the least fortunate. Thus we are led to the difference principle if we wish to set up the 
social system so that no one gains or loses from his arbitrary place in the distribution of 
natural assets or his initial position in society without giving or receiving compensating 
advantages in return.’81
For Rawls, the difference principle provides the required environment of social 
co-operation and background justice that is pre-requisite to any property claim.82 Rawls 
argues that the difference principle can allow market processes and private property, as 
these take place within the confines of a difference principle.83 The entitlements 
changing hands do so in keeping with the principles of justice. Rawls argues that 
individual property is needed for the individual “self-respect” posited by the two moral 
powers.84 Private property claims affirm self-respect in social contexts and Rawls argues 
that properly constrained, property rights are an important individual privilege. Rawls 
tempers this idea in stating that natural resource acquisition and acquisition of the means 
of production are not a “right” but can be justified within a “property owning democracy”
O f
in keeping with the “difference principle”.
This is where we see a stark contrast in the primacy and role that Rawls and 
Nozick give market claims. Rawls is not denying the legitimate transfer of entitlements 
but he is placing these matters in a separate frame of reference. Entitlements are objects 
that effect exercisable liberty within society. Because of the need for equally valued 
liberties, entitlements and/or the resources these entitlements represent cannot be thought 
of as formally as Nozick describes. This is in keeping with our unbundling of libertarian
81 Rawls, John: A Theory o f Justice, pp. 101 - 102
82 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, p. 16
83 This discussion is largely taken up in Rawls, John: Justice as Fairness, Part 2, Lecture 20, pp. 72-74
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85 IBID, p. 51
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claims in the last chapter. The market is prefaced by considerations of justice that take 
into account individual circumstances and the effect these have on our political equality. 
The question becomes if Rawls account of how subordinate they are is appropriate given 
the vast actions of redistribution that the difference principle requires. These claims are 
still present and justifiably less formal, but this still leaves us matters of degree that are 
very important. Van Parijs will offer a similar argument against strict libertarian claims. 
The transfer of entitlements over time can have effects on equality and freedom that a 
system of justice should do something to rectify given that not doing so would yield 
unequal liberties. As Rawls writes,
‘A further point is this. We saw that the system of natural liberty and the liberal 
conception attempt to go beyond the principle of efficiency by moderating its scope of 
operation, by constraining it by certain background institutions and leaving the rest to 
pure procedural justice. The democratic conception holds that while pure procedural 
justice may be invoked to some extent at least, the way previous interpretations do this 
still leaves too much to social and natural contingency.’86
This does not rule out a role for market processes. Rawls argues that matters of 
market operation can be taken care of as legislative matters. These matters can be 
adjudicated in light of the reciprocation and political equality that the principles of justice 
enforce. They are simply matters of practice that have no claims derived directly from an 
account of justice. Any market operates justly if it is coherent with the principles of 
justice as fairness. For Rawls, market claims are subordinate to the principles of justice 
as fairness in a well-ordered society. Claims to property are justified in terms of the other 
individuals in the cooperative arrangement. Due to the liberty property claims give their 
holders, these claims have to be subordinate to our systems of equality including 
redistribution. Rawls argues that entitlements are a matter of political decision making 
not a natural right. Van Parijs largely agrees with these claims by Rawls and will use 
them to justify the methods of taxation and redistribution that he places in his UBI state.
86 Rawls, John: A Theory o f Justice, p. 79
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Nozick also argued that Rawls does not take seriously enough the idea that 
objects in society have claims on them. Nozick argued these claims are justified by our 
property rights and redistribution of these items will violate legitimate title. However, 
Rawls does not want to refute historical title or claims, just the scope of them. Rawls 
states that the difference principle is a guideline by which legislators should adjudicate 
rather than a comprehensive account of all the arrangements in society.87 Historical 
claims and transfers can be just but only if they have met the scrutiny of the principles of 
justice first. The argument underlines that the historical nature of a title may not imply 
that it has remained just if the private ownership of the title has an adverse effect on the 
liberties available to the least well off. As Rawls puts it,
‘... the two principles of justice as they work in tandem incorporate an important 
element o f pure procedural justice in the actual determination of distributive shares.
They apply to the basic structure and its system for acquiring entitlements; within 
appropriate limits, whatever distributive shares results are just. A fair distribution can be 
arrived at only by the actual working of a fair social process over time in the course of 
which, in accordance with publicly announced rules, entitlements are earned and honored. 
These features define pure procedural justice.’88
This is in harmony with one of the criticisms we have already asserted of Nozick, 
namely that his conception of what it takes to ensure individual agency and the conditions 
needed to allow market processes to enforce legitimate choices are not robust enough. 
Rawls argues that markets are just only if redistribution is undertaken first. Nozick urges 
that this commitment to redistribution results in the state having to keep re-shuffling 
assets from A to B.89 Rawls’ answer to this criticism lies in extrapolating his previous 
assertion that the difference principle is just a benchmark guideline. Rawls argues that 
taxation would be a matter of procedure so individuals would be aware of it and partake 
in it without the kind of constant re-assessment by the state Nozick argues would occur.
87 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, p. 276
88 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, p. 282
89 These sentiment about paternalism is best captured in Nozick’s exposition found in Nozick, Robert: 
Anarchy, State and Utopia, (New York: Basic Books, 1974), pp. 14-16 and pp. 320-324
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As we saw in working through Nozick’s position, a libertarian position will need to 
embrace redistribution in order to contribute to a discussion about how the market can 
enforce our individual choices. Rawls’ answer is essentially that no one could rationally 
choose, within the parameters of his thought experiment, not to have such a paternal 
mechanism. It is not overly paternal but instead appropriately paternal. This aspect of 
Rawls argument becomes particularly important for Van Parijs when discussing his 
disbursal method of UBI. Van Parijs defends his paternalism based upon a similar claim 
related directly to a liberal commitment to justice. These aspects of the difference 
principle Van Parijs will retain in his development of the liberal project.
Our exposition on the commitments of a Fair Shares Proviso in the previous 
chapter would appear to do something similar to what Rawls is suggesting. We asserted 
that this is what Nozick should have accepted. Such a proviso asserts a specific claim to 
resources and allows room for actions to address natural endowments before legitimizing 
the market. These ground rules are, in essence, a set of goods individuals must be at 
liberty to acquire or use equally with all other individuals in society once we have 
undertaken the actions needed to assure their moral agency. Property rights are then 
better understood as being secondary claims. We must first address the matter of 
individual circumstances and once this is done appropriately, we can approach the issues 
of choice that we want to provide through a market. Our consideration of choices can 
have something to say about how our markets have to work, but we must meet the 
consideration of individual circumstance first.
The Fair Shares Proviso also invokes the use of impartial reflection upon 
distributions to ensure the legitimacy of outcomes in a similar if not identical way to the 
approach taken by Rawls’. The difference in this account is that the Fair Shares Proviso 
takes on the account of worsening rather than one of maximin redistribution. Rawls 
gives us a device to actually look at this standard and make sense of it even if it is 
different. Rawls also uses it to include our other considerations about justice that we 
stated in the last chapter we needed. Our impartiality device allows us to address these 
matters needed to justify a market, as they precede our market considerations. It is in this
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light that Rawls’ general premise about the subordination of property claims can be 
upheld as the correct step. However, our claim from our Fair Shares Proviso is different 
and this difference is important. It does not assume maximin actions of redistribution 
even if it clearly legitimizes redistribution. It is rather an account of fair initial 
distribution and actions to rectify injustices. The Fair Shares Proviso and our discussion 
of libertarianism takes us to a liberal account of justice, but we still place claims through 
our moral agency and the market which are different from those presented by Rawls. It is 
the push and pull between these issues and why Rawls argues for maximin reasoning that 
will be the focus of much of our forthcoming debate. This very basic contrast of the 
difference principle with our needed pre-market actions and a Fair Shares Proviso shows 
why we are going to have such a conflict. These accounts appear to take on the same 
relative concerns in qualifying our market but redistribute for very different reasons. 
Rawls himself will work to qualify maximin actions to a greater degree because such 
actions curb the results of choices in a marked way. If developments of the liberal 
position are to reconcile these positions such argument will need to honor the shares 
claim of libertarianism while specifying correctly the political nature and scope of other 
property claims.
The difference between these two positions is that Rawls attributes everything to a 
calculation of comparative liberty in society. Justice as fairness and the principles that 
follow reflect decisions made by individuals about these liberties with a very specific 
understanding of themselves and their world. These understandings come from the 
attributes and conditions allowed in or blocked out by the veil of ignorance and these 
must be appropriate in order for us to accept his principles of justice even if we accept his 
impartial premise. A Fair Shares Proviso, even in the specified and subordinate form we 
have discussed, only posits a fair initial and ongoing share of resources, even if we 
expand this definition of resources. Our Fair Shares Proviso is a form of allocative 
justice in that it allocates a set of resources, sensitive of individual circumstance and the 
needs of moral agency. Once this is accomplished in an ongoing way, it allows market 
practices to do the rest of the distributive work due to the moral agency attributed to
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individuals. This market is needed to allow choices to count. However, Rawls urges this 
kind of approach is not enough to ensure justice as fairness.
Rawls argues that simply attributing resources to individuals is not enough to 
ensure an equal value of individual liberty in society.90 Rawls argues that giving a share 
of resources does not do enough to ensure the equal value of liberty through a maximin 
set of social primary goods. The welfare of everyone is not an appropriate measure either 
as some may want more resources without affirming through labor the basic structure of 
society. The difference principle is intended to be just the right balance. As we will see 
through Van Parijs and Dworkin, this balance may not be quite as straightforward. 
Resources are needed for moral agency and to rectify issues of unchosen individual 
circumstance. Rawls urges we cannot ascribe an appropriate level pre-market condition 
from simply providing resources. The resources needed for fairly valued liberties must 
be reassessed based upon the liberty they provide. Rawls argues that if one receives just 
an allocation of resources, these will either reflect a conception of the good rather than 
the right or be inadequate for the concerns of equality in a fair society.
This claim does not appear to hold against our Fair Shares Proviso if we draw our 
conception of resources appropriately. The Fair Shares Proviso just asks us to divvy 
everything up so there is no conception of the good imposed. Instead, these shares of 
everything are projected onto individuals. Everyone receives an equal share, so there is 
no resource inequality provided internal endowments are somehow dealt with. Our 
concern becomes attributing the resources to which we ought to have a share to such a 
calculation. I believe it is possible to move our Fair Shares Proviso to encompass a more 
expansive account of resources. This would include resources created/protected through 
the basic structure of society. Drawing this definition out is extremely important but 
likely a dissertation/book on its own. So I ask you to simply imagine that such an idea is 
plausible, which I believe it is. Our liberal authors all make this relative jump and I do 
not think it is a hard one to sustain even given my eventual development of the liberal 
position. This appears to be a needed move if we are going to make good on the claims
90 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, p. 221
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of justice that Rawls has argued should preface our account of the market. So far, we 
have discussed resources in the sense of simply being naturally existing resources. 
Though I still feel this is part of how we should conceptualize the Fair Shares Proviso 
working, Rawls asks us to consider the resources of society as a whole and to make sure 
our moral agency can be fulfilled through access to careers as well as social and political 
positions. This is because they exist through an affirmed basic structure to which we are 
all participants. These roles that must be open to us, which implies they are in fact 
resources. The Fair Shares Proviso can then say something about them if we work 
through this position. It will be my argument that Van Parijs gives us a way to develop 
this thought. Defending processes of allocation will be a major concern for a UBI like 
Van Parijs’ that formalizes specific allocative practices to ensure distributive justice. 
Allocative approaches require a development or amendment to the Rawlsian argument in 
order to be justified. This is because the approach is concerned with providing maximin 
liberties through resources rather than a fair allocation of resources. I have argued this is 
in part fulfilled by our Fair Shares Proviso given we can account for individual 
circumstances in an appropriate way.
For Rawls, ensuring that individuals have an equally valuable set of liberties 
requires the state to be more proactive than simply providing access to or a share of 
resources. The demands of the principles of justice require more. This is because we 
cannot assume individual circumstances and our need to ensure the equality of 
opportunity. It becomes a matter of determining whether the eventual development of the 
liberal position I will present balances these correctly. It is my position that Rawls has 
not done this. The problem for Rawls is that he allows the consideration of our 
circumstances to constrain our ability to legitimize choices in the market to an 
inappropriate degree. He reaches this decision about how each should matter through an 
incorrect sensitivity argument present in the veil. Rawls draws too broadly the role that 
natural endowment has in the choices individuals make. He argues natural endowments 
constrain choice sets / opportunities, which they do. Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that they dictate the choices people make given the options they do have. It also does not 
mean that a society can completely rectify natural endowment inequalities. I would even
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stress that it is unwise and even dangerous to think this should be the goal of society. 
Therefore, it is unfair to expect individuals within a society to act towards an unattainable 
and arguably unjust goal. Our account of fairness, knowing these issues could befall us 
impartially and hypothetically has to be more detailed in order to be properly sensitive to 
the factors at play. A development in how we make things reciprocal and let choices 
count to the degree they ought too is required. Choices have consequences and so the 
differences in outcome allowed in a liberal account of justice have to reflect this, even if 
a consideration for natural endowment clearly accompanies a commitment to justice.
The actions of how we redistribute, to whom we redistribute and to what level we 
redistribute are all going to change based upon whether these considerations are properly 
reflected in our impartiality device. Rawls does not draw his account of what comes in 
and out of the veil to reflect the nuance I have suggested here. As a result, the principles 
of justice enforce this mis-drawn balance even if we agree that our move toward 
liberalism and most of its conceptual structures is warranted. As we move forward 
through this chapter, I will show how deep this issue is and how it links in to most of the 
arguments Rawls makes about how we conceive a just state. It is assessing the degree of 
this imbalance that becomes crucial in justifying the development of liberalism I will 
suggest.
This imbalance is apparent in Rawls argument for maximin redistribution, which 
works as follows. The well-off are assumed to be talented/naturally endowed. This gives 
them an advantage in achieving entitlements in the market. This advantage is unfair and 
as such legitimizes the maximin redistribution that follows to the least well off. Rawls 
argues this relationship from one party to the other is “... compensated for in this sense: 
the all-purpose means available to the least advantaged members of society to achieve 
their ends.”91 This is true for the well off as well since they would be ignorant of their 
abilities due to their arbitrary ascription. The concern of the least well off would then 
be the paramount consideration and act as a veto, albeit a specific one, on the liberties 
of the better off. The inequality that could exist between the least-well off and the 
better off would have to benefit the least well off in providing a set of social primary
91 IBID, p. 327
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goods. These goods are likely to be resources but our concern is with the liberties these 
resources provide and as such, the shares needed to accomplish this are going to be 
motivated by liberty provision not a fair or equal share.
Although the ownership of natural endowments is guaranteed under the first 
principle of justice, this does not in turn imply complete ownership of the entitlements 
produced or accrued through the same morally arbitrary processes. Rawls states that the 
variation in talents is a “common asset”92 and cooperative arrangements allow these to be 
realized. This places individual reward into the public frame while not removing 
legitimate entitlement to them (although constrained) in society. Simply put the greater 
endowed, not deserving to be more endowed, can still act to benefit themselves. In order 
for this to yield disproportionate entitlements justly, the arrangement must benefit the 
least endowed as they did not deserve to be less endowed. Rawls believes individuals do 
not deserve their place in society if this is derived from their distribution of natural 
endowments. Rawls emphasizes how these two factors and the entitlements they can 
yield have a profound effect on equality, liberty and fairness if not constrained by the 
difference principle.
For Rawls, this explanation of entitlements works to assert how justice as fairness 
is appropriately egalitarian without being unfair in some procedural sense. However, this 
is only part of the potential equation. If it were, we may end up moving towards total 
material equality because material inequalities all result from unfair circumstances.
Rawls sets out to address the critique that endorses Marxist equalization. Such a solution 
would imply a lump sum tax, which Rawls refers to as a “head tax”,93 under which the 
better-endowed pay more tax to provide for the less well endowed. Rawls argues that 
such a solution is flawed because figuring out if natural endowments led to realized 
advantages is impossible to decipher. Although individuals may have favorable natural 
endowments they may not choose to realize them or even know of their existence. Rawls 
argues these imposed taxes would have to be based on potential / kinetic talents instead
92 Rawls, John: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, Part II, Lecture 21, pp. 74-77
93 IBID, Part IV, Lecture 48, p. 157
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of realized talents. In doing so, individuals would be forced to pursue ends simply for the 
payment of tax. Such an arrangement would be unfair, as individuals would be coerced 
into labor that they may not wish to undertake. This would not take our moral agency 
and the legitimacy of our choices seriously enough.
Rawls argues that because the basic structure is to our mutual benefit, we cannot 
rationally choose to ascribe to different principles of justice. Choosing not to labor due to 
the material distribution that would result is a matter that we will return to in this text as it 
is at the heart of Dworkin and Van Parijs’ critique of Rawls. Rawls implies that choices 
in undertaking labor are a legitimate exercise of autonomy and can justify a 
disproportionate reward or conversely, the lack of one. Crucially for Rawls, our ability to 
choose to do X is arbitrary even if our choice to do it is not. As a result, the reward of the 
choice must be constrained within the framework of the basic structure.
In essence, the difference principle and its maximin actions become necessary due 
to the initial undeserved physical and mental inequalities innate in human beings and the 
ongoing material and conditional changes present within states. The importance of this 
single factor is critical. The inability to provide an equal share of these natural 
endowments to all leads to a distributive scheme in which rational individuals will act to 
prevent a comparatively low aggregate condition. This argument requires that we agree 
that talents are the result of an arbitrary genetic allotment and further that our choices are 
a subordinate consideration in exactly the way Rawls says they are. If our choices are not 
accounted for properly or require a more comprehensive account of their constituency 
than Rawls gives us, then our talents appear to be an exercise of moral agency that we 
need to protect in a greater way. If this is true, or at least true to a greater degree than 
Rawls allows, it leads us to reconsider the maximin actions of the difference principle 
and to accept some other development of the liberal argument.
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23  Moving from the Welfare State to a Property Owning Democracy
‘It is true that the theory need not define a cardinal measure of welfare. We do 
not have to know how disadvantaged the least fortunate are, since once this group is 
singled out, we can take their ordinal preferences (from the appropriate point of view) as 
determining the proper arrangement of the basic structure.’94
Rawls’ initial work A Theory o f Justice was largely received as legitimating the 
western democratic Welfare State upon its release. This characterization although not 
contextually unfair, is something that Rawls distanced his work from over time. Rawls 
wished his system of justice to be a freestanding political conception and although this 
entailed what we could fairly call welfare provisions, Rawls was not completely happy 
with the conception of the Welfare State to which his system of justice was ascribed. The 
Welfare State had become the focus of greater criticism over the years and Rawls’ theory 
was now conflated with an increasingly unpopular state system. Rawls, particularly in 
Justice as Fairness -  A Restatement, works through the commitments of the principles of 
justice in reflecting on and addressing criticisms of A Theory ofJustice.
As part of this discussion, Rawls formulates state categorizations and attempts to 
show what state models coherently adopt the principles of justice. These arguments are 
enlightening as they sharpen, but do not completely answer, the specific 
institutionalization of a Rawlsian state. Rawls, in working through this argument, 
addresses several suggestions for a just distributive system that will be helpful in 
addressing the arguments of Dworkin, Van Parijs and eventually my own appraised in 
this essay. Perhaps more importantly it will give us the final refinement of justice as 
fairness that will serve as the departure point from which we can assess Rawls’ theory. 
The state models presented here act to set the stage for Van Parijs’ institutional model. 
Van Parijs will argue that his state model is the ideal embodiment of these finalized and
94 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, p. 396
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tweaked conceptions of political and socio-economic structures that Rawls himself 
forwards as ideal types of states.
Rawls begins by outlining five separate kinds of political economies to consider. 
These are Leissez-Faire Capitalism, Welfare State Capitalism, State Socialism with a 
Command Economy, Property Owning Democracy, and Liberal Democratic Socialism.95 
Rawls begins by asserting briefly how the first three of these models violate the 
principles of justice through material inequality and/or the failure to realize democratic 
rights respectively. The first of these, Leissez-Faire Capitalism, is described very much 
like Nozick’s minimal state. The status of individuals as equals is secured through 
negative rights protection alone and the continued just operation of capitalist justice. 
Rawls states this fails to meet the idea of justice as fairness because it “... secures only 
formal equality and rejects both the fair value of the equal political liberties and fair 
equality of opportunity.”96
The second of these systems, Welfare State Capitalism, Rawls argues has a 
greater concern for equality of opportunity but still “.. .rejects the fair value o f ... 
political liberties.”97 The welfare state provides, through redistribution, resources to the 
least well off and in doing so provides individuals a greater set of opportunities. 
However, Rawls argues it falls short in providing justice as fairness due to the continued 
inequalities in liberty that persist through distributions of wealth. The welfare state then 
provides subsistence living to some extent without realizing appropriately the reciprocal 
fair value of liberties across individuals required by a fair system of cooperation. The 
third of these systems is State Socialism with a command economy. Rawls argues this 
violates the equal rights and liberties of individuals.98 The command economy and form 
of rule needed in State Socialism dictate that the processes of markets and democratic 
rights that are a part of a fair cooperative state are not possible.
95 Rawls, John: Justice as Fairness -  A Restatement, pp. 136-138
96 IBID, p. 137
97 IBID, pp. 137-138
98 IBID, p. 138
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Rawls argues the latter two, Property Owning Democracy and Liberal 
Democratic Socialism, can provide justice as fairness coherently. Rawls describes 
Liberal Democratic Socialism as a political system in which “the means of production 
are owned by society ... in the same way that political power is shared among a number 
of democratic parties, economic power is dispersed among firms,... elected by, if not 
directly in the hands of, its own workforce. ... [Fjirms under liberal socialism carry on 
their activities within a system of free and workably competitive markets. Free choice of 
occupation is also assured.”99 Rawls believes that Liberal Democratic Socialism is 
unattainable in present context in most states. In the alternative, we should work toward 
applying a Property Owning Democracy that conforms to the principles of justice. 
Though both Liberal Democratic Socialism and Property Owning Democracy are 
focused on how to affirm a just basic structure, which encompasses social, political and 
economic resources, they do so in different ways and to hence to different degrees. The 
modes of economy and political structure in each imply comparatively different 
institutions. As a result, the principles of justice imply the least well off must have fair 
value for their liberty but what these liberties are or ought to be can be different 
contextually while still being just. As Rawls writes,
‘In property-owning democracy,... the aim is to realize in the basic institutions 
the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation between citizens regarded as free and 
equal. To do this, those institutions must, from the outset, put in the hands of citizens 
generally, and not only of a few, sufficient productive means for them to be fully 
cooperating members of society on a footing of equality. Among these means is human 
as well as real capital, that is, knowledge and an understanding of institutions, educated 
abilities, and trained skills. Only in this way can the basic structure realize pure 
background procedural justice from one generation to the next. Under these conditions 
we hope that an underclass will not exist; or, if there is a small such class, that it is the 
result of social conditions we do not know how to change, or perhaps cannot even
99 IBID, p. 138
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identify or understand. When society faces this impasse, it has at least taken seriously the 
idea of itself as a fair system of cooperation between its citizens as free and equal.’100
Access to these assets is required to have a fair society and affirm the basic 
structure. However, it does not say how robust these assets need to be aside from them 
being distributed fairly. As such, Liberal Democratic Socialism and a Property Owning 
Democracy both meet this standard. It is important to add her briefly that these are 
precisely the sort of resources I would suggest our amended Fair Shares Proviso would 
need to take onboard. Importantly for Rawls, this distinction is met by a Property 
Owning Democracy but not a Welfare State. Rawls argues a Property Owning 
Democracy is not a Welfare State because a Property Owning Democracy works to 
disburse private ownership and allows all individuals a comprehensive set of primary 
goods. In contrast, Rawls argues a Welfare State only universally provides these goods 
to the least well off upon being less well off. In doing so, it does not empower 
individuals to enjoy a necessary level of equal opportunities. In not realizing justice 
appropriately, the Welfare State entrenches social and economic inequalities. On the 
other hand, a Property Owning Democracy empowers all to, over time, attain anything 
possible in society (ideally speaking). Equal liberty requires equal condition that in turn 
requires equal distributions over a lifetime. This is the aim of the Property Owning 
Democracy that institutes justice as fairness coherently. As Rawls states,
‘It [the just state] supposes that citizens have at least an intuitive plan of life in the 
light of which they schedule their more important endeavors and allocate their various 
resources so as rationally to pursue their conceptions of the good over a complete life. This 
idea assumes that human existence and the fulfillment of basic human needs and purposes are 
good, and that rationality is a basic principle of political and social organization.’101
Rawls notes, the Welfare State, although enforcing and endorsing redistribution, 
does not go about redistribution in a way that can be reconciled with the principles of
100 IBID, p. 140
101 Rawls, John: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 141
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justice. Rawls notes that the exchange value in material wealth equals greater and thus 
unequal liberty. The Welfare State instead of addressing this issue initially and 
multilaterally simply waits for them to occur. It is only upon their occurrence that it 
addresses these issues and frequently acts upon problematic criteria. Rawls fears that 
such a tactic only enforces unacceptable social inequalities based on entrenched 
economic inequalities.
Rawls continues his critique of the modem Welfare State in pointing out further 
status inequalities. Rawls is concerned that non-Property Owning Democracy systems of 
justice do not allow the same access to political processes based on material affluence.102 
Rawls is deeply troubled by the correlative relationship material wealth has in successful 
forays into politics. Rawls argues in a well-ordered society, justice as fairness precludes 
levels of inequality in the ability to attain positions in government. The material 
requirements of government office entrench a particular class in society and effectively 
allow them to hold a dominant political and social position to other equal political actors. 
This is an inequality Rawls argues directly conflicts with the coherent application of the 
principles of justice.
Rawls turns his attention to the idea of providing only a “social minimum”.103 
This critique posits that the distributive commitment of the principles of justice is to 
provide comprehensively but solely the basic things needed to live a meaningful life for 
all individuals. The idea of a social minimum is to ensure that the distributions provided 
by the state are at acceptable levels to support the needs of individuals while not 
providing excessive support. From the outset, this sort of system appears to provide the 
distributions of primary goods needed to provide a fair value for liberty across society. 
However, Rawls argues a straight social minimum argument still does not fulfill the 
needs posited by the principles of justice.
102 This concern is particularly in reference to the United States and campaign finance issues. See Rawls, 
John: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, pp. 135-137
103 Rawls, John: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, pp. 128-131
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For Rawls, the principles of justice dictate that systems of distribution and 
entitlement must maximin the value of the liberties enjoyed by the least well off. Rawls 
argues that a social minimum provision only provides a minimum set of life chances that 
may not be equally valued. Rawls argues that systems of justice ought rather to ensure 
equal liberties and life chances through redistribution. Rawls concedes that the two 
concepts will likely affirm similar privileges and distributions but the demands of justice 
postulate one commitment over the other. Rawls argues that a social minimum solution 
cannot be based on justice as fairness. Instead, it must make claims based on the intuitive 
ideas that construct society concerning what the minimum provides. In doing so, a social 
minimum would affirm a kind of comprehensive doctrine in the prescriptive things it 
would provide, which would in turn violate the original premises of Rawls’ project. Van 
Parijs will use this argument in providing a set of primary goods through a UBI rather 
than some form of in-kind provision. He believes, like Rawls, that the avoidance of 
prescriptive allocations is paramount to ensuring a just society. However, the jump in the 
argument is critical to note here. Rawls moves to prescriptive problems with the social 
minimum rather than confronting the idea that a different conception about a fair 
distribution could exist that is allocative yet non-prescriptive. Importantly, a different 
conception that could fulfill this criterion would imply some different yet legitimate 
sensitivity in deciding what is fair. This would cause us to reconsider some deep 
philosophic aspects of Rawls approach. I will show as we move on, why this distinction 
becomes so important.
Rawls continues by re-asserting the primacy of his account of distributive justice 
in comparison to allocative justice.104 Rawls states that his systems can assign a role to 
the market as individuals acting under the rules of justice in a system of cooperation 
means that the resulting distributions are fair.105 Entitlements arise within the system of 
cooperation and as such must adhere to the rules that govern its fairness. However, his 
account of distributive justice, unlike allocative justice, does not entrench inequalities as 
he feels allocative institutions would.
104 See Rawls, John: A Theory o f Justice, p. 56 and p. 77, and Rawls, John: Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement, Part II, Lecture 14, pp. 50-52
105 Rawls, John: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, pp. 50-51
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Rawls raises this distinction by bringing up the idea of athletic draft systems, in 
particular the NBA draft.106 In this example, Rawls notes how teams are slotted 
opportunities in the draft based upon where they finished the season prior. The teams 
confederate in a league, not knowing who will have the highest quality players, coaches, 
monetary resources or plain good fortune as time goes by. In creating a fair system of 
cooperation for their mutual advantage, the teams agree to a fair way to distribute 
incoming resources. So they agree to the inverse order draft, a system that benefits the 
least well off.
Each season, the process starts anew and individual teams are not penalized or 
disadvantaged based on past performance or entrenched systems of distribution. Instead, 
they are simply given a draft pick relationally inverse to their order of finish. Rawls 
wishes to illustrate that this system is fair as an institution of distributive justice. Each 
individual team is awarded a material distribution based upon a quantification of their 
need. Over time, teams are assured of a greater distribution, a maximin distribution, 
through a relationally better draft pick. If teams were just allocated a draft pick each in 
an arbitrary fashion or equally but not in relation to their need compared to each other, 
these systems of allocative justice would not satisfy the equal liberties over time that 
justice as fairness must provide. The least well off are provided something, but not 
something that will equalize conditions over the various parties involved in the 
cooperative agreement. The value of their liberties will become less and less equal even 
thought they are equally provided a pick through a straight allocative measure. As a 
result, Rawls argues we can see that we need to order our draft so that those at the bottom 
have a legitimate chance of getting to the top. If we do not those at the top will have an 
unfair advantage in a cooperative agreement that should value everyone’s liberties 
equally.
This would appear to refute our previous support of the Fair Shares Proviso 
within an account of liberal justice. However, this is only the case if Rawls assertions
106 IBID, p. 51
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about allocative justice hold. These assertions are predicated on an inappropriate account 
of moral agency as it relates to abilities and the way systems of allocation can be applied. 
In the next chapter, I will explain why Rawls arguments on these points do not hold. We 
will revisit this portion of Rawls argument again both through Dworkin and Van Parijs as 
they both find ways in which this part of Rawls thought is problematic.
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2.4 Conclusion
It is at this point that we need to highlight the major issue that is to come. All of 
the developments to come are placed within this general frame of reference, so it 
important to understand it thoroughly in order to assess the validity of the argument to 
come. Rawls is using justice as fairness through a specified thought device to setup 
background institutions of redistribution that set the environment for a market device that 
honors our choices.107 Pure process, like that of Nozick, does not take into account the 
ongoing needs of individuals to ensure their equal moral agency in society. As we 
discussed in the last chapter, the inability of Nozick to articulate properly the demands of 
justice lead to an account that does not meet with our ongoing concerns. Had Nozick*s 
argument been described more coherently by understanding the demands of the proviso, 
accounting for natural endowment inequalities and ensuring moral agency of individuals 
through resources then the arguments needed to subordinate the market and redistribute 
would be clear. In fact, these would lead us to accept liberal justice. Rawls’ critique of 
libertarian systems comes to a similar conclusion as our discussion of Nozick did. 
Background justice has to be provided and sustained in order for market claims to hold 
any weight. Rawls gives us an idea of fairness to motivate these actions and a device to 
work them through. This is clearly a needed step in developing an account of justice.
As we have asserted our market does still have a needed role. Rawls is not averse 
to the potential legitimacy of the market. Rawls is even willing to go so far as to say that 
a market system is necessary to assure the rights and liberties of a fair society. These 
actions and the ability to own property are important aspects of individual self-respect 
and autonomy.108 Ultimately the space Rawls affords market processes is significant but 
in a subordinate way. Our discussion of libertarianism asserted the need for precisely this 
distinction. We undertake actions of justice and redistribution on several counts first, but 
the market still has a place. Rawls describes a conception of justice that allows us to cash
107 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, p. 263
108 IBID, p. 318
Balancing Choice and Circumstance -  Fair Shares and Just Access in Liberal Justice 90
out the idea of worsening used by a market proviso. Rawls shows us how a thought 
device can work to impartially reach decisions about resource justice. Rawls gives a 
salient argument of why our states should care about individual circumstances caused by 
their uneven natural endowments. These are clear considerations about moral agency 
that legitimize redistribution, which our libertarian arguments missed. Rawls also shows 
how a commitment to equal opportunities is going to cause us to consider resources in a 
broader way than simply natural elements. He shows why our progression into a liberal 
account of justice is so easy. Rawls* argument gives us a way to deal with these issues in 
a more robust, nuanced and necessary way.
However, Rawls goes further with his liberal argument. He argues that allocative 
justice is unable to provide justice as fairness and the principles that stem from it. As we 
have seen in the discussion of Rawls’ amendments to his original works, much of why 
the commitment to redistribution is so great and ongoing beyond the allocative process 
relies on our talents being as Rawls describes them and allocative accounts of justice 
being as prescriptive as Rawls fears they will be. We have to agree that talents are 
arbitrary and undeserved. We must further agree that the liberty to act, to choose to use a 
talent, is relative to the basic structure in which we live and a result of genetic luck we 
should not let bias our discussion of justice. Rawls points out that our talents are often 
the product of cultivation that requires ample social opportunities in order for them to be 
realized. The affirmation of the basic structure provides these opportunities and makes 
the claims garnered by talents subordinate to the needs of a fair society. As the basic 
structure is set up to maximin the opportunity sets of the least well off in order to be fair 
and allow the opportunities the talented need to excel, the redistribution from the well off 
to the less well off is legitimate.
Rawls would not argue against fair shares or the kinds of distributions that flow 
from a Fair Shares Proviso but he would argue that a system of allocation cannot provide 
them. The Fair Shares Proviso device is not needed because the principles of justice have 
ruled out allocative systems. Instead, we have an account of justice as fairness and the 
regimes that provide it which give Fair Shares but not in a strict allocative way. But this
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account is dependant on our account of what makes dictates our impartial rules and how 
they act fairly to be the same as his own. If they are not, then allocation will have to live 
up to an amended critique. The Fair Shares Proviso, which works within an allocative 
account of justice, could have an important role in a fair society if allocation can be 
justified because of conceptual issues in Rawls account. As we move forward in this 
text, it is these conceptual problems that I will highlight and expand upon.
Rawls wants choices to matter, as it is a choice to realize an individual talent even 
if possessing one is arbitrary and exercising one requires the affirmation of the basic 
structure. But the balance between these factors is reliant on talents being exactly as 
Rawls describes them. It is only through this account that he can legitimize the role he 
gives to individual choices. If they are not, the commitments of liberal justice will be 
different and will likely preclude the maximin aspect of Rawls* redistribution. This 
would happen because the exercise of a talent would be a choice at least primarily. 
Although this would not bring us to Nozick’s strict procedural outcome where choices 
are paramount, it would ask us to come to a different conclusion about what it means to 
affirm the basic structure and balance the claims of distributive justice. It would not rule 
out our amended proviso at least in regard to external resources. This is because we 
would have to give moral agency and the choices made through it more room to work and 
cause material inequalities. Both Van Parijs and Dworkin will develop Rawls argument 
to add or remove sensitivities that Rawls exposition overdraws. A change to the 
argument about talents presented by Rawls will cause us to take choices more seriously 
and their resulting material consequences. It will also cause us to reconsider the potential 
viability of an allocative account of distributive justice that is amply non-prescriptive.
The maximin calculation would have to be a level of access to resources rather than an 
entitlement to the product of those who only used their share of these same resources. Of 
course, this is dependant upon addressing natural endowments in an appropriate way. In 
the next chapter, I will postulate how this ought to be done.
This highlights how important it is in accepting the difference principle that we 
must agree with Rawls’ description of talents and individual choices. These come from
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deep within Rawls project and simply manifest themselves most pointedly in the 
principles of justice that cash these ideas out into rules and institutions. If we question 
this account of talents, choices and natural endowment there are two ways to proceed. 
The first, which we will explore in the next chapter, is to amend the veil to yield different 
judgments as Dworkin does. By changing the parameters of the judgments, the 
judgments can change and so too can our conception of choices and distribution. The 
second, which Van Parijs will attempt, is to accept Rawls judgments from the veil and 
simply modify and extrapolate his institutions. To do this, we must accept the reasoning 
posited here beyond the veil to the principles of justice and argue that Rawls extrapolated 
these incorrectly or at least not completely.
Nevertheless, it is hard to see how the principles of justice, as described in this 
chapter, can be amended to resolve a sensitivity problem. These principles merely reflect 
the fair resolution of decisions made from a specific account of knowledge. It is the 
knowledge and the balance it imposes that is truly at fault. The account of what is in and 
out of our considerations at the veil drives the principles of justice to be what they are. 
They reflect very specific arguments about our impartial standards of justice. If they are 
not sensitive to the way things “really” are, they will yield principles that do not reflect a 
fair arrangement of society. If the Rawlsian principles have not done so, it will have to 
be because these sensitivities present in the veil are incorrect. This will be my argument 
going forward and it will be important in accepting the path I will forward through Van 
Parijs and Dworkin as an appropriate development of the liberal argument.
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Chanter 3 - Dworkin. Talents and Ambition Sensitivity
Introduction
In the previous chapters, we have examined different conceptions of distributive 
justice and what these have had to offer in our consideration of choice and circumstance. 
In particular, we have focused on the role of systems of voluntary market transactions 
within these accounts. The inspection and progression of these arguments has led us to 
the liberal account of justice. In our inspection of Rawls, we saw the true power of the 
liberal argument. In exploring the difference principle, we were led to question Rawls’ 
conception talents, natural endowments and choices. Rawls wants individual choices to 
matter in individual material outcomes. He explains choices can justify material 
inequalities in society. Choosing to exercise one’s talents is a matter of autonomy and 
can yield disproportionate rewards within the basic structure of society. Crucially, our 
decisions about maximin redistributions through the difference principle rest upon Rawls 
specific interpretation of this issue.
However, the difference principle is not sensitive to the converse of this situation, 
namely individual choices yielding disproportionately negative material consequences. 
These cause individuals to be classified as being within the worse off group, which they 
may have fostered completely through their autonomous choices. These are not 
described as choices by Rawls but rather the unfortunate circumstance of a lack in natural 
endowments. These are unchosen genetic predispositions that individuals would guard 
themselves against in the original position thus yielding the principles of justice Rawls 
espouses. By Rawls account, our concerns with justice dictate such choices cannot cause 
individuals to drop below our maximin redistribution threshold because the value of their 
liberties has to be sustained in an ongoing way. But this explanation does not ring true if 
an individual has great natural endowments but chooses not to realize them. It does not
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seem fair that these equal choices undertaken by those with the same endowments gamer 
unequal levels redistribution. Furthermore, maximin redistributions can cause us to 
redistribute endlessly to people who can only realize very negligible gains in their 
liberties. Rawls account of individual choices causes us to question the use of the 
difference principle and Rawls argument against allocative justice.
Ronald Dworkin sees these issues arising from discussions of distributive justice 
and attempts to reconcile choices with circumstances by developing an account of liberal 
justice. Dworkin is concerned with the systems of justice visible in modem states and 
how these can be amended to reflect considerations of justice. As Dworkin states, “Equal 
concern is the sovereign virtue of political community—without it government is only 
tyranny—and when a nation's wealth is very unequally distributed, as the wealth of even 
very prosperous nations now is, then its equal concern is suspect.”109 He agrees with the 
general premise of Rawls but wishes to correct the troubling issues raised by the 
Rawlsian project such as the difference principle.
Dworkin is concerned that Rawls fails to adequately account for non-ideal types 
of individuals in conceptualizing his theory. These cause Rawls to justify redistributive 
obligations through the difference principle that reflect incorrect sensitivities. In this 
chapter, I will summarize Dworkin’s argument for an auction and insurance scheme, 
which modifies the devices of Rawls’ argument. I will articulate how Dworkin’s 
argument works to amend perceived deficiencies in Rawls’ system of justice and what 
issues Dworkin’s state model raises.
The discussion of Dworkin is extremely important in assessing the arguments of 
Van Parijs in the next chapter and in asserting the need for the further developments of 
the liberal argument I am going to present. This is for two primary reasons. The first is 
that Van Parijs engages directly with the arguments of Dworkin and works in large part 
to refute their validity. Van Parijs’ Rawlsian conception of justice is at odds with parts of
109 Dworkin, Ronald: Sovereign Virtue: The Theory o f Practice in Equality, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), p. 1
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Dworkin’s argument and for us to assess them fairly, it is important to engage with them 
as Dworkin describes them first. The second reason is that Van Parijs himself will 
engage in a critique of Rawls on similar premises, even if he uses different methods and 
reasoning. To appraise the effectiveness of this argument, we must understand intimately 
the arguments of both Rawls and Dworkin so that a comprehensive analysis of Van 
Parijs’ argument can be undertaken. It is only in seeing the shortcomings of all of these 
liberal accounts that we can move forward in developing a liberal account that addresses 
the issues that remain inappropriately resolved. This will lay the groundwork for my own 
development of the liberal account of distributive justice. Through the exposition of the 
distributive justice claims of Dworkin, I intend to show how a liberal commitment to 
justice need not yield the intrusive redistributions of the difference principle. By the 
same token, I will critique Dworkin’s and Rawls’ conception of natural endowments and 
what a fair and reciprocal system would need to reflect given a more considered 
discussion of this issue. This will involve a discussion of talents, disabilities and 
handicaps. 1 will show the need for a far more detailed understanding of the issues 
surrounding handicaps and the capability of choice. I will argue this leads us to accept 
what I will call the Principle of Just Access. With this general conception sketched, I will 
return to the idea of market and discuss what this all means for our weighting of the 
issues of individual choice and circumstance within the liberal account of justice.
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3.1 Dworkin’s Critique of Rawls
To understand Dworkin’s critique, let us first discuss Rawls’ argument for 
distributive justice over allocative justice through the difference principle. Dworkin’s 
critique will revolve around the issues of choice, responsibility and distributive measures. 
I believe the Basketball Draft example110 that Rawls alludes to in Justice as Fairness -  A 
Restatement gives us a fertile example of the major problem with Rawls’ argument. This 
is a tangible example of Rawls’ distributive claims and the problems they yield.
Basketball teams, coming together to form a cooperative association, agree to a 
set of rules and practices that are fair and just between them as equals. This is essentially 
the first step in Rawls. They set forth to determine impartial principles to ensure the 
longevity of each other and the basic structure, the league at hand, which is essentially 
step 2 of Rawls’ theory. These teams, not knowing where they will end up after coming 
together at this bargaining point, act to institutionalize practices sensitive to potentially 
poor outcomes. These teams are ignorant and impartial in some appropriate way through 
a veiled position such as step 3 of the Rawlsian project would dictate.
The distribution of players is one of the unknown resources that a fair system of 
distribution would need to consider. This leads to all sorts of potential principles to 
ensure equality like a salary cap perhaps, but for our consideration here, let us just 
consider new players, as they are the resources allocated in the draft process. The 
drafting of new players is structured to ensure the least well off are compensated for their 
position over time by creating an inverse order draft. Rawls argued that the inverse 
ordering of the draft ensured that teams received goods based upon need, ascertained by 
the preceding season’s performance. As the well off or successful teams would have an 
advantage due to the increased position their success afforded them, the teams unaware of 
their future success would agree on an arrangement that provided liberties, through
110 Rawls, John: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement; Second Revised Edition, ( Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2001), p. 51
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preferential player selection to the least well off. This principle of distributive justice 
ensures that teams will all have equal and ongoing opportunity to succeed based upon 
their actions/talents/will/etc. It also affirms the basic structure of the cooperative 
agreement through which all the teams benefited, as the league requires a plethora of 
teams. Rawls felt this best embodied the commitments of the principles of justice, in 
particular the difference principle. Rawls argued allocative justice, although achieving an 
egalitarian distribution, entrenched power/privilege relations by failing to > 
disproportionately assist the least well off. By simply giving each team a draft pick or an 
opportunity to sign players equally, the league would not dynamically address 
inequalities between the teams, which would be (in Rawls terms) unfair.
Ironically, in the mid-1980s, the very draft process in question suffered a major 
setback. The 1983-84 Houston Rockets, an NBA franchise at that time in the Mid-West 
Division, were having a competitive yet not all that successful season. By virtue of their 
previous seasons favorable distributive draft pick, (1st pick of the 1983 draft) Ralph 
Sampson, the team had improved greatly from their woeful 14-68 record in the 1982-83 
season.111 However, inexplicably toward the end of the 1983-84 season, with an 
improved but mediocre record, the Rockets began to lose in spectacular fashion. This 
spiral downward culminated when at the end of the 83-84 season, the Rockets yet again 
received the first pick in the draft. This pick led to the selection of Hakeem “the dream” 
Olajuwon with the first overall pick. Hakeem and Sampson were to lead the Rockets to 
the 1986 NBA fmals and Hakeem would be a crucial part of many successful Rockets 
teams in the 80s and 90s.
However, the meteoric downfall of the 83-84 Rockets led to an uproar within the 
league and claims of “tanking” by the Rockets to receive the first overall pick.112 The 
argument in our terms was that the Rockets were capable of achieving a greater outcome
111 Refer to Basketball Reference at http://www.basketball-reference.eom/plavers/s/samDsra01.html & 
http://www.basketball-reference.com/teams/HOU/1983.html (accessed 21st of April 2010,15:33)
112 The Rockets lost 14 of their last 17 games to finish last in die Division. For an excellent summary of 
NBA draft issues please refer to Kalb, Elliot, Costas, Bob and Collingsworth, Cris: The 25 Greatest Sports 
Conspiracy Theories o f All-Time -  Ranking Sports Most Notorious Fixes, Cover-up’s and Scandals, New 
York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2007), pp. 45-56
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but had chosen not to. In doing so, they harmed everyone else within the cooperative 
arrangement through their own actions and freely entered choices. These claims were 
never formally substantiated as it is difficult if not impossible to weigh the impact 
choices have in an outcome. However, the NBA did respond in following seasons by 
introducing a weighted lottery instead of an inverse order coin-flip system. The lottery 
system has evolved over the past few decades in part because of pick trading, league 
expansion, and draft conspiracies. The result of the current weighted lottery in terms of 
distributive justice is that it provides priority allocations to teams based upon their need, 
quantified through their season record. It does this by giving each a number of balls in 
the lottery. The team with the most need statistically receives the most balls whereas the 
teams with lesser needs statistically receive fewer and fewer balls in the same lottery. A 
draw then takes place that determines who gets which picks, first through last, in the first 
round. The statistically worst team receives the most chances of getting the first pick, but 
is not guaranteed this distributive outcome. Instead, these teams are only given a greater 
possibility of having a high draft choice.
I venture that Rawls would argue that this lottery system does not equalize 
condition appropriately, as the least well off are not assured of greater equalizing 
compensation, just a proportionally better chance at comparatively better compensation 
than other equal teams. The argument for why the weighted lottery system is just is 
based upon the idea that condition is in part distributive and in part the result of choices 
and ambitions of a given team or autonomous agent. The Rockets presumed intentional 
failure was believed to be a strategy that took advantage of the egalitarian distribution of 
draft picks and in the process all the other members of the league. The Rockets, if they 
tanked, used the basic structure to claim resources rather than affirm it through fair play. 
They were capable and talented enough, arguably, to be a better team than their record 
would indicate and chose to “tank” given the advantages of doing so. Although the 
Rockets did well to optimize these distributions, which as draft followers will know is not 
a given in a first overall pick, their ability to draft first gave them an advantage. If this 
advantage was gained due to the legitimate performance/realized talents of the team the 
principle of distributive justice works. However, if the outcome of condition is from the
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teams* own choices and intentional actions, allowing them to receive a distributive 
advantage through the first pick is illegitimate. They chose, with an equally valued and 
thus valid decision, to benefit from the actions of redistribution rather than to legitimately 
finish where their natural endowments would have dictated. However, our measure on 
Rawls account is their position as being worse off. This standard does not allow us to 
make this needed distinction. Because it was and continues to be impossible to determine 
whether teams in the NBA “tank”, the weighted lottery system is invoked to ensure that 
teams are proportionally compensated for their frailties but not axiomatically rewarded 
perpetually for a condition they may be a party to fostering.113 This is to ensure the 
system values the choices of the successful and unsuccessful equally while still 
addressing the natural/human inequalities between teams.
Think of this as the problem of choice and individual responsibility within a 
structure of reciprocation and it is what Dworkin sets out to address in his critique of 
Rawls. Put bluntly, Dworkin wants to correct the sensitivities in Rawls’ conception of a 
fair and reciprocal agreement of mutual advantage. Choices cause discrepancies in 
conditional outcomes. Therefore, if these choices can be equally valued by addressing 
natural endowments and a provision of a set of allocative resources, then they need to 
have more room to operate in our distributive practices. Rawls does not do this because 
his concern with circumstances cuts so deeply into his project. Dworkin wishes to rectify 
inconsistencies he perceives in Rawls’ theory of justice, in particular the difference 
principle, by developing an alternative liberal account of justice. Although Dworkin 
raises many intriguing issues with Rawls and suggestions for specific policy perspectives, 
we will focus here on his systematic response to distributive justice through the 
difference principle.
113 The Donald Sterling ownership reign over the San Diego / Los Angeles Clippers is an excellent example 
of this issue. Refer to Keating, Peter: ‘Uncontested: The Life of Donald Sterling’ in ESPN: The Magazine, 
June 2, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/nba/news/storv?id=4187729 (accessed 21st of April 2010, 15:34) 
His personal issues aside, Sterling is most known for his reliance on redistributive measures in the NBA to 
keep his franchise turning a personal profit.
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Dworkin aims to develop liberal justice while keeping some of its primary claims 
and motivations. Dworkin urges that Rawls is not appropriately sensitive to the 
individual responsibility present when choices lead to resulting conditional outcomes.114 
Dworkin begins by discussing in detail the various reasons why welfare calculations can 
be problematic. Though Dworkin does not wish to underestimate the power of various 
factors on choices, he states “so far as choices are to be made about the kind of life a 
person lives, within whatever range of choice is permitted by resource and culture, he is 
responsible for making those choices himself 115 The egalitarian redistributions of the 
difference principle are sensitive to condition and obligate individuals to uphold them 
given the judgments that stem from the original position. These redistributions are not 
sensitive to the issues that arise when the choices individuals make lead to their relative 
material position. The more affluent are still obligated by the difference principle to 
provide for the less well off without assessing how they arrived at being less well off. 
Dworkin asserts that individuals may make expensive choices and in doing so, burden the 
disproportionately the well off to pay for their expensive lifestyle. In this way, the 
commitment to the difference principle adds inequality to society by allowing choice 
preferences to affect the obligations of redistribution.
Dworkin sets out to address specific problems systematically. However, it is 
important to note that Dworkin does not refute the overall conception of justice affirmed 
by Rawls and chooses primarily to focus on refining the parameters of redistribution. 
Dworkin develops Rawls thought from the point of the veil of ignorance and offers his 
own modified definition of this device, which allows individuals knowledge of their 
talents but not knowledge of the value of their talents. We will discuss this modification 
in detail later in this chapter. It is an attempt to formulate a liberal theory that wishes to 
find a different systematic answer to the problems of expensive tastes, reciprocation and 
personal choice.
114 Dworkin, Ronald: Sovereign Virtue: The Theory o f Practice in Equality, p. 4
" 51BID, p. 6
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Dworkin asks us to invoke an impartial thought device and envision a society of 
individuals washed onto a remote island due to a shipwreck. The resources these 
shipwrecked individuals have on this island must be distributed fairly and as such an 
auction is held in which each person has an equal ability to acquire goods. Dworkin 
suggests that in order to provide an appropriately sensitive account of justice that these 
individuals should envision a taste sensitive auction in which resources can be bid on by 
all who hold an equal amount of initial social capital, in his example “100 clamshells”.116 
The choices of the auction are a reflection of individual choices and conceptions of the 
good. Individual choices are realized through this market device in a fair and reciprocal 
manner. The fair value of resources is determined through the motivations of individual 
desires and the value these desires cost in an equal bidding process. All individuals, 
having the same ability to acquire resources respective to each other can then be 
responsible for their choices and arrive at a fair distribution of social primary goods. In 
such a system, the political obligation is on society to provide the “clamshells” and 
access to the auction in keeping with the principles of justice, as these units of social 
value provide equally valued liberty within the auction device. The allocation 
represented by the clamshells is equal and thus the fair shares of resources that result, 
although unique from one another, are fairly distributed.
. Dworkin argues that such a system, in invoking an institutionalized “envy test”117, 
will ensure that no one is upset with their distribution of goods compared with other 
equal individuals. The envy test is a tool to ensure that individual outcomes are the result 
of choices alone. It is hypothetical in the same way the original position was and intends 
to impartially determine legitimate distributions of resources. The idea works to ensure 
that no one can rationally envy another individuals allotment of resources because they 
had an equal ability to acquire them in keeping with the value they assign to them as 
individuals.
116 IBID, p. 68
1,7 IBID, p. 67
Balancing Choice and Circumstance -  Fair Shares and Just Access in Liberal Justice 102
The non-prescriptive nature of the clamshells is intended to do precisely this task. 
Everyone has the same clamshells and participates in the same auction with an equal 
ability to utilize the clamshells. The proper operation of the envy test will then allow the 
state to re-run the auction should this initial equality be unjust and legitimize actions to 
rectify the relative inequality. The envy test works to measure if a distribution of 
resources is just. Individuals cannot envy each other in this context because they were all 
equally free to follow the courses of action available at the auction. The envy test works 
to ensure each individual has the same ability to acquire the goods available based upon 
their individual tastes and the social values set in the bidding process by other equally 
endowed individuals.
The standard of envy-freeness through an auction device essentially accomplishes 
what we have argued our Fair Shares Proviso should. To avoid envy, individuals are 
given clamshells to acquire as much or as good of what they actually want in keeping 
with the individual value of the resources available. These resources are placed in 
bundles that are inclusive of social roles. The auction represents the equality of 
opportunity to do what one might want to do, given the value one gives to the bundles 
respective of everyone else’s value of the same bundles. They cannot envy the results of 
this allocative process because their choices are equally relevant in the hypothetical 
device. The allocation is not of resources but of clamshells. As a result, they are not 
prescriptive in the sense Rawls feared. The equal distribution and value of the clamshells 
makes the liberty of individuals who receive them the same. The Fair Shares that result 
are fair from our allocative process even if they appear uneven upon physical inspection. 
Thus, individuals can claim no relevant harm through what anyone else started with as 
they could have done the same. Their choices are the arbiter of what follows in terms of 
distribution. This is legitimate based upon the importance we ought to give to individual 
moral agency and the legitimate choices that come from it.
Envy-freeness through the auction device is a liberal account of allocative justice, 
as it affirms distributions are just even if material outcomes are unequal based upon an 
equal distribution of an allocated share. The clamshells and the auction act as a way of
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conceiving the commitments of Fair Shares Proviso over time. As we will discuss 
eminently, this is not all Dworkin asks us to judge in terms of endowments as he includes 
natural endowments within the measure of envy. This is a needed step given the 
Rawlsian arguments for removing aspects of natural endowments from our considerations 
of principles of justice in an appropriate way. Dworkin affirms this commitment. 
However, it is important here to see how Dworkin is using the auction and clamshells to 
work out a resource allocation argument.
Dworkin argues that such an auction conception develops liberal justice 
appropriately to avoid the issue of expensive tastes, which is unresolved in Rawls’ 
argument. Rawls’ over-riding concept in his theory of justice was that equal individuals 
need a fair system of equally valued liberties within a system of social cooperation. The 
demands of this commitment lead to redistribution in order to provide comparative 
liberty. Dworkin’s auction system retains these features. Individuals are equal and 
undertake a commitment to a fair system of cooperation. As we will discuss shortly, they 
undertake redistributive measures to provide an equal set of distributive liberties using 
the envy test and the conceptual auction. Individuals have the equal ability to pursue 
their material conceptions of the good based upon the value they assert to them while 
facing no inherent or systematic inequality in their acquisition or possession. Hence the 
opportunities they have, given the needs of their moral agency are met, are the same. 
Dworkin argues his process will provide an equal set of initial liberties and an equal set 
of opportunities to individuals in society. The spirit of Dworkin’s conception of justice is 
largely in harmony with the primary Rawlsian ideas of justice.
However, unlike Rawls, Dworkin wants to build in choice sensitivity so that the 
liberal project will be coherently reciprocal. As we have noted, Rawls’ system does not 
aptly deal with the issues that individual choices yield when considering systems of 
redistribution. Dworkin argues this is because Rawls’ system is not sensitive enough to 
the individual ambition that drives their choices. As such, Dworkin affirms the 
commitment to redistribution but questions the maximin aspect Rawls gives it. The least 
well off under the difference principle could claim redistributed resources even when
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they had choseato arrive in their condition of being least well off. Dworkin uses the 
envy test driven auction to rule out this potential circumstance of the difference principle. 
In operating the auction as Dworkin describes it, the least well off could not rationally 
envy the material position of others. Individuals could have followed alternative courses 
of action had they made different choices and had different tastes. The least well off are 
responsible for their outcome because they started out with an equal endowment to 
acquire their conceptions of the good.
Dworkin also argues that Rawls fails to address properly an inherent 
inconsistency in the conception of abilities in his theory of justice. For Rawls, natural 
advantages or disadvantages are not to affect distribution resources over an entire society. 
Individuals in the original position would be unable to determine what their distribution 
of these natural resources would be. Individuals in this position would then agree to an 
equal distribution of social primary goods to provide the essential liberties postulated by 
the principles of justice. Rawls wishes natural endowments not to count specifically in 
the provision of social primary goods and liberties within the basic structure. Dworkin 
shares this concern, as natural endowments are relevant when considering distributive 
justice. Nevertheless, Dworkin argues that the way Rawls draws this argument is too 
broad. Dworkin argues that Rawls’ system is too sensitive to natural endowments when 
considering redistributive measures. Rawls wants the difference principle to increase the 
value of liberties of the least well off through the maximin redistribution of social 
primary goods. If this is the case, some individuals such as the severely handicapped, are 
going to need immense compensation to utilize these social primary goods. This sets up 
a situation in which the compensation given to those with unfavorable distributions of 
natural endowments could spiral out of control. As Dworkin writes,
‘Suppose that the welfare (on any interpretation) of an entirely paralyzed but 
conscious person is vastly less than the welfare of anyone else in the community, that 
putting more and more money at his disposal would steadily increase his welfare but only 
by very small amounts, and that if he had at his disposal all the resources beyond those 
needed simply to keep the others alive he would still have vastly less welfare than they.
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Equality of welfare would recommend this radical transfer, that is, until the latter 
situation was reached. But it is not plain to me (or, I think, to others) that equality, 
considered just on its own, and without regard to the kinds of considerations that 
sometimes might be thought to override it, really does require or even recommend that 
radical transfer under these circumstances. I do not claim (as this last observation 
recognizes) that any community that embraced equality of welfare in principle would 
then be committed to the radical transfer.’118
Dworkin notes that the condition of some of these politically equal individuals 
could be improved slightly by disproportionate financial support. The difference 
principle dictates that this action is necessary to maximin the condition of the least well 
off and the liberties they can enjoy. The result is that those with greater natural 
endowments have to pay more and more in redistributive practices to achieve less and 
less actual improvement in liberties for certain individuals. Dworkin argues that a 
commitment to an equal and fair social structure cannot reflect this kind of redistributive 
arrangement.
Dworkin argues that if we apply the envy test to such a conception of talent and 
natural endowment that the talented individuals may envy the distributions of the 
untalented. They may envy resources that the untalented receive in compensation for 
being untalented. If the talented valued leisure for instance, they may decide the 
increased labor for nominal financial returns, caused by the constraints of the difference 
principle, means that they could rationally envy being not so naturally endowed. 
Therefore, Rawls, in instituting the difference principle, inadequately describes talents 
and how to compensate individuals fairly for inequalities in natural endowments.
Rawls does react to this criticism by adding leisure to the list of primary goods to 
be valued within the difference principle. Rawls argues that the way to remove this 
sensitivity problem is not to scrap the difference principle but rather to consider leisure a
118 IBID, Part 1, Chapter 1, pp. 60-61
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primary good, which can be valued along with all other primary goods.119 Rawls argues 
this ensures that someone who is merely lazy does not gamer compensation to an unfair 
degree given the choice they have made to be lazy. Van Parijs will critique this approach 
in the following chapter because he will argue this does not take equally valid 
conceptions of the good seriously enough. We will visit this argument in more detail in 
the next chapter. However, it is important to note, how profound a problem the 
difference principle may be. The compensation that is required by the maximin principle 
of providing a set of social primary goods to the least well off yields redistribution that is 
so robust that the talented are liable for incredible amounts of redistributive support. 
Dworkin argues Rawls has missed this crucial paradox in the operation of the difference 
principle given his argument for fair reciprocity. Dworkin argues that even with these 
redistributions there are still going to be individuals unable to use their distributions or 
use them with the same freedom as most of the other citizens in the state.120 Because of 
this, even these incredible redistributions will not equalize their condition.
Dworkin fears that unless certain natural/internal inequalities are addressed, the 
disparities in wealth may allow and affirm economic inequalities that make individuals, 
in particular the handicapped, fundamentally unequal. So although he is critical of 
Rawls’ redistributive reasoning, he does not want to refute the need of a fair society to 
redistribute to those with natural inequalities. Some of these individuals can clearly 
enjoy a meaningful life with a level of reciprocally fair support. Dworkin needs to 
address this issue if he is to fulfill his conception of Rawlsian political equality. The 
auction logic assumes that all the bundles of goods can be legitimately used upon 
purchase not just purchased by equal individuals. Because this is a fundamental aspect of 
Dworkin’s argument, it must be addressed appropriately.
Dworkin realizes that for the handicapped, their deficiencies in natural 
endowments mean that although they are free to bid on any bundle of goods they are not 
equally free to use all of the bundles available at the auction, as their natural endowments
119 Rawls, John: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 179
120 Dworkin, Ronald: Sovereign Virtue: The Theory o f Practice in Equality, Part 1, Chapter 7, pp. 285-305
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may not permit the plausible use of a certain set of goods. Dworkin urges that the answer 
to this problem is not simply to provide added compensation prior to the auction, as this 
does not ensure equality. The handicapped, although afforded a greater ability to claim 
the bundles they do want and can use, are still not equally free to select various roles in 
society. Their equality of opportunity is hampered by circumstances we cannot rectify 
but can compensate for. Dworkin notes that some handicapped individuals cannot ever 
attain a level of equality, no matter how much of a greater distribution they receive, and 
as a result, they will never be able to avail themselves of all of the bundles of goods. So 
ensuring a greater allocative distribution in the hypothetical device does not do enough to 
ensure justice. The requirement to equalize their initial condition could make these 
individuals an unlimited drain on resources if the conception of compensation is to follow 
the path of the difference principle.
Dworkin states that the answer to this problem lies in assuming initially that 
individuals are aware of their own mutual vulnerability and see the world beyond their 
initial starting point through a modified veil of ignorance.121 This account allows 
individuals knowledge of their talents but not knowledge of the value of these talents. It 
is at this point we need to make an important clarification to Dworkin’s argument, as Van 
Parijs will construe this definition in a distinct and incorrect way. Dworkin assumes that 
in removing the knowledge of value, he has removed the element of taste. This line of 
thought is relatively clear in that one cannot determine their taste for an attribute if they 
do not know the value of the talents such an attribute allows one to have. Van Parijs will 
argue that the other aspects of Dworkin’s argument rely on taste distinctions in order to 
make any sense and that these undermine such an account of the veil. If the value 
screened out by the veil is the value others hold but no one’s own value, then this sort of 
critique would be true. I will engage with this to a greater degree in the next chapter. 
Dworkin may fairly need to clarify this point further. The verbiage could be misleading. 
However, if we are to unbundle this idea, all we would need to establish is that the value 
removed by the veil is enough to make individual taste for an endowment unknown. This
121 IBID, p. 78 See -  Dworkin’s actual summary of how the Rawlsian Veil operates is on p. 136. Page 78 
is a discussion of the actual modification Dworkin feels the insurers should face.
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is not much of a step and I would argue what Dworkin intended to confer with his 
argument. Individual knowledge of talents then is more a calculation of abilities versus 
the set of opportunities those abilities allow you to undertake. There is no taste here, only 
math. The knowledge of talents holds no value other than a calculative measurement of 
natural endowment A allows me to undertake set B of opportunities. No matter how 
small or large B is, you will not know if what you want to do, your taste, is served by 
your set, thus allowing you to fairly calculate your insurance.
So if we establish this as what the modified veil does, we can move on to see what 
it is doing to our principles. This veil allows more into the knowledge of the original 
position representatives by informing them of their propensities but not their value. This 
also postulates that individuals in the original position would understand that they might 
face or acquire various frailties that would put them in such a precarious social position. 
These individuals will agree, given the knowledge present through the modified veil, that 
they will create a system of distribution that is sensitive to attributes of choice and that is 
not sensitive to aspects that are unchosen, such as a poor natural endowment.122 Given 
this grim prospect, individuals will agree to a form of social insurance that would provide 
for them should they be in such a disadvantageous position. Upon deciphering what 
individuals behind the modified veil would choose to pay as an insurance premium to 
protect against being handicapped, Dworkin argues that the requisite payments can be 
enforced as taxation to provide the social welfare for the handicapped within a society.
Dworkin pragmatically asserts that inequalities and disadvantages may still occur 
under such a solution, but that this process will yield just results and distributions. This is 
because we cannot foster perfect natural equality and it is unfair to expect society to work 
towards this end when it is not attainable. Some individuals will still face disadvantages, 
even sizable ones, due to their distribution of natural endowments. These disadvantages 
are acceptable, as all individuals knew in the impartial vacuum of the original position 
and upon agreeing to compensation, that these conditions could befall them. Dworkin 
argues that this yields a just outcome and a just distribution of compensation even if some
122 IBID, p. 204
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individuals could be given an improved minimal level of social standing with massive 
redistributive assistance. The individual moral obligation to provide greater support than 
the level of compensation can and frequently will drive redistributive actions between 
individuals but this not the responsibility of the state to enforce coercively. Dworkin 
argues that some inequality in natural endowment is inevitable so the goal should be to 
create a just process that treats individual actors equally given that any individual might 
find himself or herself at a natural disadvantage.
Dworkin argues his solution adequately and appropriately redistributes resources 
to those with deficiencies in natural endowments while avoiding the issues of the 
handicapped envying the talented and vice versa. An insurance scheme is for Dworkin a 
check on redistribution in order to ensure redistributions are fair given the impossibility 
of actually equalizing the natural condition of all. For Dworkin, this development 
addresses the deficiencies of Rawls’ theory. Individuals are responsible for their choices 
and preferences without placing the burden for these decisions on other citizens for their 
preferences. Dworkin argues these features are necessary to ensure that the distributive 
outcomes are not influenced by “choice insensitive”123 factors. Dworkin argues that 
distributions that compensate those with unchosen frailties are in keeping with Rawls’ 
general premise of creating a fair society through an impartial thought experiment. They 
remove the physical aspects of distributive outcomes in a way coherent with a fair system 
of social cooperation. Dworkin argues that this alternative explanation develops a 
Rawlsian account in a way more sensitive to the demands of justice as fairness.
However, to do so, Dworkin urges a greater differentiation of talents than the one 
postulated by Rawls. Van Parijs will wish to develop Rawls theory due to some of the 
same shortcomings Dworkin identifies in Rawls but will do so through a method that is 
critical of Dworkin’s approach.
Dworkin notes that individuals may cultivate their skills in various ways over 
time. Some of these methods and motivations may be more productive than others even 
across equally endowed individuals. Dworkin argues these are not legitimate differences
123 IBID, p. 204
Balancing Choice and Circumstance -  Fair Shares and Just Access in Liberal Justice 110
that imply greater redistribution. Dworkin asserts that distributions need to be 
appropriately “ambition sensitive.”124 Ambition is the act of individual discretion that 
realizes the use of a talent. It motivates the choices individuals make. As this process is 
a matter of autonomous individual choice, it needs to be the basis on which material 
distributions rest after we have fulfilled the structures and commitments of justice. 
Individuals are responsible for their level of ambition and their preferences to which they 
aspire. These responsibilities and consequences that result cannot be fairly foisted upon 
the rest of society. They can yield material inequalities but these are justified, as 
ambition is an aspect of every individual no matter the skills or propensities they may 
possess physically. With choice insensitive factors removed, endowment insensitivity is 
achieved by the use of the insurance scheme. Dworkin argues the outcomes of the 
resulting choices are a legitimate cause of material inequalities.
Dworkin’s argument is that Rawls, in drawing the difference principle as he does 
to make distributions endowment insensitive, institutes measures that do not allow the 
project to be properly ambition sensitive. Rawls argued that the possession of natural 
endowments, including the propensity to undertake certain choice sets, were all arbitrary 
attributes, the result of good genetic luck and the apparatuses of the basic structure, that 
had to be screened out of our judgments about legitimate distributive outcomes. Dworkin 
argues that some aspects of natural endowment effect distribution and these need to be 
screened out and compensated for if we are to take our reciprocal responsibilities to one 
another seriously. Rawls justifies why we should redistribute to the least well off. 
However, Dworkin argues individuals have a role in exercising their talents and labor. 
They should be compensated for this without having to use these entitlements to realize 
nominal improvements in the liberties of the least well off, although they may choose to 
do this freely. Rawls’ maximin liberty measures instituted by the difference principle 
violate this consideration of individual autonomy and underline why Dworkin’s 
development of Rawls is so necessary. If choices are to matter, then individuals must be 
responsible for them.
124 IBID, p. 89
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By restricting the validity of individual choices, Rawls does not give choices the 
space they need to have an appropriate meaning in society. If individuals make a choice 
then they must by extension, accept the consequences of this choice. It is the aim of a 
society structured on the principle of fairness to provide resources in order for individuals 
to have fair value for liberty. However, it does not seem fair that some individuals can 
choose to be the least well off rather than be forced by natural circumstance to be one of 
the least well off and as a result, demand greater redistribution from other members of 
society. Maximin reasoning will justify redistribution sensitive to results or means, 
which are not always caused by natural endowment deficiencies. Choices have to count 
if we are going to respect rights and autonomy. Rawls does not draw the parameters of 
this aspect of humanity properly. Dworkin provides a way for the power of the liberal 
critique to account for the ambitions individuals may have in their lives. The liberal 
consideration of justice present by Rawls lends much to our conception of justice. 
However, this conception raises serious issues of its own. The first is that individuals 
may choose to be the least well off in society rather than end up there due to natural 
deficiencies. The second is that the talented cannot be held to account for these 
individuals' choices through constant redistribution if these choices are an aspect of 
individual autonomy. Dworkin develops the argument due to these issues and in the 
process legitimizes an allocative account of justice, which Rawls wanted to rule out.
With allocative measures come markets, and our libertarian account of how markets need 
to work through a Fair Shares Proviso and what this tells us about kinds of taxation and 
redistribution that are just, is placed firmly back into our account of justice.
As starkly different as Dworkin’s definition of talents is from Rawls in at least 
this one way, his eventual response in how we ought to best institutionalize a fair 
redistributive system appears to mirror Rawls. This is because Dworkin develops Rawls 
thought rather than discards it. The decisions as to what amount of insurance is 
applicable and what conditions one is to insure against are drawn through Dworkin’s 
modified veil of ignorance. In this scenario, the knowledge the representatives have is 
different from Rawls account but the veil still acts to screen out certain contextual 
knowledge. With this understanding of the process, Dworkin questions what can be
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classified as a natural disadvantage or as an irresponsible use of a talent. Dworkin sees 
distinct problems in dividing concerns of welfare, resource provision, capability 
aggregates and opportunity from each other. As Dworkin puts it, “[e]quality of welfare 
or well-being is subject to different interpretations. People disagree about what genuine 
well-being really is.. .”125 Dworkin argues that these are irresolvable matters and are 
impossible to use in calculating individual affluence. A political theory should then take 
a more objective and pragmatic view of the observable relations in society. Since all of 
the roles these factors have played in individual condition are impossible to decipher, 
Dworkin suggests the threshold of redistribution will have to be material affluence even 
if this violates, in some ways, the conception of justice in question. Going forward I will 
develop the allocative argument in light of our Fair Shares Proviso and show that 
although we need not develop our argument away from redistribution, a coherent 
conception of allocation and market practices will lead us to say something far more 
specific about who owes what in terms of redistribution. It will be my argument that this 
cannot reflect naked end results but rather share use. The issue is that Dworkin deals 
with much of these issues in an abstract way. It is in developing the liberal account of 
justice beyond Dworkin that we see there are ways to apply non-prescriptive allocation in 
a tangible way. These systems then appeal to different decisions or at least more 
developed ones in relation to how these systems act appropriately. I will show how Van 
Parijs gives us a tool to deal with this but for now it is important to simply to understand 
where Dworkin feels the redistribution will come from.
This “second best”126 approach implies that there is no way for a socio-political 
scheme of justice to wholly personify the ideals of the commitments of justice. Justice is 
a goal to which we aspire, re-inspect and measure our observable society rather than an 
attainable utopian end. Instead of attaining political nirvana, we should strive for it. The 
goal of our political philosophy ought to be to provide the system that is the most 
coherent with the principles of justice. This system must be fair and reciprocal but also 
honor the aspects of choice and taste that individuals clearly have even if we can debate
125 IBID, p. 285
126 IBID, Note 5, p. 478. In reference to the discussion in Part 1, Chapter 2
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how they come about. Dworkin believes that the way to realize a Rawlsian liberal 
conception of justice is not the redistributive scheme Rawls suggests through the 
difference principle, but rather his auction and insurance scheme.
Dworkin attempts to show how a Rawlsian conception of justice can be choice 
sensitive while affirming egalitarian outcomes through amended sensitivities. Dworkin 
also provides us with an intriguing system. He utilizes an allocative tool, an auction, in a 
way that is not prescriptive of a “good life” and an insurance scheme to implement his 
modified development of liberal justice. Dworkin causes the reader to consider if Rawls’ 
accounts of the attributes that motivate the “difference principle” are correct and if not 
how they might be critiqued and addressed. Dworkin’s arguments will have to withstand 
greater scrutiny if they are to stand up in part or in full as a systematic answer to 
affirming a broadly Rawlsian commitment to justice. This will be particularly important 
when we assess Van Parijs critiques of Rawls and Dworkin in the next chapter and how 
he will deal with some of the common concerns he shares with Dworkin. With 
Dworkin’s arguments in mind, the next section will analyze aspects of what has been 
presented here in greater detail. This will be used to assert my Principle of Just Access as 
a necessary development of the liberal argument. Nevertheless, it is important to 
understand precisely where and how Dworkin diverges from Rawls. These divergences 
will provide us with something particularly unique to consider when addressing 
systematic answers to distributive justice.
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3.2 - Talents. Handicaps, and the Principle of Just Access
Within the three liberal systems of justice presented thus far, we have at least one 
common thread that I would like to explore in greater detail. Each of these theories 
comes to considerably different decisions as to how we weigh claims about individual 
talents. In order for us to continue the process of deciding what level of distribution or 
redistribution is necessary, we must inspect these arguments and come to a conclusion as 
to whether these accounts are coherent. It is my position that none of these accounts has 
truly drawn our balance between choice and circumstance correctly. As a result, we are 
compelled to develop our account of liberal justice further than these authors have. We 
will do this by first revisiting Nozick, and the “Wilt Chamberlain” argument.127 In 
revisiting this argument, we will discuss the responses Rawls and Dworkin would have 
and where these arguments succeed and fail in critiquing Nozick’s argument. This will 
leave us with a distinct conception about what the state’s position on talents ought to be 
in light of these different beliefs about talents before yielding us some conclusions as to 
what parts of each of these arguments hold.
Nozick holds a distinct position on talents. For Nozick talents are simply 
arbitrary attributes individuals can use in tandem with their labor to create or gain 
property rights.128 Nozick felt as Rawls did that the possession of talents is arbitrary. 
However, these attributes are solely self-possessed. The self-ownership of talents makes 
them the sole possession of the individual. It is up to the individual’s discretion to use 
them. This makes talents an attribute protected by individual rights and hence not 
morally relevant to the state. Anyone’s particular distribution of genetics is immaterial to 
their use of these natural features as it is their choice to use them that matters. The fruits 
of this labor are then protected by individual rights as long as they have met the 
conditions of the entitlement theory. If someone uses their talents to gain entitlements 
from individuals through just processes, then they are entitled to these acquired things.
127 Nozick, Robert: Anarchy, State and Utopia, p. 160-164
128 IBID, p. 185
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Talents play a crucial role in Nozick’s entitlement theory because they are the one 
aspect of individuals that ideally creates their ability to deviate, through actions of their 
individual liberty, distributive outcomes. Nozick believes that these talents are not only 
arbitrary but also incontrovertibly self-possessed. As such, they are an aspect purely 
resident in the individual and their exercise or lack thereof is a matter of individual 
choice. Ergo, if someone uses their talents to gain or create an entitlement, through 
voluntary and just processes, then they are entitled to these acquired things.
Rawls holds a very different belief about talents. Rawls believes that genetic 
propensities are arbitrary much as Nozick does. However, Rawls argues the arbitrary 
assignment of natural endowments should not be relevant in determining equality in a fair 
arrangement of social cooperation. Their arbitrary nature means they must be removed 
from personal consideration at the original position through the veil of ignorance.
Talents are arbitrary, and since in the original position individuals would not know what 
talents they had and be aware they may have none at all, they would agree that talents 
should not entail that one’s arbitrary natural advantages entitle material superiority and 
meaningful differentiations in condition. Fair value of liberty dictated material 
redistribution. The decisions about how to protect each other from deficiencies in natural 
endowments meant that a maximin principle was required to ensure a fair arrangement of 
society.
Importantly, Rawls is keen to note non-genetic social advantages and the effects 
these factors have on the exercise of talents. Although natural endowments are self- 
possessed, the ability to exercise and foster them through labor requires the affirmation of 
a basic social structure. The distribution of talents is arbitrary but the way institutions 
react to them out of a concern for justice need not be. The self-ownership of an attribute 
does not imply that the resulting entitlements are absolute since these attributes are often 
fostered by the structure of opportunities and liberties in society. For Rawls, talents 
cannot be considered an individually deserved attribute in creating the state because of 
the arbitrary good fortune in receiving them. The randomness of talents means they
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should not enter in the conceptualization of state institutions, as individuals cannot know 
in the original position if they possess one. Rawls contends that people in the original 
position knowing of talents but not whether they possess them would decide to adopt 
redistributive measures to protect their liberties in a fair way.129 The arbitrary nature of 
talents over-rides any potential deservedness in the initiation of the state, and helps 
dictate the redistributive state.
Rawls’ commitment to justice means that the talented must provide a maximin set 
of liberties for the least well off even if they are “free-riders.”130 This is primarily 
because free-riding is something individuals would not do given their mutual advantage 
in affirming the basic structure. Rawls attempts to address this problem by instituting 
leisure calculations into the difference principle. As a result, if individuals are still in the 
worst off group, this has to be the result of poor natural endowments. However, as we 
saw in our draff example, this is not an adequate explanation. As we will see in the next 
chapter through the critique of Van Parijs, Rawls attempt to correct this explanation 
through assessing leisure as a primary good is an inadequate amendment. The very 
construction and operation of the difference principle is called into question. The 
implication here is precisely what Dworkin notices. The least well off may be least well 
off through their freely made choices rather than their lack of natural endowments. If this 
is the case, a fair system of reciprocity that takes on choices as a relevant attribute of 
distribution is needed and Rawls does not give this idea appropriate space to work due to 
the actions of the difference principle.
Rawls gives us tools to work through impartial judgments. These add much to 
our considerations about individual circumstances but fail to address wholly our concerns 
about taking individual choices seriously. Through this process, he illustrates why such 
judgments should include a consideration of natural endowment. Nevertheless, this does 
not undermine all of points about the market and the role it can play in formalizing our 
choices. Rawls states when considering the distribution of opportunities and resources at
129 Rawls, John: A Theory o f Justice, pp. 71-75
130 Not used by Nozick but a reference to those who do not contribute to the society.
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the original position, “[a]n arrangement of the basic structure is efficient when there is no 
way to change this distribution so as to raise the prospects of some without lowering the 
prospects of others.”131 The fact that careers are open to all individuals does not change the 
fact that some individuals will have greater liberty simply by virtue of their availing 
themselves of an opportunity. The outcome will be that some individuals will enjoy greater 
liberties and conversely suffer inequalities due to arbitrary and socially affirmed criteria. 
Rawls argues that this is a decision of efficiency and is coherent in that sense.
However, Rawls argues that efficiency is not all that should be considered when 
arranging a distributive system. As Rawls notes, efficiency arguments could be made for all 
manner of unjust economic arrangements.132 These arrangements raise the economic 
efficiency but at the cost of maximin social liberties for the least well off. To avoid these 
potential outcomes, the individuals agree to prioritize the principles of justice prior to 
considering calculations of economic efficiency. If this threshold is to be sustained, the 
difference principle is required. This is in part why Rawls argues we should opt for the 
difference principle over allocative justice. Rawls argues the equality of opportunity alone 
still privileges natural endowments in yielding material outcomes as these endowments are 
reflected in the opportunities available to individuals. To remove this differentiating factor 
from considerations of justice requires the difference principle. The implication here is that 
Rawls would argue, given our Fair Shares Proviso or any other allocative account still has a 
problem beyond the lack of a consideration for natural endowments. Rawls is arguing that 
allocations will allow unfair inequalities. However, if the strong undertone of securing 
oneself against inequalities of natural endowment is removed or at least dealt with in some 
other way from this process, this critique does not hold any power. This is in part because 
Rawls has to allow choices space and by doing so allow some legitimate inequalities. If the 
difference principle is motivated by incorrect or at least incomplete criteria about natural 
endowments, the spectrum of these legitimate inequalities will have to change within Rawls’ 
own argument.
131 Rawls, John: A Theory o f Justice, p. 70
132 IBID, p. 71
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What is left is how we deal fairly with individuals whose natural endowments are 
unequal and if the difference principle reflects a proper account of this issue. For Rawls, 
talents cannot be appropriately neutralized in the discussion of distribution to allow them 
to operate unconstrained. Perhaps more important than this aspect of Rawls treatment is 
the level of constraint we should have in allowing these to work. Political equality drives 
our commitment to distribute as Rawls suggests due to the problematic nature of talents. 
The subtext of this argument is that natural endowments work to privilege some, while 
the lack of them works to subordinate the life chances of others. Natural endowments 
determine opportunities and the resulting distributions these opportunities afford cannot 
reflect these arbitrary conditions. As a result, the maximin principle is needed to ensure 
the outcomes of these natural endowments are constrained.
I believe it is important to note, as Dworkin does, that discussing talents and 
handicaps as a binary condition (you have one or you do not because of your natural 
endowment) is a mistake. A handicap does not preclude one from having a talent. Nor 
does having a talent preclude one from having a relatively poor endowment of natural 
attributes. It is true having either a talent or a handicap is arbitrary but this does not mean 
that they have an absolute effect on opportunities, social liberties or material outcomes.
It further does not imply that the choices one makes no matter how limited their 
opportunity sets, are illegitimate. I would argue most handicapped individuals are 
capable of making judgments and clearly meet an equal if not close to equal status of 
moral agency. Not all handicapped people are capable of moral agency, but most are. 
Handicapped people are still capable of making choices given their available attainable 
ends. These choices are as valid as any other individual choice. What is problematic is 
the restriction on attainable ends caused by certain deficiencies or anomalies in natural 
endowments. On Rawls’ view, the well off or better off are obligated to redistribute to 
the least well off due to his contention that non-rectifiable inequalities in natural 
endowments cause the least well off to be least well off. ‘There but for the grace of god 
go I* 13\  with an unchosen handicap on the other side of the veil. Being a bad chooser is 
not an unchosen handicap by its very description unless we are willing to defend an
133 This is a phrase attributed to John Bradford (1510 - 1555) the 16th Century English Evangelical Martyr
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extremely problematic position that sustains a comprehensive level of biological 
determinism. Yet Rawls argues we would protect ourselves from this very outcome and 
it would be fair of everyone else to do the same. As Dworkin notes, this not only treats 
choices and responsibilities inappropriately, it leads to a commitment to redistribution 
that is increasingly less effective in increasing the liberties the legitimately handicapped 
can enjoy.
I argue a better way of conceiving a handicap is as an unchosen natural condition 
that prevents or hampers the exercise or acquisition of talents. This makes the 
relationship between the two clearer and removes their mutual exclusivity. It may also 
place legitimate considerations on how society views outputs and quantifies handicapped 
individuals, particularly in education systems.
I do not have time to expand on this issue here but I will briefly elaborate. The 
thrust of the issue is this. How we judge people is based upon merit but merit systems 
attribute levels of merit based upon specific outputs. These outputs can be and frequently 
are ability normative in that they reflect standards expected of someone with a “normal” 
set of natural endowments. This is less a measure of talent or ability than it is a measure 
of someone being able to produce a specific kind of quantifiable output. These outputs 
are not sensitive in an appropriate way to the actual merit someone may have who simply 
cannot excel in the medium of quantification used by the system of merit due solely to 
their unchosen natural endowment. I do believe that this ought to have an effect on how 
we conceive our provisions of accessibility. These are considerations of justice that are 
philosophically important to work out rather than simply a matter of amending specific 
policies or practices. These legitimate issues are pertinent here and will become part of 
my future academic focus in working through a Principle of Just Access. It is a matter 
that has been noted by some critics of Rawlsian Liberalism perhaps most notably Martha 
Nussbaum, Amartya Sen and advocates of the capabilities approach.134 Although 
functioning, ability and merit are important matters, I believe that Sen’s account of
134 Please refer to the works of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum in the bibliography of this text for more 
details.
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impartiality and Nussbaum’s account of obligation are quite troubling. As a result, the 
capabilities approach does not pose the kind of comprehensive critique of Rawls it 
appears too at first blush. The capabilities approach is motivated by observations about 
ability that are important and lack appropriate description in Rawls account. However, to 
be more than an intuitive account of how to treat the handicapped, the capabilities 
approach will need serious reconsideration. Rawls project may more readily adopt these 
considerations with proper extrapolation, which I intend to undertake when approaching 
the Principle of Just Access. I simply ask here that you the reader explore the binary 
distinction Rawls utilizes in approaching natural endowment as a singular issue. I ask 
you simply to reserve issues of unbundling this distinction to this level of abstraction 
even if further considerations are appropriate and important.
The amended conception of handicap I am forwarding here calls into question the 
conceptions of this issue that have been used by all of our authors. The argument that 
talents are purely realized at the behest of the individual is true. Natural endowments are 
arbitrary and unchosen and cause obstacles in realizing labor. This is clearly a matter of 
fairness and a concern for a system of justice. This removal of liberty through an 
arbitrary factor makes an individual fundamentally unequal when labor protection is 
unaccommodating to their unchosen condition. When their resulting condition is 
dependent on their ability to actualize their talents, the result is an ongoing inequality that 
is not fair or just.
Rawls does well to illuminate the fact that talents are largely a product of 
cultivation and arbitrary natural circumstances. But again, this is only part of the story. 
Individuals must choose to realize their talents through these opportunities in order for 
them to yield anything. Natural endowments are arbitrary and in most cases unequal. 
However, the lack of an ideal natural endowment does not preclude the possession of a 
talent or the ability to utilize it. Having a very favorable natural endowment does not 
preclude an individual from wasting their talents and even being a member of the least 
well off group. All a favorable natural endowment actually means is that the potential 
preferences one can elaborate on are greater. Without the choice to do so, these
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endowments have no actual material benefit. These endowments are not realized into 
talents by individuals simply to sustain the basic structure due to the mutual advantage in 
doing so. Rawls is right in that the ascription of natural endowment is arbitrary and 
dependent on a structure of opportunities but he oversteps in saying it is everything in the 
consideration of talents. It makes more sense to compensate individuals who have 
unchosen handicaps initially rather than constrain talents from determining material end- 
result outcomes. This is what Dworkin adds to our debate.
Dworkin develops Rawls account given the problems that he observes in the 
operation of the difference principle. Dworkin shows that these issues stem from an 
argument about what should be allowed through the veil of ignorance used in the original 
position argument. We can now take stock of what our consideration of distributive 
justice needs to reflect. It is important to embrace an example of talents and entitlement 
to work through our discussion of them thus far. To expand on the example of talents 
offered by Nozick, Wilt Chamberlain was a talented, perhaps the most talented, 
basketball player of all time. However, the portion of talent that was arbitrary was the 
genetics he possessed which allowed him to be an incredibly effective center. Wilt may 
have been untalented as a point guard or as a free throw shooter but if he was a talented 
basketball player, why was this so? If we analyze Wilt’s propensities, his height and 
large hands helped him be an excellent rebounder, shot blocker and an excellent inside 
offensive player but made it difficult for him to shoot ffee-throws, ball-handle and shoot 
long range jump shots. Moreover, Wilt’s height and large hands did not simply, by their 
mere existence, make him good at any of the three things at which he excelled. His 
physical attributes may have made him well suited to play basketball and perform the 
tasks attributed to centers of his era, but he had a great deal of help at Overbrook High 
School and later at the University of Kansas, which helped cultivate him into one of the 
most effective big men in NBA history. Wilt’s willingness and effort to learn his craft 
throughout his career and become a better player is what set him apart from some with
135 Wilt’s Free Throw percentage was 51% for his NBA career, compared to an 82% conversion rate for 
Yao Ming (as of the end of the 2006/07 season), 72% for Kareem Abdul-Jabbar (also a successful actor), 
74% for Willis Reed, and 58% for Wilt’s nemesis, Bill Russell. Refer to http://www.basketball- 
reference.com (accessed 21s* of April 2010,15:43)
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similar or even identical genetics. His individual choices applied these natural 
circumstances in a specific way. However, he could not exercise this will or learn his 
craft without tutorial resources. This means that for Wilt, his talent and hence his 
quarters came from three particular attributes, natural endowments (embodiment), social 
opportunities (tutorial resources), and his will and labor to apply the two in tandem to a 
particular set of tasks (autonomous choices and moral agency).
Rawls might argue that Wilt’s drive to learn, improve, and apply himself is itself 
genetic, the result of specific neurological impulses within the brain.136 This might be 
quite true, but Wilt did not need to apply genetic talent A in company with genetic talent 
B. Wilt has to have made a choice to use his skills, however they were relayed to him, 
and as such there has to be some level of choice to any skill. Imagine, if you will, that 
Wilt had no other natural endowments other than those alluded to above. He was not 
capable of being a movie star or a notorious lover.137 It just so happened that his 
ambitions lined up with his natural endowments. He could actually have had an 
unfavorable natural endowment. I would imagine he had a difficult time purchasing a 
car, walking in certain buildings and acquiring appropriate clothes. He could have even 
faced a natural handicap that prevented particular preference schedules, yet he chose to 
maximize his endowment for a reward he desired. If he had decided instead to become a 
point guard, he would have languished in relative obscurity because his choices led to his 
natural endowment being under utilized. This was his choice and one we need to protect 
if we treat Wilt as the producer of “self-authenticating claims”.138 A natural endowment 
has no value on its own. It requires equal social liberties but it also requires choice in 
order to have any measurable consequence.
The degree of effort or labor required to produce a product is something unique to 
an individual and an act of individual autonomy (a choice). This does not mean that a 
natural endowment precludes the ability to make such a choice. Instead, it implies that
136 This point was brought to my attention by my advisor, Dr. Peri Roberts and I would like to thank him 
for bringing this point to my attention.
137 Chamberlain, Wilt: A View from Above, (Seattle: Signet Press, 1992)
138 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, p. 32
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certain conditions of natural endowment reduce the available opportunities/choices 
individuals can make in comparison to each other. This requires us to consider forms of 
compensation and a system of equal liberties, much as Dworkin postulates. Ensuring 
against certain physical outcomes and providing equally valued liberties are 
commitments dictated by our need to construct a fair society. These outcomes have 
effects on the opportunities individuals have and as a result, our commitment to equal 
opportunities requires that we consider these factors. They are not neutral as Nozick 
argued and they do not have the kinds of effects or warrant the maximin processes Rawls 
argued for either. Although the commitment to providing resources and affirming our 
fair basic structure ought to include a consideration of how we are going to deal with 
inequalities of natural endowments, their role in determining the amount of redistribution 
we are to undertake has to be different from the conceptions given to us by Nozick and 
Rawls.
A commitment to liberal justice dictates redistribution and market constraints but 
the material discrepancies that occur within the market stem from individual choices, 
which need to be equally valued. We could not say Wilt was free if he was expected to 
be a center by society based upon his natural endowments. He must dictate the 
compensation he is to receive to exercise his talents more broadly, even if his price is so 
high his talents are never realized. He has to have control of how he dictates the use of 
his talents and bare the consequences of doing so. Though this was Rawls’ clear 
intention, the redistributive criteria caused this aspect of individual autonomy to be 
constrained too tightly based upon hypothetical obligations that were incorrectly drawn. 
What we must consider is if Dworkin’s commitments are the correct ones given the 
added nuance we have now asserted in considering talents, handicaps/natural 
endowments, and redistribution.
To do this, let us once more re-consider Wilt. Throughout Wilt’s career, 
depending on the coaches he was around, the players who surrounded him, and the team 
strategy employed, his skills ebbed and flowed. For instance, his assist total in 1967-
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1968.139 It is not that in 1965 or 1972 Wilt was genetically less or more capable of 
passing a basketball but in 1967-1968 more effective passing schemes were employed. 
Wilt excelled through the presented avenues of cultivation using his labor and genetic 
endowment. His ownership over these talents means that it is acceptable that he receives 
more entitlements over genetically equal or similar individuals. Conversely, in areas he 
did not excel, free throw shooting and winning championships for example, it would be 
acceptable to discriminate against having him on your basketball team or compensating 
him less than another player because he does not have these propensities. However, these 
two statements are only true if the characters involved have the same relative tutorial 
resources or bundles of social goods to utilize in a way sensitive to their social value to 
others. Their initial allocation has to be fair and allow them access to the same bundles. 
Without them, individuals would have inherently unequal opportunities to exercise their 
labor to cultivate their arbitrary talents. Such an inequality would void the moral 
neutrality between talents and would drag us away from allocative practices because the 
opportunity to undertake initial choices would be unequal. However, if this is avoided, 
what individuals do with their bundles and how successful they are is down to their 
equally valued choices.
Dworkin and Rawls rightly point out that people’s talents are not easily discerned 
as to their deservedness but arrive at different conclusions about what this means within 
the framework of equality. As we have discussed, a natural endowment does not 
preclude a talent. These are in fact only realized through individual preferences. Without 
the ability to gain desired compensation, it is unclear why one should be obligated to 
realize the potential of their natural endowments if doing so does not meet their 
preferences.
Let us return to the gifted Mr. Chamberlain for a moment. Let us say that he 
wished to be a point guard even though he clearly has the physical disposition to be a 
center and further that he was a failure at this endeavor. Wilt would now end up with a
139 Wilt Chamberlain had 702 assists during the 1967-68 season, averaging 8.6 assists per game. Refer to 
http ://www.basketball-reference .com
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much smaller share of resources, especially given the basketball pay scales of the 1960s, 
compared to being an all-star center. Simply because he was bom with the physical 
disposition to be a center does not mean he had to apply his natural endowments in the 
most materially yielding way or in any way at all. He could have legitimately chosen to 
sit at home eating Doritos all day. Why should he, having been given greater natural 
endowments, be given redistributive resources to equalize his material condition if his 
distribution of natural endowments was great but his choice to use them, or not use them 
as the case may be, yielded a lower distributive share? For Rawls, the justness of the 
redistribution to Wilt in these circumstances rests wholly on his inability to access a 
maximin set of social primary goods and the resources implied therein. His actions 
placed him in a circumstance in which he needed redistribution for this reason. Every 
single aspect of talents being present or not present is the result of arbitrary natural 
factors for Rawls. Even if this is not what Rawls wanted, it is what his theory implies. 
Reworking the index of primary goods does not change this fact. Wilt’s unwillingness to 
be a center, his desire to be a point guard, his physical attributes to undertake either must 
all be arbitrary for the maximin redistribution to be legitimate.
Although this is clearly true about Wilt’s distribution of genes, this cannot be said 
of his choices if they are in fact attributable to individual autonomy. Rawls wants us to 
allow choices to count but his model does not honor these factors coherently. Certain 
levels of resources are needed to access essential liberties but maximin redistribution 
goes beyond this point. Dworkin is not denying the need to provide Wilt with a 
distribution of resources and to take into account any legitimate handicaps he may have 
in his distribution of natural endowments. Dworkin is denying Wilt’s claims to an 
ongoing maximin set of primary goods. Rawls claimed that such arguments are fueled by 
an account of efficiency that is not in keeping with the principles of justice. However, in 
Dworkin’s case, the level of efficiency is not the motivation for accepting differentiations 
based on talents. The motivation is to question Rawls principles of justice based on a 
different account of what these principles ought to reflect. Dworkin’s position comes 
from a better comprehensive understanding of what is required to enact a talent and the 
knowledge that a handicap or lack of a natural endowment may not preclude having a
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talent or an actionable preference. This further illustrates precisely how deeply the 
Rawlsian project needs to be amended in order to yield a fair and just result, which will 
be a major obstacle for Van Parijs. This understanding stems from the veil and that is 
why Dworkin amends it. Moreover, this appears to be a needed development of the 
liberal argument given an appropriate balance of the issues at hand.
It is from this veil modification that Dworkin wants us to assume a resource 
auction with equal buying power between citizens for resources in order to come to just 
distributions. This system affords individuals an equal distributive share, an equal 
allocation of “clamshells”, from which individuals are allowed to make value choices 
about their resources. As we discussed in the previous chapter, Rawls argued against 
allocative justice even though he felt it would create outcomes similar to the distributive 
justice argument he forwards. This is because Rawls felt allocations would enforce 
decisions about what constitutes a minimal account of the good life. In doing so, Rawls 
feared that allocative justice, in undertaking calculations of a social minimum, would 
actively enforce a conception of the good through intuitive arguments of what was 
needed to sustain the minimum. For instance, humans need to eat, so the state hands out 
bread even though this may not be an individual’s actual preference.
In Dworkin’s case, the allocation is not a prescribed minimum but an equal tool to 
realize a taste and envy sensitive distributive share of the available resources. The actual 
resources being acquired are or can be in keeping with individual tastes with one notable 
exception, if individual’s tastes dictate they want more than the allocated clamshells get 
them. Rawls’ critique of allocative justice is true only if the system of justice ascribes 
what individual needs either are or ought to be or if it wishes to defend choices of 
expensive taste being an essential liberty of the least well off. The auction provides the 
provision of equally valued liberty through access to individually selected bundles of 
social primary goods. The value of the liberties provided by the auction to the auction 
goers is fair and equal in theoretical terms. Moreover, if there is a problem with how fair 
these distributions are or were, Dworkin gives you the ability to re-run the auction to 
determine what a new fair distribution would be. It is important to note here, that this
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idea will need to be cashed out in some way in society, which is why I will argue Van 
Parijs has something specific to offer us. However, theoretically speaking this 
commitment to allocative justice accomplishes the goals of reciprocation established by a 
Rawlsian account of justice without the difference principle and is in keeping with our 
Fair Shares Proviso.
The first of these claims can tell us a lot about what is and is not an acceptable 
form of allocation. Moreover, the principles of justice still imply a distribution of 
“clamshells” given the goods and liberties in a particular society. However, individuals 
cannot be expected to provide for the expensive tastes of other citizens or to compensate 
them for their poor or less wasteful practices with their goods. When contemplating 
redistribution we have to keep the following aspects in mind. The redistributions must 
affirm an ongoing set of usable liberties. Due to the natural inequalities individuals face, 
these redistributions must compensate those with unchosen obstacles to their preference 
schedules. These tasks must be accomplished while ensuring the system is sensitive to 
the choices individuals make due to their tastes.
It is my argument that Dworkin’s auction and insurance scheme do not 
accomplish these tasks in full. These are needed steps forward and take us away from 
Rawls and ultimately Van Parijs as well. Therefore, we are taken down Dworkin’s path 
of liberal development. However, his account requires further development once we 
work through the commitments his account implies. The re-running of the auction allows 
processes of liberty provision to be ongoing. The operation of insurance ensures that 
individual handicaps are compensated for while being reconciled with the fair costs 
shared by all. However, Dworkin argues these systems still require massive result-based 
redistribution through an unqualified end-result income tax. This is troubling given how 
we have asserted allocative justice ought to work and we will revisit this issue. What is 
more troubling is that Dworkin argues for a specific kind of compensation from insurance 
that we cannot reconcile with actually providing appropriate sensitivity to ambition for 
the handicapped. Dworkin’s assertions are all predicated on a very precise modification 
of the veil of ignorance argument. If natural endowments do not have the relationship to
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talents and distributive outcomes that Rawls proposed, we have to discuss if the 
sensitivities Dworkin suggests meet our modified understanding of what handicaps and 
talents mean within the liberal argument.
Before suggesting how best to proceed, it is important to explore Dworkin’s 
argument a little further. Dworkin builds into his theory an insurance scheme due to the 
inability of the disabled and handicapped to partake equally in all the bundles of biddable 
goods at the auction. Handicapped individuals, even if given greater social buying 
power, may still face an inability compared to other individuals to choose bundles of 
goods when socially endowed with clamshells. In order to make his theory endowment 
insensitive, the insurance scheme assesses what individuals would pay to protect 
themselves from this fate should they end up in such a situation outside his account of the 
veil of ignorance. These assessments result in levels of taxation that fund the 
redistributive coffers to help those in need of compensation prior to the auction to the 
greatest reasonable degree allowed within the parameters of Dworkin* s modified liberal 
argument.
What we must ask ourselves here is whether this account of handicaps is 
appropriate, just and detailed enough to merit the kind of insurance scheme Dworkin is 
suggesting. His reasoning is difficult to refute on first glance, as the handicapped clearly 
are not able to use certain sets of goods available at the auction. Surely, individuals who 
we would see as able-bodied will also be unable to partake in sets of resources. We 
would not think this is unfair as though they may be able bodied, their lack of Wilt 
Chamberlain-like height might preclude them from being a center for the Lakers or 
conversely Wilt’s size might preclude him from being a steeple-chase horse jockey.
These claims offset one another even if we are aware that we could have endowment A 
and wish to have bundle B or vice versa. What a handicap actually consists of is a 
difficult issue and one Van Parijs will take up in the following chapters in critiquing 
Dworkin as he wishes to constrain these claims to a greater degree, so let’s for now 
assume that generally speaking what a handicap is can be ascertained fairly. We must
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now ask ourselves why the able-bodied are obligated to the reciprocal degree Dworkin 
postulates.
Handicapped individuals have equal rights to resources yet equal liberty to utilize 
these bundles escapes them in some cases without extra assistance and in other cases 
completely. However, handicaps are as diverse as the people who have them. Certainly, 
some individuals are not going to be able to pursue any meaningful talent or utilize 
bundles of goods without stewardship, but this is a minority of handicapped individuals. 
Capabilities overlap, adaptations are made and for the vast majority of individuals whom 
we could reasonably see as handicapped, they are capable of living meaningful lives, 
exercising conceptions of the good and understand the bundles of goods/lifestyles they 
are unable to utilize. What we cannot say is if their lack of endowments has actually 
curtailed completely or to some relevant degree their desired set of talents and 
preferences.
The condition of being handicapped in the contexts in which we have addressed it 
thus far is a categorization that says very little specifically about what precisely afflicts 
the individual aside from an established deficiency in natural endowments causing a 
disparity in the ability to use bundles of goods.140 The scale of this disparity is not 
elaborated on in any greater detail. It says nothing also about the “handicapped” having 
talents or conversely the “talented” having handicaps. The two are clearly not mutually 
exclusive by any account as we have argued. This means that some handicapped 
individuals are capable of utilizing bundles including bundles they may “want” as 
opposed to “settle for” given their condition and gaining disproportionate material 
affluence. Whereas some handicapped individuals clearly cannot act in these ways.
140 This is not a minor point. I will simply state here that I believe it is likely that different kinds of natural 
endowment deficiencies such as mobility, cognitive and sensory all require different treatments which will 
be part of extrapolating the practices of a Principle of Just Access in the future. This is not simply because 
they are physically different conditions, but rather in part because they are treated differently by our social 
structures as well. It will be this social treatment that will add considerations that take us well beyond our 
present policy measures in realizing the pervasive social and political inequalities that result from social 
approaches to handicaps. This will move us away from a pure physical/medical conception of accessibility. 
It is simply important here, in the context of this work, to assert the theoretical need for development rather 
than assert exactly what this is going to look like when we work it through comprehensively.
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Leaving aside any potential argument about deservedness of physical condition,141 let us 
say for now the circumstances of these generalized handicaps are spontaneous or at least 
morally neutral circumstances. I have asserted that being unable to utilize particular 
bundles one is at liberty to purchase is something everyone faces, even those of average 
natural endowment. By this account, to be handicapped is a calculation of proportion in 
regard to the use of bundles given that in all likelihood even an able-bodied individual 
will not have 100 percent discretion in using all the available bundles.
The choice issue raised by Dworkin in the selection of bundles is a valid one. For 
Dworkin, the auction is presumed to address the choices of the equally able bodied in the 
selection of bundles and attribute distributive need accordingly. The process is 
aggregative in the way it would need to be due to the lack of mutual exclusivity between 
handicaps and talents. The insurance is an aggregative measurement formulating the 
compensation you would want given potential distributions of natural endowments taken 
against the background of the bundles such a condition might keep you from using and 
ignorant of the value you could realize through the set of bundles you can use.
The handicapped, like all other humans, are capable of making expensive 
aesthetic choices as well and it would be unjust to deny the handicapped access to the 
auction if they could legitimately participate. After all, the bundles are not just goods, 
but actually ways of life and professions. Dworkin’s auction system underpinned by an 
insurance scheme seems to assume that the proper compensation for being infirmed in X 
way by an insurance agreement is going to be adequate and appropriate. Insurance 
conceived in this way would undoubtedly have to take on judgments about what a good 
life in condition X would consist of. If having a handicap does not preclude having a 
talent and the provision for having a handicap is realized in compensation for the 
ownership of that malady, the issue of having a handicap and having equal liberty seems 
to be still unresolved. You could have a handicap and be at liberty to do as you choose. 
You could have a handicap and still have an expensive taste or unachievable desire. 
Furthermore, the goal of the auction itself is to be ambition sensitive. This sensitivity
141 Negligent actions that lead to a handicap such as sawing off one’s own hand intentionally
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does not appear to be wholly served if the handicapped can make legitimate choices with 
the options they have or ought to have.
It appears that Dworkin’s answer to this difficult question appeals to pragmatism. 
Dworkin asserts it is not possible to reconcile completely and harmoniously all of our 
competing liberal claims with factors and information that we are neither completely 
aware of nor in some cases able to change. As Dworkin writes,
‘We shall therefore ignore practical difficulties, like problems of gathering 
information, that do not impeach these theoretical goals, and also make simplifying 
counterfactual assumptions that do not subvert them. But we should try to notice which 
simplifications we are making, because they will be of importance, particularly as to the 
third and most practical application of our projects, at any later stage, at which we 
consider second-best compromises of our ideal in the real world.’142
So it is best to come up with a solution that corresponds with the ideal of justice 
driving the entire project, namely what equal ignorant parties would agree to as just 
practices. Compromises from what are ideal principles of justice to how we actually 
conceive our project should only trouble us if we could come up with a better alternative 
way of applying these standards of justice in a fair and reciprocal manner given the 
problems we face in our ‘real’ and thus imperfect situation. For Dworkin, this is used to 
underpin his assertions about how the auction and insurance schemes are paid for even 
though his plan for doing so appears to violate the ideal principles of endowment 
insensitivity and ambition sensitivity that motivate the model.
Dworkin points out what is wrong with Rawls in terms of ambition sensitivity.
He postulates a system of legitimate allocation that seems to address this problem. 
However, his conception of handicaps and how to address them falls short. If we are to 
accept Dworkin’s argument for an insurance scheme, we must accept that it is the best of 
the “second best” options for providing for the handicapped based upon properly
142 Dworkin, Ronald: Sovereign Virtue: The Theory o f Practice in Equality, p. 73
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impartial judgments and the brute fact we are largely unable to change their natural 
circumstances. Clearly, individuals do not choose their distribution of natural 
endowments. Equal individuals deserve equal liberties and fair value for these liberties in 
a system that provides like liberties for all. It is fair to acknowledge that individuals* 
natural endowments allow greater access to initial bundles of goods. Choices and talents 
cause unequal distributions in wealth and have a causal relationship. Individuals must 
make a choice to realize or not realize a talent in a system of equal liberties. The 
possession of a certain set of natural endowments does not preclude having a talent, 
choices or the availability of a preferred set of preferences. Individuals in this position 
not knowing, 1. what the value of their distributions of these natural endowments are, 2. 
how these distributions will affect their choice of bundles given their preferences outside 
the modified veil of ignorance, and 3. how they would like to be compensated given their 
unknown situation in regard to 1 and 2, would agree to something other than the strict 
compensation and subsequently the redistributive measures Dworkin suggests.
Taking on all of the matters simultaneously may indeed be impossible given the 
conception of justice presented here. However, taking Dworkin’s argument based upon 
his own aims (an endowment-insensitive and ambition-sensitive account of distributive 
justice) shows how he has not given us the best possible systematic solution. Dworkin, in 
trying to make an endowment insensitive theory, has painted over aspects of natural 
endowment that have a far more subtle impression on distribution than the simple cause 
and effect reasoning that he presents. It is the fact that Dworkin draws the compensation 
argument so broadly that fuels much of Van Parijs’ systematic refutation of Dworkin.
The idea of having no capabilities at all or extremely limited ones that would relegate you 
from being able to achieve other ends would clearly motivate you to provide yourself 
with an adequate level of compensation in order to survive and enjoy what you could out 
of life. This extreme case and how Dworkin argues we ought to handle it, is not 
problematic. Ensuring the means to secure trusteeship in the case of being truly infirmed 
is adequate. Trusteeship is needed because being severely disabled is a known outcome 
outside even the modified veil. As a result, individuals would insure themselves against 
ending up in this condition by providing the kind of trusteeship required to represent their
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rights, their needs and their interests even if they would be unable to do this themselves 
due to their natural endowments. The level and expense of this trusteeship is balanced by 
the insurance calculation. This ensures the compensation is not too expansive, nor 
inadequate given our standard of fairness. In this outcome outside the veil, individuals 
have little or few opportunity sets and the trusteeship would ensure they have these 
available to them in keeping with the insurance calculation.
However, this does not seem appropriate for all of the cases that fall between 
being typically embodied and those in need of complete trusteeship. Dworkin’s attempt 
to tackle handicaps fixates far too much on a conception of handicaps that is incomplete. 
The extremes of the conception are articulated fairly well, that is extreme handicap and 
the possession of negligible deficiencies in natural endowment (although Van Parijs will 
disagree with this latter point).
However, the distributions that fall in the middle may or may not preclude 
particular preference schedules. Dworkin argues that the process here is to calculate our 
inconvenience and needs from a given condition and to compensate based upon this 
standard. Dworkin’s modified argument gives knowledge of talents/propensities but not 
their value. I argue that if individuals knew that there was a possibility these conditions 
would not harm their preference schedules, they would act to insure themselves against 
not being able to access bundles they would actually want first. Dworkin does not 
address this appropriately, because it is not sensitive to the fact individuals may be able to 
utilize bundles with appropriate accommodation. These individuals envy the 
endowments of others so the insurance compensation is intended to remove the envy 
from A to B. However, this compensation could have made the bundle available to A at 
no added insurance cost to B. It would only be in lieu of this being possible within a 
system of fair reciprocal cooperation, that individuals would seek to be compensated. 
Individuals would want to exercise their reasonable capabilities if this adaptation was 
reciprocally reasonable.
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Crucially, this appears to take on the idea of Dworkin’s insurance scheme broadly 
but envisions the adaptive and compensatory measures of it in a different way. Dworkin 
does not draw his scheme this way because he argues the expenses will be too expansive. 
Dworkin argues the maximization of preference schedules would make expansive 
redistributive claims. This was part of his critique of the actions of the difference 
principle. The expansive redistributive claims would only improve nominally the 
conditions of the handicapped while enforcing great and unjust expenses for the 
embodied. In moving this theory away from Rawls, he argues against this maximin 
redistribution conclusion. Their potential set of ends would only improve slightly while 
the rest of society faced an inordinate financial burden.
The insurance scheme is generally intended to prevent the overcompensation of 
the least well off and the handicapped in a society while still affirming the equal political 
condition of all in a way sensitive of legitimate frailties. Given the allocative measures 
present in the auction, I am arguing that the decision we would reach in the provision of 
the insurance will be quite specific in itself. This is a particularly important nuance given 
the type of state Van Parijs argues for and his arguments against Dworkin. I would 
further urge that all liberal arguments need this development because none have treated 
this issue appropriately. This is because we need to take the moral agency of the 
handicapped seriously and not overdraw it when balancing the claims of circumstance 
and choice. An adaptive commitment does not repudiate the action of mitigating cost 
through a reciprocal calculus such as the insurance scheme Dworkin suggests. 
Accessibility accommodations are not a maximization of condition or of the access to the 
most bundles possible, which Dworkin summarizes such a commitment would do. 
Instead, the accommodation is one we could fairly reach in abstraction as constrained by 
our insurance calculation. For example, an adaptation that might be required for 
someone is a wheelchair. The provision of the wheelchair can be legitimized if it meets 
the fair reciprocal cost of the insurance and it would give the individual a far greater set 
of bundles to choose from. This commitment does not say, as Dworkin fears it might that 
we should provide a diamond studded wheelchair or individual hovercrafts because we 
are committed to a maximin account of redistribution. These kinds of adaptations would
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be very cool and the case of the hovercraft may allow some individuals greater access to 
bundles, but it not fair to expect society to provide an exorbitant adaptation. Our 
insurance calculation can constrain cost but it can fairly prioritize adaptation over 
compensation based upon our desire to take choices and the moral agency of the 
handicapped seriously.
However, this is only accomplished if the costs of adaptation are not in 
themselves taste sensitive. My implication here is not just one of second-best 
practicalities but rather the logical commitment of the principles of justice that resulted 
from the modified veil. This principle I will call the Principle of Just Access.143 It is 
only after this that generalizations of condition can come into play as they can assert the 
needed faculties to access a set of goods based solely on the set of goods not the personal 
preferences of the individual to a set of goods. The Principle of Just Access will work as 
follows. In the original position, it could be asserted that individuals with handicap X 
will need adaptation Y or Y, P, and Q to do Z. Individuals calculating how much they 
would want to compensate themselves for having a handicap would determine the 
reciprocal insurance but prioritize how they receive it. If Y or Y, P and Q are cheap 
enough to be paid for by the level of compensation, this is what they should receive in 
order to access Z. If Y or Y, P and Q are too expensive and would disproportionately 
burden society, then the individual would receive compensation for not being able to 
access Z. Taken over a society where those with meaningful handicaps is sizeable 
although still a distinct minority, this would allow the state to legitimately mandate forms 
of access in infrastructure and adaptive provisions that could allow those with handicaps 
that are not extreme to participate in a full range of activities permitted by their natural 
endowment. Given Dworkin’s, and as we will see Van Parijs’, development of the 
Rawlsian project, this is an added layer of nuance that is needed for the commitment of 
providing equal opportunities. This principle, which preceded the difference principle, 
dictated that careers as well as social and political offices would be open to all based 
upon their ability to fulfill these roles. Given what we have now established about
143 My sincere thanks to my advisor Peri Roberts for giving my idea this very appropriate and far more 
straightforward moniker.
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handicaps and talents, a principle that provides for accessibility claims reciprocally is 
required by our conception of justice. The Principle of Just Access is this principle and is 
needed to take the ambitions of the handicapped seriously even if we constrain 
reciprocally the actions of the principle. The Principle of Just Access acts to leximin, 
fairly through insurance calculation, the choices individuals can make. It is important in 
affirming moral agency for the handicapped. However, it is also crucial in moving us 
further toward allocative justice and a distribution of fair shares. This is because we have 
a need to equally value the tastes individuals have which motivate these choices. The 
latter of these points I will return to in the next chapter but let us for now focus on the 
internal endowment and ambition aspects of my principle.
The handicapped are in this way empowered to take part in more bundles of 
goods as a matter of justice rather than simply to receive compensation for their inability 
to do so. In a compensatory scheme, the handicapped are materially provided for but not 
necessarily given the ability to access the bundles of goods their embodiment prevents 
them from partaking in. If the agreement is to provide the access necessary to partake in 
bundle selection with the greatest plausible equality through reasonable adaptive 
provisions, handicapped individuals actually receive the access to exercise choices and 
talents that the material compensation on its own will not provide. The Principle of Just 
Access is a better systematic commitment given our inability to change natural 
circumstances completely compared to the nebulous and irreducible compensatory 
actions of insurance given to us by Dworkin. It is better because it is ambition sensitive 
and yet endowment insensitive in a far more coherent and equal way.
Within the confines of Dworkin’s experiment, the veiled individuals have to take 
seriously their potential ambitions while insuring themselves against certain conditions 
and balancing these claims against the possibility they have no “natural” obstacles 
whatsoever to their preferences. This arrangement allows the constraint intended by the 
insurance to be retained in deciding what kinds of accessibility and compensation are 
required. However, the accessibility must come first given that these individuals could 
all equally have ambitions within any natural set of opportunities their endowments
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afford them on the other side of the veil. Because accommodations are calculated, as 
Dworkin suggests, we are able to discern what accommodations are reasonable and 
which are not in helping individuals realize a set of opportunities. The question we must 
ask Dworkin, given he does not add this wrinkle to this theory, is why compensation is 
what we give the handicapped person when a fairer value for their liberty would be to 
provide them with these reasonable adaptations first through a Principle of Just Access. 
Then after undertaking such a process examining the constraint of the insurance 
calculation and deciding when compensation is more appropriate (presumably due to the 
cost of the adaptation). This development is vital if the handicapped are going to be 
subject to the property claims of a system that is ambition sensitive. Their ambitions and 
choices must count too and it should be our foremost concern when considering how to 
treat the handicapped in an allocative scheme like Dworkin’s.
The major advantage to a Principle of Just Access constrained by an insurance 
scheme is asserting first the appropriate level of reciprocal redistributive obligation.
More simply put if Y or Y, P and Q are needed to do Z and this is what we would agree 
to, we only do so if we knew the cost of Y or Y, P and Q on our collective society.
Indeed some adaptations may make activity Z available to a person with a specific 
handicap but some of these provisions are quite costly, so we must envision a way this 
could be provided without disproportiately obligating the talented or industrious. The 
insurance scheme works to strike the balance of reciprocity in devising a system that 
affords a set of actionable ends for the handicapped with a set of equal liberties for all. If 
the burdens of providing the adaptations needed for a specific handicapped individual to 
partake of a bundle of goods are so costly that it reduces the bundles and liberties 
disproportionately of either the equally handicapped or the society as a whole in 
obligating them to provide the adaptation, it would be an unfair arrangement of society.
It would be unreasonable of individuals to expect to be able to partake in absolutely any 
of the available bundles in the societal auction. All individuals are clearly capable of 
making taste choices given their general particularities and the handicapped in this 
respect are no different. So although they are clearly owed compensatory measures to 
counteract their frailties and insure their condition when a great deal of stewardship is
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required, this obligation cannot be absolute given that it is equally arbitrary that other 
individuals are bom with other natural endowments. Crucially, providing adaptation 
would make the distribution sensitive to what handicapped individuals choose to do with 
their talents and labor. Handicapped individuals may need assistance but this assistance 
must prioritize access reciprocally prior to monetary compensation even if these actions 
are justly constrained. A proper inspection of society should yield precisely this sort of 
commitment if motivated to ensure endowment-insensitivity and ambition-sensitivity in 
distributive outcomes.
Dworkin does not give us this nuance in the insurance scheme. It is important to 
accept the Principle of Just Access given the aims of his system and the changes he urges 
should be made to an account of justice. Dworkin’s development of liberal justice is 
important in making an account of justice balance matters correctly. However, without 
moving beyond his account, we will not be doing enough. The issues that surround 
discerning what effect ambitions and talents can have on distributions are difficult 
conceptual arguments. It is important to understand Dworkin’s pragmatism in addressing 
it as realizing absolute natural justice is not possible in practice. However, accepting 
compensation without the Principle of Just Access operating first is far from even a 
second-best solution. Handing handicapped individuals’ compensation in the form of 
money, which is clearly the implication of the project, does not take seriously their 
ambitions, choices or moral agency. Perhaps most strikingly, this is an argument about 
how we conceive justice, not how we undertake best practices in our non-ideal world 
beyond the veil. The Principle of Just Access will undoubtedly imply different things in 
different contexts. However, the Principle of Just Access will be needed no matter what 
to drive this process and ensure a fair society. Striking a fair balance may require a 
“second best” approach but this does not mean that we should not allow ambition to 
count for the handicapped as much as it can count. The Principle of Just Access allows 
us to develop the liberal argument in this way. It also does not impugn Dworkin’s 
allocative development of the liberal argument. It simply prioritizes how elements of this 
argument have to work in order to be coherent and just.
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The problem of pragmatic assertions within Dworkin’s response rears its head 
again in Dworkin’s acceptance of end-result taxation. In the following chapters, I will 
show how Van Parijs gives us a way around this problem even if he does not use it 
himself to accomplish this task through resource rents. It is important here to simply 
understand the issue. Dworkin wants choices to count but argues it is simply too difficult 
to figure out which material end-results are legitimate and which are not given the 
possession of certain endowments. Because of this, end-result taxation is the best way, 
even if it is not an ideal way, of calculating redistributive obligation. This account falls 
short if we have a better tool for realizing our ideal principles through institutions of 
justice as I have argued our Principle of Just Access does. Given Dworkin’s allocative 
account of fair distribution, I will argue that there is a better measure than using naked 
end-results given the need for ambition sensitivity. The Principle of Just Access removes 
the aspects of natural endowment that are troubling in our account of realizing talents. It 
is the best we can do. As such, it makes us take more seriously how our allocative 
processes work. In the forthcoming chapter, I will suggest there is a better tool to 
measure obligation within an allocative system of justice and I will inspect Dworkin’s 
argument more during this process. It is important here to understand where Dworkin’s 
extrapolation of a modified veil does not go far enough. This is the case in terms of the 
ambition sensitivity of the handicapped and I will argue it is also the case in envisioning a 
scheme of fair reciprocal taxation on an allocative account of distributive justice.
The Principle of Just Access must be part of our conception of compensation 
through insurance if this conception is to be coherent with its own aims. The Principle of 
Just Access requires a constant inspection of “reflective equilibrium”144 in conditions of 
technological advancement. The rules of what is too much and what is not enough in 
respect to any given handicap and bundle of goods Z is going to be a moving target based 
upon the technological advances and their relative share of distributive resources in a 
society over time. As troubling as this inspection and commitment may be logistically, 
these hard discussions are just part of the ongoing process of best realizing moral 
commitments in imperfect conditions. Given the strain on distributive resources is the
144 Rawls, John: A Theory o f Justice, p. 10
Balancing Choice and Circumstance -  Fair Shares and Just Access in Liberal Justice 140
same as Dworkin’s scheme because constraints created through insurance, I believe the 
clear advantages to envisaging a commitment to the handicapped in this way are seen in 
how the scheme could better address the commitments to ambition sensitivity and 
endowment insensitivity of all parties in a society including the handicapped.
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3.3 - Conclusion
It is important at this juncture to note what precisely Dworkin adds to our 
considerations of justice. Choices realize talents. This is why a consideration of justice 
ought to be ambition sensitive. These choices are affected by individual and social 
circumstances. These considerations cause us to take steps of remediation in order to 
ensure a fair society. Rawls gives us a way to work through these considerations and 
ensure a fair society. Dworkin acknowledges this and develops this liberal argument due 
to the sensitivity problems that caused Rawls to endorse maximin redistribution. 
Dworkin’s development of liberalism, in this regard, is a needed step.
Rawls clarified the decisions about justice we ought to make. A just system is a 
fair system and it is for this reason we must question our procedures rather than treat 
them as a deontological consequence of our rights. The redistributive scope of the 
difference principle implies actions of maximin transfer to the least well off within the 
spectrum of efficient distribution. His theory relies on an argument about talents that I 
have asserted is not detailed or sensitive enough to articulate the true nature of talents. 
The problem is that choices are not properly accounted for in Rawls’ position. A natural 
endowment need not always place such individuals in the categorization of being the 
worst off in society. In fact, they could be quite affluent if their preferences and 
ambitions do not conflict with their physical condition. Inversely, those with preferred 
sets of natural endowments may choose not to utilize them legitimately and become the 
least well off. This is not because of their natural endowment but because of their 
individual choices. Knowing this potential exists, the reasoning of the difference 
principle is problematic.
Dworkin highlights these problems and uses them to motivate the auction and 
insurance scheme. These devices articulate the concerns we should have in terms of 
natural and social resources while building in greater considerations for the legitimacy of 
individual choices. This leads to a system of allocation by refuting the strong contention
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Rawls had against this kind of system ensuring justice as fairness. It is through our 
inspection that we can see why this move is a necessary one and why it comes from a 
modification of Rawls’ account of the veil of ignorance. However, Dworkin falls short 
on fully addressing what is needed to ensure the correct balance between ambition 
sensitivity and endowment insensitivity. This is not a matter of questioning his project 
but rather extrapolating it properly. I have argued for some distinct developments of the 
liberal argument through the Principle of Just Access and an allocative market.
In the last section, I argued a better way to address these considerations in the 
modified process suggested by Dworkin would be to accept the Principle of Just Access, 
which would provide reciprocally fair accessibility provisions to the handicapped. This 
comes through prioritizing how we conceive appropriate modes of compensation. 
Dworkin wrongly discounts this option because he places it before the insurance 
calculation. The calculation of the obligation is legitimate, but it acts only to provide 
compensation. Given a deeper understanding of the issues at hand, individuals would act 
to insure they had access to plausible reciprocal ends rather than to be simply paid off. If 
our insurance calculation acts in a subjugated order, it creates a leximin set of choices for 
the handicapped that is constrained fairly and reciprocally. Disabilities do not preclude 
individuals from having talents nor from making choices. These individuals are not 
always incapable of interacting in a market system. Thus implying the illegitimacy of 
allocative claims from a consideration of natural endowment is not appropriate even if 
such a discussion leads us to include these factors in our considerations of justice. It 
instead implies that choices have to be valued equally even for the handicapped and our 
obligation to provide opportunities to make choices can be constrained by fair standards 
of reciprocation.
In this way, disabilities would be taken as contributory to the exercise of talent 
but not as the sole factor. Given we cannot actually equalize distributions of natural 
endowments or fairly commit to the maximin principle this appears a better “second best”
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option.145 The disabled are entitled to greater compensation due to the morally arbitrary 
nature of their handicap. However, to conflate the handicapped as being unable to use 
bundles of goods or make choices is to overstate the helplessness of the handicapped and 
to belittle their autonomy. The issue is meeting the extra needs their handicaps create in 
accessing aspects of society. These individuals need help to reach and retain an initial 
starting point in society over time comparable to the non-handicapped but this does not 
mean that the handicapped are untalented nor are they unable to economically excel in a 
capitalist society. The cases in which the handicapped are truly incapable of being 
equally able to participate in society no matter the resources provided are relatively small. 
They need to be provided for in an account of justice and Dworkin gives us a way to deal 
with this matter fairly and reciprocally. Still, to conflate talents and disability as the same 
question is to make a tragic and gratuitous over simplification of the two matters taken 
separately. One does not imply the other.
Although Dworkin does well to address Rawls’ mis-step in constructing the 
difference principle, the lack of articulation in the consideration of talents still poses a 
large problem. It is a problem that will appear again when we discuss his measure of 
taxation based upon end results in the next chapter. Dworkin provides us with a way in 
which an allocative scheme can work within the framework of a Rawlsian account of 
justice broadly speaking. Dworkin posits a development of Rawls theory to build in 
needed sensitivities. It also highlights precisely where in the Rawlsian project this 
development has to arise in order to account for these sensitivities properly. Even if 
Dworkin’s “second best” options lack needed nuance and extrapolation, Dworkin’s 
general premise and developments of Rawls’ project are going to be extremely important 
going forward. He rectifies shortcomings in Rawls’ thought and Van Parijs will need to 
do the same in some manner to pose a convincing argument about distributive justice.
145 It is important to note here in passing that I am not even sure we need to think of this as “second best” 
course of action. Even if we could “fix” natural endowment issues, I believe that individual agency may 
preclude actions to rectify, through bodily operations, these factors without individual consent. Our 
obligations and conception of liberal justice are then always going to require a Principle of Just Access 
even if this dictates in context medical remediation. I feel there is much to be written about natural justice 
and the social aspects/interpretations/treatment of handicaps which I hope to elaborate on if 1 am fortunate 
enough to expand on the idea of a Principle of Just Access as a singular written work.
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Our discussion needs to move on to discuss Van Parijs’ critique of what a 
legitimate disability is and how we balance the claims of choices and circumstances. Van 
Parijs will put the ideas of Dworkin under scrutiny in the next chapter. It will be 
important to note the way Van Parijs uses a similar frame of reference to Dworkin but 
takes it in a very different direction. We will also have to see if Van Parijs has properly 
addressed the problems that I have asserted exist in accepting the liberal arguments we 
have assessed. They will ultimately be a focal point in deciding how Van Parijs’ system 
of justice works or ought to work in developing liberal justice.
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Chapter 4 - Van Pariis and “Real Freedom”
Introduction
In the past three chapters, we have explored several different explanations of 
distributive justice. These answers raised important critiques and concerns that will be 
our tools for assessing conceptions of justice moving forward. The intent of this 
exposition was to determine a conception of justice should encompass and how a state 
might best fulfill these needs. I have argued through this process for some specific 
developments in our conceptions of justice given some of the shortcomings I believe they 
have. With these arguments in hand, we now move onto the work that will be the 
primary focus of this text, the commitment to “real freedom” and basic income state 
presented by Philippe Van Parijs.
Van Parijs presents an approach that develops Rawls conception of justice. From 
a cursory look, Van Parijs’ suggestion for an Unconditional Basic Income (UBI) and the 
reconciliation of various claims of justice seems counter-intuitive. As we have seen 
through the progression of this text, given some key developments, our approach has 
moved more naturally to a specific account of liberalism that embraces allocative 
processes. As a result, Van Parijs presents an account of liberal justice and state practices 
we need to take very seriously. For Van Parijs, our goal is to work to provide optimal 
individual freedom within a just state. For Van Parijs the resulting commitment of 
justice, “real freedom for all” hence referred to simply as real freedom, intends to justify 
capitalist practices and the operation of choice-based market mechanisms with the 
redistributive concerns a coherent conception of liberal justice raises. The result for Van 
Parijs is a “real libertarian” state, which institutes a maximized unconditional basic 
income (UBI) to provide individuals with “real” opportunities to pursue their conceptions
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of the good life*
As we move through this chapter and the conclusion, we will first engage with a 
summary of Van Parijs’ argument for “real freedom” and the institutions he argues this 
idea requires of the state. We will move from this understanding to explore how Van 
Parijs and his conception/institution of “real freedom” deals with the issues raised in the 
previous chapters, namely choice sensitivity, endowment insensitivity, property rights, 
background justice and equal initial material condition. We will also place Van Parijs* 
suggestions against the developments to liberal justice I have forwarded and see what his 
claims do or do not do to realize these needed moves in the liberal argument. To 
accomplish this, we will first assess what exactly “real freedom” is and where it fits into 
our previously asserted canon of liberal thought. The first step will be to assess what Van 
Parijs theoretical argument is along with assessing the aims and objectives therein. This 
exposition is necessary to understand the institutional motivations and structures that we 
will assess in consideration of Van Parijs’ critics in the following sections. Through this 
initial exposition, we will see the role of the market and choice Van Parijs places within a 
Rawlsian project. We will then discuss how this system construes market relations and if 
it succeeds in correcting capitalism. We will see if Van Parijs has met our intuitions 
about structures of entitlement, the market, autonomy, circumstances and choices.
By elaborating on his arguments, we will show where greater articulation is 
needed if Van Parijs’ systematic suggestions are to meet our decisions about how to 
. develop liberal justice. It will be my position that Van Parijs can flow more naturally 
than it first appears from a straightforward liberal argument. However, his argument 
requires a development like that of Dworkin and a Principle of Just Access as I have 
outlined in the last chapter. I will show how Van Parijs helps us make good on our 
conception of the Fair Shares Proviso and how it works within an allocative market 
structure. I will show at the same time that Rawls, Dworkin and Van Parijs do not work 
these needed aspects into their theories and this causes us to embrace further 
development of the liberal position, which I will forward in the conclusion. In this 
chapter and in the conclusion, I will show how this development can be arrived at and
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explain how some of Van Parijs’ institutions can be defended by this account. In the 
conclusion, I will tie these arguments together. I will highlight what developments Van 
Parijs gives us and why these must be motivated by the bespoke liberal argument I 
present to work coherently. However, we must address presently what Van Parijs’ 
substantive account of liberal “hybrid” justice is and how he intends to provide the 
benefits of “real freedom”.
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4.1 “Real Freedom for All” and the Unconditional Basic Income State
Van Parijs’ ideas have developed over the course of the past thirty years in 
response to problems and developments he saw immerging in political systems around 
the world. His theories and subsequent state model are an attempt to solve the problems 
he sees in each and amalgamate their individual benefits. As he writes,
‘Slipping back ever more deeply into laissez-faire capitalism, reaching 
desperately for the Swedish model, clinging defensively to the welfare state—is there any 
other future worth contemplating for advanced capitalist countries, now that whatever of 
genuine socialism was still left on the list of political possibilities has been decisively 
squeezed out by what happened in Eastern Europe? Along with a growing number of 
people in Western Europe, I believe that there is, and, moreover, that this further possible 
future is more desirable than the three I have just mentioned. Basic income capitalism is 
the expression I shall use to describe this further possibility. It refers to a socioeconomic 
regime in which the bulk of the means of production is privately owned, while each 
citizen receives, aside from any income she may derive from participation in the labor or 
capital markets or may owe to some specific status, a substantial unconditional
,146mcome.
Van Parijs’ project is bold. Our systems of political economy are tugged in many 
different directions that seem in one way or another troubling. Van Parijs suggests there 
is another way forward that can resolve these conflicts. Van Parijs’ theories and 
institutions are an attempt to solve the shortcomings of socio-economic and political 
arrangements of societies and governments. Importantly for Van Parijs, this solution is 
derived through correcting the issues and retaining the intuitively strong arguments that 
exist with other theories of distributive justice. Van Parijs’ solution is one of systematic 
change but this requires that we reframe our thinking about arguments of justice.
146 Van Parijs, Philippe: ‘Basic Income Capitalism’ in Ethics, (Vol. 102, No. 3, Apr. 1992), pp. 465 -  484, 
p. 465
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Van Parijs argues that these systems have taken state structures in different 
directions because they do not consider the proper philosophic principles when 
motivating the structures of the state. Generally, these states either focus far too strictly 
on rights, such as the libertarian capitalist model of state. Alternatively, states 
redistribute in an incorrect manner based upon a conception of equality or condition, such 
as welfare and contemporary socialist/communist models. Van Parijs argues that we 
must change our thinking about these issues to arrive at alternative institutions of 
distributive justice that correct the shortcomings of the states we see today.
To do this, we must reconcile the importance of individual freedom with the need 
for individual resources and political equality. Van Parijs argues that the way forward is 
to consider what it means to provide individuals with the freedom to do “whatever one 
might want to do”.147 This is what Van Parijs calls “real freedom”. 148 It differs from the 
considerations of freedom we have thus far assessed. “Real freedom” is an expansive 
account of the freedoms individuals ought to have in society. Van Parijs argues our 
conception of individual freedom is incomplete if it is only the freedom to do what we 
currently want to do or only the freedom from coercion. Our freedom ought to be 
ongoing and allow us the means to access the greatest set of opportunities over the course 
of our lives in the most non-prescriptive way possible. Van Parijs is setting out a 
development of the liberal project specifically focused on providing an optimal level of 
individual freedom, which the projects of Rawls and Dworkin have done improperly.
The argument for “real freedom” justifies the systems he later suggests. For this 
reason, accepting his system requires us to analyze closely the commitment to freedom he 
is asking us to make. Van Parijs is specific in outlining what must be done to provide 
this conception of freedom both theoretically and institutionally. Van Parijs understands 
the importance of formal rights protections but argues this is only part of a proper 
consideration of freedom. Van Parijs wants the reader to recognize that “real freedom”
147 Van Parijs, Philippe: Real Freedom for All, What (if anything) can Justify Capitalism, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 4
148 IBID, pp. 25-29
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requires legitimate access to ends. He wishes to retain the important and appealing 
emphasis on individual freedom present in capitalist societies while addressing the 
immoral inequalities current capitalist systems can yield.149 This requires Van Parijs to 
use “real freedom” to depart from unfettered capitalism but on different grounds and/or in 
different ways from contemporary socialist and welfare practices. Van Parijs states the 
commitments of “real freedom for all” as follows:
1. There is some well-enforced structure of rights (security).
2. This structure is such that each person owns herself (self-ownership).
3. This structure is such that each person has the greatest possible opportunity to do 
whatever she might want to do (leximin opportunity).150
The first two of these commitments are present in “right” libertarian state models 
such as the model drawn by Nozick, which we inspected in the first chapter. These 
obligations lead the minimal state to provide only rights protection and endorse what Van 
Parijs refers to as a “pure” capitalist system in order to protect property rights. These 
protections are formal freedoms in that they only act to ensure that individuals are able to 
do what their individual rights license them to do.
However, Van Parijs does not encourage understanding self-ownership and rights 
security in these strict ways. Van Parijs calls such a fixation with rights, “rights 
fetishism”151 and urges a more nuanced view of rights protection, in particular a more 
specified understanding of property rights. The lack of clarity in rights aside, Van Parijs 
still asserts them as one of the foremost concerns of “real freedom”. This is because 
rights security and the formal self-ownership provided by the possession of these rights 
secure individual autonomy. Legitimizing and providing the appropriate background for 
individual choices is the basis needed for the third commitment and later the structures
149 IBID, Introduction, p. 1
150 IBID, p. 24
151 IBID, p. 15
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needed to fulfill all three of the commitments of “real freedom” simultaneously. “Real 
Freedom” requires real options so that individuals can do whatever they might want to do 
within the constraints of a fair and just society. In many ways, the formal rights security 
and self-ownership show similarities between the “right” and “real libertarian” 
approaches. However, this is where the similarities largely end. Van Parijs’ freedom- 
based approach urges that the State must take on board further commitments. This is a 
stark deviation from the rights-based minimal commitments espoused by Nozick and 
other “right” libertarian theories of justice that support procedural capitalism as a matter 
of rights protection. However, the move Van Parijs is making is one we can support 
given what we have asserted about libertarian claims in the previous chapters.
For Van Parijs, rights are important but they are only part of what our conception 
of individual freedom ought to be. This fixation with rights leads Nozick and other 
libertarians to endorse conceptions of procedural justice that do not adequately consider 
the needs of justice and initial equality. At the same time, the importance of rights is 
implicit in the self-ownership and rights security tenets of “real freedom”. For these 
ideas to mean anything, they must substantively protect a set of individual rights. 
However, Van Parijs argues that in order for individuals to have an optimal level of 
individual freedom, they must have a leximin set of opportunities to accompany these 
rights. These opportunities require redistribution and a set of meaningful resources. 
Though this includes the protection of rights, these rights do not solely secure individual 
freedom.
This difference plays an important role in Van Parijs’ refutation of “pure” 
procedural capitalism. This argument is important in coming to the eventual liberal 
conclusion Van Parijs is asking us to arrive at about freedom and justice. It is evident at 
this early stage that Van Parijs is taking us down a similar path to the one we have 
already asserted about the libertarian argument and how it leads more naturally than one 
might think into a liberal account of justice. Capitalism, for Van Parijs, is not implied by 
rights security. The market is an important but subordinate consideration. Instead, it will 
be an instrumental result of realizing a commitment to “real freedom” in specific socio­
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economic contexts. This commitment encompasses rights, but puts these in context as 
part of the larger egalitarian commitment. In order for individuals to engage fairly, 
equally and most importantly with an optimal level of individual freedom, Van Parijs 
argues they must have a leximin set of opportunities, which includes a distribution of all­
purpose means.
Van Parijs sets out to verify his claims by working through how they could be 
institutionalized. The first question he sets out to answer is whether a capitalist or 
socialist model of government best fulfills the commitments of “real freedom”. Van 
Parijs begins by discussing how neither of the systems is inherently unable to provide the 
first two commitments of “real freedom”. Van Parijs argues that socialist structures do 
not violate rights or self-ownership simply by institutionalizing the public possession of 
property. He argues that socialism and capitalism hold as paramount the formal self­
ownership of those participating in either system. The public ownership of property does 
not refute this imperative.
“Right” or “pure” libertarian theories of justice and property rights, like that of 
Nozick, argue that socialism is inherently unjust as a state system because it violates the 
rights of individuals. For Van Parijs, the “pure” form of capitalism is characterized 
primarily by the complete legitimization of private ownership including ownership over 
the means of production. Van Parijs argues these kinds of claims rest on the idea that in 
putting one’s labor into an object, the fruits of this labor are the rightful entitlement of the 
laborer.152 Van Parijs urges instead that one’s labor may not gamer a complete property 
right over the product. Instead, Van Parijs suggests his more nuanced understanding of 
property rights. Van Parijs uses the following example, “[i]f she uses no resource in 
scarce supply, she can legitimately keep the whole of her product. If she does—as all her 
kin do in the real world—then she cannot fairly complain about a scheme that distributes 
maximally among all the value of the scarce assets very unequally appropriated by 
some.”153 Van Parijs differentiates and qualifies claim rights. They are only absolute in
152 IBID, p. 160-164
153 IBID, p. 135
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certain cases in keeping with a resource account of redistribution. If this is not the case, 
collectivization of a product produced through labor can be just.
For Van Parijs, his approach intends to correct the problems of not just capitalism 
but Marxist-style socialism as well. Van Parijs argues against a “pure” form of socialism 
as a system that legitimizes public ownership of all resources including the means of 
production. Van Parijs argues socialism in a “pure” form will be unable to provide the 
more nuanced understanding of property rights he describes as all property will be 
collectivized. However, he argues an “impure” form of socialism may be able to work 
with such an entitlement structure. Instead the argument for “impure” capitalism, such as 
basic income capitalism, is that socialism, even in an “impure” form, is less capable, in 
an ideal situation, of providing optimal “leximin opportunity” sets when compared to an 
impure capitalist structure.154 For this to be so, Van Parijs sets out to address the charge 
that capitalist structures are inherently exploitative and as such violate the formal self- 
ownership of individuals.
The refutation of such claims lies in the same property distinction argument Van 
Parijs posited to refute the same kind of claim against forms of socialism. Van Parijs 
explains in the same example that having a property right over a self-produced good 
made with a plentiful resource is not inherently exploitative and thus neither is a claim 
right garnered from this labor. The idea of a qualified yet robust claim right is a concept 
that socialist structures have difficulty protecting. Private property rights can be 
constrained by public provisions for the basic structure but are plausible and necessary, 
which makes complete public ownership, schemes a problem. As we noted in discussing 
the argument of Cohen for collective ownership in the first chapter, the complete public 
ownership of resources required an untenable account of autonomy due to the unqualified 
veto individuals had over each other. Van Parijs never enters this debate in any deeper 
detail at least in forwarding “real freedom”.
154 Impure capitalist structure meaning one that has this more detailed and stipulated understanding of 
property rights counter to the absolute property rights propounded by Nozick.
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I venture to add here that his description of both systems protecting formal rights 
lacks at least a certain amount of deep inspection into what a socialist account has to look 
like. We could argue that many of the systems we attribute to being “socialist” are not 
socialist in a comprehensive way. If claims of property are qualified but important, we 
have to assert that they fulfill something deeper in our account of justice like the choice 
aspect of individual moral agency. Although both socialism and capitalism may have 
formal protections, they do not have the same formal protections. Choices do not matter 
to the same degree in each. One ends up being better than the other at providing qualified 
claim rights because it attributes power to moral agency and choices the other does not. 
These nuances are important and will be returned to but for now, let us just continue 
because the argument being posed is in keeping with what we have asserted about our 
development of a liberal conception of justice. Although some capitalist systems may be 
exploitative, not all capitalism is by nature exploitative. This implies that capitalism is 
capable of being morally coherent in an “impure” form. This is in keeping with the 
qualifications needed to reconcile a market device with an appropriate conception of 
justice.
So if both systems in an “impure” form can answer the moral questions asked of 
them in respect of the first two tenets of “real freedom for all”, the question in terms of 
“real freedom” becomes which “impure” system provides the third commitment of “real 
freedom” (leximin opportunity) better. Van Parijs argues this is, in ideal situations155, a 
specific type of “impure” capitalism. Van Parijs argues that “impure” socialism has 
trouble optimizing preference schedules as decisions of utility are made on some level 
and the personal value of needs and entitlements are harder to allow given public claims 
of ownership. Although socialism provides for needs universally, it does so in a 
prescriptive manner by providing the item regardless of its value to a given individual. 
Although an overwhelming majority of people may “need” X, the value people associate 
with that need is not taken into account and thus there is a violation of their ability to 
choose, which could be reconciled under an “impure” form of capitalism. Socialism
155 Please refer to, Van Parijs, Philippe: ‘Philippe Van Parijs Responds’, Boston Review, (October/ 
November 2000, updated 2005), http://bostonreview.net/BR25.5/vanparijs2.html
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must assume social value or utility. In doing so, Socialism has a hard time reconciling 
the provision of resources with the choice sensitivities that Van Parijs argues should be a 
part of our conception of freedom.
Capitalism becomes optimal, if envisaged correctly, for providing these optimal 
preference schedules because it allows individuals to self define the value of their needs 
and desires. This increased freedom secures a level of opportunity selection and choice 
not present in even “impure” forms of socialism. However, Van Parijs argues this form 
of capitalism implies an unconditional basic income (UBI) in order to make sure that the 
commitments of “real freedom” are met. The UBI will be discussed in more detail later 
in this chapter but it is important here to understand why this measure is needed in a 
fundamental way to secure “real freedom”. To be able to do whatever one might want to 
do in a state that utilizes a market, individuals have to have some equal way of accessing 
this market. The UBI becomes necessary in providing individuals with the access to the 
market that quantifies their choices, needs and desires. The purpose of this project is to 
layout the framework of a state model that addresses the problems seen in modem states. 
So, without this cmcial piece of the “impure” capitalist state, the capitalist project is 
untenable as it realizes only the formal aspects of individual equality. “Real freedom” 
requires a way for individuals to access the means of production and the resources 
present in the society and the UBI is to fulfill this role.
As Van Parijs will utilize aspects typically attributed solely with socialist or 
capitalist systems, he uses this exposition to legitimize why his standard of “real 
freedom” borrows aspects and corrects the shortcomings of each in a unique way that we 
should accept. “Impure” capitalism is not as strict as the “pure” version and does 
something both forms of socialism cannot. As I have alluded already, Van Parijs reaches 
this distinction in a way that is not troubling but perhaps requires deeper inspection. 
Choices count but are relative to the reciprocal claims of others relative to the resources 
used. This effectively qualifies property and market claims. Van Parijs is asserting our 
need to accept his “impure” account based upon our need to take these claims, caused by 
our choices seriously. Therefore, our need to honor property claims comes from a far
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deeper philosophic consideration about the importance of honoring choices and their 
outcomes. Van Parijs will construe resources with freedom because he assumes they 
provide the needed level of moral agency and equally valued choices we have been 
arguing for, but they clearly do not do this on their own. Formal protections have to do 
some work here. It is what it takes to fulfill a commitment to valuing choices fairly and 
reciprocally that needs to drive our developments. It may be that “impure” forms of 
distribution work based upon context in more or less appropriate ways. To have the 
resources individuals need for moral agency and a set of leximin opportunities, how a 
state distributes goods is likely to change in a way reflective of what is available 
contextually. However, the importance of the systems is to provide the means to fulfill 
ends, in other words, the ability to make choices. What gets handed out is only part of 
the story because we need to be able to choose how we value and dispose of these 
resources. This implies a market and would drive the criticism of socialism (in many 
forms) far deeper than Van Parijs believes. .
However, this is based upon an argument about choices that Van Parijs simply 
never has. Being concerned with what one might want to do means that individuals have 
to be able to choose what they want to do in a just and reciprocal way. The freedom we 
are talking about does nothing without choices, so our attention has to focus on how this 
issue is balanced against our other claims not just that choices happen in either context.
If one provides for them better it is because it does not constrain them in a way that is 
unfair and hence unjust. It is this factor, in part, which shows why Van Parijs gives us 
useful institutions but an inappropriate or at least incomplete account of distributive 
justice. The intuitive notion about choices mattering is present in driving his theory and 
institutions in a certain direction. The “impure” system he advocates has to fulfill the 
commitments of “real freedom” but so too must illustrate why “real freedom” 
legitimately falls within the liberal family in which Van Parijs says we should place it. 
The “impurity” of the system being used shows the need for background justice, as the 
claims he wants to allow are qualified. It also removes “real freedom” from the strict 
egalitarianism and ownership structure of “pure” socialism and the “pure” rights account 
of libertarianism. What is left is the liberal middle ground. Nevertheless, as I have
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shown through my development of this middle ground argument, there is a right way and 
a wrong way to develop such an account. Van Parijs in missing the role this point plays 
in his argument begins to show why he will develop liberalism incorrectly and why this 
will lead to some major problems.
This commitment to providing “leximin opportunity” is a development of the 
Rawlsian conception of justice as fairness. Rawls’ concerns about material liberty and 
political equality highlighted how formal rights protections were not enough to ensure a 
fair and just society. This argument is compelling, as we have discussed in the previous 
chapters. Van Parijs argues “real freedom*4 is an exercise in 'reflective equihbrium’”156 and 
as such can be seen as taking on a Rawlsian conception of liberal justice. Van Parijs’
“real freedom” project is one that adopts the Rawlsian argument as to how to resolve 
justice and develops it. However, as his argument does not mirror Rawls completely, it 
will be vital to assess where Van Parijs develops a Rawlsian project into his own. Van 
Parijs adopts this position through his general commitments to equal liberty and 
opportunities. The Rawlsian leaning of Van Parijs’ standpoint has a profound effect on 
the use of the market in the “real libertarian” state. He advocates the use of the market 
but not because it protects rights. Van Parijs argues the use of the market is necessary to 
ensure individual freedom.157 The value of capitalism is instrumental rather than a matter 
of strict formal rights protection.
It is in this light that we can see how Van Parijs is specifically developing Rawls 
project. “Real libertarianism” is not actually libertarian in any classical sense. Van Parijs 
states that the third principle, that of leximin opportunity, “... requires that the amount of 
external resources given to those who are given least of them should be as large as it can
156 Van Parijs, Philippe: ‘Hybrid Justice, Patriotism and Democracy: a Selective Reply’ in Reeve, Andrew 
and Williams, Andrew (eds.) Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) pp. 201 -  218
157 Van Parijs, Philippe: ‘Egalitarian Justice, Left Libertarianism and the Market’ in Carter, I., de Wijze, S., 
and Kramer, M. (eds.) The Anatomy ofJustice. Themes from the Political Philosophy ofHillel Steiner, 
(London: Routledge, 2009) pp. 145-162
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sustainably be, with resources measured by their opportunity costs, as approximated by their 
competitive market values.”158
Van Parijs diverges in this way because he wants to correct the deficiencies a 
purely procedural and rights focused conception like Nozick’s has. As Van Parijs notes, 
“One is really free, as opposed to just formally free, to the extent that one possesses the 
"means," not just the "right," to do whatever one might want to do.”159 Van Parijs 
emphasizes, “Liberty comes in through this neutrality postulate, through the constraint of 
self-ownership, and through a concern, not directly with people's happiness itself, but with the 
means required to pursue it.”160 As we have seen, this move from libertarianism to a liberal 
approach flows more naturally than it first appears it might which gives Van Parijs’ argument 
power.
Van Parijs argues that “real freedom” shares the concerns that all of these 
positions (‘coherent’ libertarianism, welfare egalitarianism and sociahsm/communism) 
have in common. As Van Parijs writes, “real freedom” “.. .further shares with these 
positions (as well as with standard libertarianism and modem utilitarianism) a general 
postulate of neutrality, that is, the demand that what counts as a just society should not be 
determined on the basis of a particular conception of the good life. Along with these 
positions, real libertarianism can therefore be presented as a meaningful way of 
articulating the importance we ascribe to liberty, equality, and efficiency.”161 Van Parijs 
illuminates here at least part of a Rawlsian / liberal process. The commitment to “real 
freedom” stems from a neutral position of equality that extrapolates into a provision of 
external/social resources to ensure equality and individual freedoms. Importantly for Van 
Parijs, these resources represent the social liberties needed for individual freedom, so it is 
there provision in particular which will be the focus of his actions.
158 Van Parijs, Philippe: ‘Hybrid Justice, Patriotism and Democracy: a Selective Reply’ in Reeve, Andrew 
and Williams, Andrew (eds.) Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) pp. 202
159 Van Parijs, Philippe: ‘Basic Income Capitalism’ in Ethics, (Vol. 102, No. 3, Apr. 1992), pp. 465 -  484, 
p. 470
160 IBID, pp. 469 - 470
161 IBID, pp. 469
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As a result, Van Parijs can place the claims of libertarianism as subordinate to the 
values of a liberal conception of justice in much the way Rawls and Dworkin did. 
Capitalism is not required to protect rights because it has merely an instrumental value. 
This instrumental value can only exist after the background commitments and institutions 
of justice are created and sustained. Whether this instrumental value is the same value 
we have asserted to the market so far will become an important question, but let us say 
for now that at least the market is sitting in the right place within our political thought.
As a result, Van Parijs argues we ought to follow a liberal conception of justice.
Van Parijs argues that because “real freedom” defines and balances these claims 
properly from a position of neutrality, the true measure of the “real freedom” standard 
comes in assessing the institutions it advocates. “Real freedom”, like its egalitarian 
counterparts, takes these arguments about justice seriously and uses them to motivate 
institutions. The question becomes which of these solutions fulfills and balances these 
claims appropriately. As Van Parijs writes, “Whether one can sustain this ... claim that 
real libertarianism should be preferred to the other members of the [Liberal] family, can 
only be assessed by spelling out and assessing its institutional implications.”162
Van Parijs is still giving us a different argument from the liberal theories we have 
encountered thus far. Van Parijs argues we must amend aspects of Rawls’ project if it is 
to balance our commitments to justice given the contexts present in contemporary states. 
The difference between Rawls and Van Parijs is already evident in the very basic 
commitments of “real freedom”. They deviate from Rawls’ construction of the 
difference principle in a fundamental way as the practice is one of leximin not maximin 
proportions. As Van Parijs writes,
‘.. .a defensible liberal conception of social justice, as characterized, needs to be 
real-libertarian, that is, must maximin - possibly subject to some constraints - people's 
real freedom, that is, the means they require for the pursuit of their conception of the 
good life, whatever that is. By "maximin" I mean that a strong priority is being given to
162 IBID, p. 470
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the real freedom of those with the least amount of real freedom. This characterization is 
meant to be broad enough not to exclude the lexicographic variant of the maximin (or 
leximin), indeed, to accommodate a formula that would allow for significant increases in 
the real freedom of some of the better-off at the cost of a negligible decrease in the real 
freedom of the worst off.’163
This separation appears to be a semantic difference. Van Parijs wants a UBI to be 
maximized to provide a leximin set of opportunities. This development of the liberal 
project drives much of what Van Parijs suggests his institutions should reflect. But this 
change in the theory of Rawls works much as Dworkin’s insurance did, namely to make 
sure the maximin actions of the difference principle do not drive redistributive levels to a 
point that is unfair. However, unlike other liberal accounts, the UBI is intended to draw 
this commitment out more explicitly. For Rawls, resources are used to ensure the fair 
value of our individual freedoms and liberties but that resources do not constitute liberty 
or freedom in and of themselves. Van Parijs on the other hand, believes that the more 
resources we have to do “real” things, the freer we actually are. Greater resources equal 
greater freedoms for Van Parijs, so the concern becomes providing the resources to 
realize the freedoms we are trying to optimize. The UBI becomes a tool to provide the 
resources we need to be optimally free. If individuals do not use the tool to realize these 
liberties or utilize these opportunities, they may face inequalities in society.
The UBI does not act to correct these if they occur, whereas the difference 
principle argues otherwise. The redistributive mechanisms of the difference principle 
discussed in the previous chapters yielded some distinct problems in terms of choice, the 
market, property rights, and talents. These result-based principles maximined 
opportunity sets for the least well off without the proper regard for how individuals 
arrived in their condition in terms of the redistributive scale. In providing a leximin 
commitment instead of a maximin principle of opportunities, Van Parijs hopes to provide
163 Van Parijs, Philippe: ‘Why Surfers Should be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic 
Income’in Philosophy and Public Affairs, (Vol. 20, No. 2 Spring, 1991), pp. 101-131, pp. 103-104
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us with a “hybrid”164 account of liberal justice that will address the deficiencies of the 
difference principle and ultimately Dworkin’s auction and insurance scheme, which 
noticed this problem as well.
Van Parijs asserts this because he argues that the liberal accounts of justice we 
have so far assessed have adopted incorrect sensitivities and hence inappropriate 
institutions. We will discuss Van Parijs’ issues with Dworkin’s sensitivities later in this 
chapter. It is important to understand first what Van Parijs is developing in Rawls 
project. Van Parijs is concerned with the amendments of the difference principle Rawls 
uses in his later work. Van Parijs argues that in adding leisure to the list of primary 
goods, Rawls changes his theory in a way that is unfair to certain valid conceptions of the 
good. Rawls undertook this change to deal with criticisms of the difference principle, 
like that of Dworkin, and moved his theory away from supporting non-contributors (free 
riders). Rawls argues that by adding leisure to the list of primary goods, the value of this 
good can be taken into the calculation of the difference principle. As a result, the 
difference principle can give value to those who do not contribute and choose to sit on a 
beach all day instead. However, this amendment causes certain conceptual problems as 
leisure receives a prescriptive value. Van Parijs wants to reconcile the commitment to 
providing a leximin set of opportunities with the need to ensure this prescriptive aspect is 
removed from institutions and principles of justice. Living a leisurely existence may be a 
legitimate conception of the good, and Van Parijs wants us to take this claim seriously 
when discussing our liberal account of distributive justice. As Van Parijs writes,
‘I shall argue that a defensible liberal theory of justice, that is, one that is truly 
committed to an equal concern for all and to nondiscrimination among conceptions of the 
good life, does justify, under appropriate factual conditions, a substantial unconditional 
basic income. An unconditional basic income, or, as I shall usually call it, a basic 
income, is a grant paid to every citizen, irrespective of his or her occupational situation 
and marital status, and irrespective of his or her work performance or availability for 
work. It is, in other words, an individual guaranteed minimum income without either a
164 Van Parijs, Philippe: ‘Hybrid Justice, Patriotism and Democracy: a Selective Reply’
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means test or a (willingness to) work condition. It is the absence of the latter condition 
that has aroused most ethical controversy.’165
Van Parijs argues that our concern for “real freedom” must be to provide an 
optimal level of “real freedom” to everyone through rights security and a leximin 
opportunity sets. This is a similar commitment to the original construction of the 
difference principle by Rawls, which arranged distributions in such a way, as the 
condition of the least well off is maximined systematically. This principle is not 
troubling for Van Parijs, as he will eventually simply qualify what is materially 
maximined in order to provide the leximin opportunities of “real freedom”. By adding 
leisure to the index of primary goods, Van Parijs argues that the principles of justice are 
compromised. He writes,
‘If we were to put Rawls’s proposal into practice, this index would go up as a 
result of the exogenous change. But, clearly, this improvement in the measured condition 
of this fraction of the least advantaged is purely fictional. It hides a stagnation of their 
situation in absolute terms and a worsening of their relative position, and simply reflects 
the fact that their leisure is postulated to be equivalent, at any particular time, to the 
income enjoyed at that same time by the least advantaged full-time workers.’166
For Van Parijs, this change to the Rawlsian project means that the index of goods 
privileges income and certain forms of labor and as a result harms politically, socially 
and economically those who simply have a different and legitimate conception of the 
good. Van Parijs argues our liberal commitment to justice simply cannot be coherent if it 
does not provide for these individuals in an equal systematic way even if we wish to 
condone as legitimate some of the material inequalities their choices create. Society has 
to provide for “free riders” as part of their commitment to liberal justice even if this 
means providing them with a maximin basic income simply for being a citizen. Their
165 Van Parijs, Philippe: ‘Why Surfers Should be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic 
Income’, p. 102
166IBID,p. I l l
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conception of the good should count equally.
Van Parijs argues that if we revert to the older and properly stripped down 
conception of the difference principle, we can arrive at a Rawlsian argument for basic 
income. Van Parijs argues that Rawls actually lays the groundwork for a system of 
justice that would endorse a “real libertarian” position. Van Parijs writes,
‘Thus, what I here take to be Rawls's version of the real-libertarian position and in 
particular his Difference Principle appear to recommend, subject to the respect of 
fundamental liberties and of fair equality of opportunity, that one should introduce a 
wealth-distributing, power-conferring, self-respect-preserving unconditional basic 
income, indeed, that one should introduce such an income at the highest sustainable level. 
For the Difference Principle is a maximin criterion, and the level of the basic income 
determines the bundle of socioeconomic advantages available to the worst-off, to those 
who have nothing but that basic income.’167
However, Van Parijs argues, that Rawls as presented does not give us this 
position. Van Parijs continues “... if this argument were sound, we would not need to go 
any further. But the argument so far is not just a bit loose, because of the lack of a 
precise index of primary goods. It is fundamentally flawed, because a liberally 
indefensible bias has crept into the interpretation of real freedom provided by the 
Difference Principle.”168 The bias Van Parijs alludes to is that the difference principle, as 
presented, still privileges those who value leisure, “lazy”, if not amended. Yet, if we do 
not amend it as Rawls suggests, the difference principle will privilege those who work to 
gain wealth, “crazy”. Van Parijs argues being an industrious laborer is also a conception 
of the good, which is valid but must be equally valued. We will revisit these points about 
the value of choices and conceptions of the good, as these are important arguments going 
forward, but it is important here to understand what Van Parijs is asking us to accept 
instead of Rawls verbatim argument about distributive justice. Rawls utilizes an
167 IBID, p. 105
168 IBID, p. 105
Balancing Choice and Circumstance -  Fair Shares and Just Access in Liberal Justice 164
unwieldy metric of work and leisure calculations to make his way around the initial 
problems with the difference principle.169 The initial conception of the difference 
principle caused a social structure in which resulting conditional outcomes were 
compensated without regard to how individuals arrived in them. To work his way around 
this problem, Rawls suggests that justice as fairness should reflect the value of leisure as 
a primary good.170 Van Parijs argues any implementation of this amendment either 
biases the system to favor the leisure lover or the extensive laborer rather than valuing 
both as equal conceptions of the good. To illustrate this, Van Parijs uses the 
Clever/Dumb example.171 In this example, Clever gets paid in total half of the amount 
Dumb gets paid but only has to work 1 hour to earn this amount compared to Dumb’s 
eight hour shift. Van Parijs argues that Rawls still allows the redistribution from Clever 
to Dumb because Clever has so much more leisure time. The reason this occurs is that 
the assessment of Dumb’s primary goods comes from his/her position as the worst off 
given the yield for his/her labor and lack of resulting leisure time. This criterion factors 
in leisure but still causes some individuals to be responsible for other individual’s 
choices, say choosing to labor at a more relaxed pace. Van Parijs argues this does not 
allow individuals equal “real freedom”. Rawls’ difference principle opens the door for 
conditionality to be placed on the provision of primary goods through workfare or means 
testing, which Van Parijs argues is an illiberal outcome if we are going to take leisure and 
industriousness as equal conceptions of the good life. What Van Parijs does not work out 
of this position is that he is implying the choices people make have to be equally valued 
and if they are, they have unequal results, which question the motivations for maximin 
(or leximin) actions. This effects the difference principle, but at a far deeper point in the 
liberal project. Though the UBI is intended to value the chosen tastes of individuals 
equally, there is more to this idea, which ultimately creates the contradictions in his work.
169 Refer to - Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, pp. 181 -  182 and Rawls, John; Justice as Fairness: A 
Restatement, p. 179 and Van Parijs, Philippe: Real Freedom for All, What (if anything) can Justify 
Capitalism, p. 132
170 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, pp. 181 -  182 Rawls, John: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 
179
171 Van Parijs, Philippe: Real Freedom for All, What (if anything) can Justify Capitalism, p. 132
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Van Parijs argues that instead of instituting a redistributed maximin set of primary 
goods, we ought to work toward providing a leximin set of opportunities and understand 
the tools to do this must be maximined in order to provide this leximin set. These tools 
must work so that the bias of the difference principle is not allowed to determine the 
distribution of the tool. Therefore, the principles guide the tool and then what happens 
with it does not privilege any given account of how it ought to be or is used. The aspect 
that matters is the “real freedom”, the actual opportunities individuals have, and these are 
what must be leximined in a maximin way rather than the maximin provision of social 
primary goods. For Van Parijs this removes the prescriptive problem he sees in Rawls 
and adds a limit to maximin actions needed to ensure redistribution is constrained. The 
leximin aspect is just a development of maximin reasoning so Van Parijs is giving us 
nothing new to lead to why we accept this account. The tool is needed to remove 
prescriptive aspects of Rawls but Van Parijs gives no greater reason than this to accept 
such a tool. The two in tandem simply imply the access to all-purpose means for 
everyone to realize this commitment and Van Parijs argues that the UBI can do this.
The general hypothetical thought project and many of the arguments present in 
Rawls, Van Parijs is asking us to accept. Yet Van Parijs is asking us to accept a different 
measure for our redistributive standard and a specific system to institutionalize these 
measures. Crucially, the “real libertarian” account is drawn to avoid the construction of 
the difference principle as stated by Rawls, even if we agree to some form of maximin 
standard to provide leximin freedoms. Van Parijs asks us to hold these arguments as 
separate and perhaps most puzzlingly, does not rework his way through Rawls’ account 
(systematically, institutionally, or teleologically) beyond this issue with the difference 
principle. Van Parijs explains the issue as solely a matter of procedure and development 
within the difference principle rather than a matter of the issues within the difference 
principle flowing from a systemic issue in Rawls’ thought.
Still, it is clear what Van Parijs is attempting to do. Van Parijs is positioning “real 
freedom” as an account of individual freedom and justice that develops Rawls but in a 
way distinct from Dworkin. The hybrid explanation diverges from these other liberal
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accounts in several fundamental ways. The first of these is seen in how Van Parijs 
fulfills this commitment to opportunity in a different way. Van Parijs proposes to 
institutionalize the availability of opportunity sets through an allocative process. In order 
to fulfill these three tenets and the commitment of the state to “real freedom”, Van Parijs 
argues for the inception of the UBI. The UBI is an allocation but on a distinctly different 
level from the clamshells of Dworkin’s extended auction. Van Parijs is instituting the use 
of the allocation after the provision of background justice, not as Dworkin does to define 
the legitimacy of distributive outcomes. The UBI provides individuals with access to 
opportunity sets of their own choice, much like the set of primary goods Rawls wants to 
provide individuals with or the bundles Dworkin allows individuals to purchase with their 
clamshells. For Van Parijs, the fact that they are provided through a system of capitalist 
transactions, namely the exchange of UBI for objects and resources valued competitively 
in the social marketplace, is an optimal but not necessary aspect of a commitment to “real 
freedom”.
The emphasis is on the liberal egalitarian justification of “real freedom” and the 
distribution through a UBI that the commitment to it entails. As Van Parijs writes in 
discussing the just treatment of surfers on Malibu beach (the leisure loving lazies),
‘Does justice require that they be fed? Somewhat more accurately, does liberal 
justice entitle them-no questions asked, no strings attached-to an income sufficient for 
them to feed themselves? If my argument is correct, it certainly does, at least in a society 
that is affluent enough to durably afford an unconditional income at that level. For if 
liberal justice consists, as I have taken for granted it does, in maximinning the real 
freedom to pursue the realization of one's conception of the good life, those who take an 
unfair share of society's resources are not those who opt for such a low-production, low- 
consumption lifestyle. They are people like myself and most of my readers, who, thanks 
to the attractive job they were given, appropriate a huge employment rent.’172
172 Van Parijs, Philippe: ‘Why Surfers Should be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic 
Income’, p. 130
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The UBI is essentially the equal share of the resources needed to have 
opportunities but in a way that is far more useful and non-prescriptive than actually 
divvying up the resources themselves. We must accept that different conceptions of the 
good may make us contextually lazy or contextually crazy but in either case, we have a 
right to the resources we need as individuals to live and to our respective conceptions of 
the good. This commitment we cannot escape and it will ultimately lead to Van Parijs’ 
defense of the unconditionality of the basic income. The fact that some individuals do 
not contribute to our society economically, being ‘free-riders’, does not mean they 
alienate their right to a liberal egalitarian distribution of resources over a lifetime. What 
is more, these commitments led us in the same breath to move away from basic income if 
it is not available at a high enough level to ensure we can buy our hypothetical lunch. 
Furthermore, the ascription of need does not alienate individuals from the important 
freedom of self-defining even the most basic of these needs or preferences. The 
sensitivity to choice and taste in distribution can be done while then avoiding the 
prescriptive problems Rawls feared in a “social minimum” systems of allocation. Van 
Parijs dodges this issue by placing his tool within the constraints of Rawls difference 
principle account (broadly speaking) so that the allocation is not prescriptive but still 
maximin (in a leximin sense).
Rawls argued in a similar way for the use of the difference principle. The 
difference principle was needed in order to assure just these sorts of provisions for 
individuals. The problem with this conception, that Dworkin and Nozick helped 
articulate, is that it failed to take onboard the outcomes of individuals’ choices. Systems 
that allocate support based upon outcomes can yield unfair redistributive obligations 
between individuals. Choices need to matter in a deeper way, and Van Parijs appears to 
believe this in his arguments for privileging the UBI as a device. If it is important to 
define needs, this must be because choices need to be equally valued. Van Parijs’ may 
have worked his way around Rawls critique by aligning himself with Rawls but in doing 
so he has not acknowledge the powerful intuition we need to accept in order to arrive at 
these conclusions. This intuition, properly understood, takes us away from Rawls 
altogether.
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Van Parijs’ critique of Rawls follows a similar and yet distinct mode of argument. 
Van Parijs argues that Rawls fails to adjust rather than construct the difference principle 
correctly when calculating the aforementioned objection into his theory. Van Parijs 
refers to the arguments for a property-owning democracy that Rawls argues fulfills the 
commitments of justice as fairness. This amendment was undertaken by Rawls to move 
his theory away from welfare capitalism. Van Parijs argues that upon inspecting the 
argument Rawls is making when amending his theory, his basic income system is the 
epitome of a property-owning democracy, properly institutionalized.173
As we have seen, Van Parijs argues that Rawls, in adjusting the sensitivities in the 
difference principle, lays the groundwork for a system that redistributes the goods needed 
to enjoy social liberties without the ongoing conditional maximin actions that the 
difference principle was intended to invoke. Rawls argues for the importance of self- 
respect, property-ownership and the liberating aspects of a free market mechanism. Van 
Parijs argues a UBI properly adheres to the choice sensitivities that Rawls wanted in a 
property-owning democracy.
Van Parijs takes on many essential elements and even in large part the teleology 
of Rawls’ argument but he separates his model in a clear way from Rawls. Van Parijs 
ultimately also distances his conceptions from the singularly domestic nature of Rawls’ 
theory as well.174 Yet his foundations are similar in that they support the hypothetical 
processes Rawls argues for and many of the resulting principles from this exercise. Both 
aim to provide a fair society. Both aim to act upon individuals being equals and 
engendering this treatment throughout the course of their lives. Both aim to give fair 
value to liberties through the provision of resources and opportunities. Both affirm the 
importance of rights and the value of a market mechanism. Important for our discussion 
here, Van Parijs adopts a conception of freedom that mirrors Rawls’ concern for 
resources and a fair set of liberties. Van Parijs wants “real” options for people to enjoy.
173 Van Parijs, Philippe Real Freedom for All, What (if anything) can Justify Capitalism, p. 46
174 IBID, p. 226
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For this reason, the redistribution of resources and provision of opportunity sets is very 
much in keeping with Rawls’ general project.
However, I believe it is important to note here before moving on that Van Parijs’ 
theory is very Rawls-like in the same sense that Nozick was Locke-like. Van Parijs 
argues for an allocative system that is unlikely to embody Rawls’ commitment to a 
property-owning democracy quite as readily as Van Parijs claims it would. This will 
ultimately come forth from a deep tension between the two that I will articulate later in 
this chapter. Rawls’ concern with systems of allocation was that they did not properly 
endow a fair and equally valued set of liberties through primary goods. The reason 
being, these allocations are not the goods themselves and the natural endowments of 
individuals affect the use of the allocations in an unfair way.
As we have seen through my development of the liberal argument, in order to 
justify allocative processes, we had to work through the issues of moral agency, 
circumstance and choice are accounted for in order to arrive at an allocative market 
structure. Van Parijs argues that the use of in-kind provisions and natural endowment 
compensation will mitigate the problems Rawls has with allocation. It is clear, even now, 
that such an argument will lean on the validity of choices without working this position 
out. We will return to, and describe in greater detail, these arguments and institutions 
later in this essay. For now, it is important to assert where amongst the projects we have 
so far assessed Van Parijs fits. He is more accurately using portions of Rawls’ argument 
to justify his systematic suggestions. He is not developing Rawls at the same point 
Dworkin does. Van Parijs has specific problems with Dworkin’s extended auction and 
insurance project that lead him to refute in large part the suggestion of it as properly 
embodying an account of liberal distributive justice.
Van Parijs argues that Dworkin’s system does not provide “real freedom” due to 
the calculations and stipulations Dworkin places on his system through the application of 
the insurance scheme. Van Parijs refers to the insurance scheme as “counterfactual”175
175 IBID, p. 59
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and Van Parijs argues there are many specific problems with it. Van Parijs’ primary 
objection to Dworkin is that he allows the insurance scheme to compensate individuals 
with identical natural endowments due to their potentially expensive tastes.176 The 
details of this argument we will explore later in this essay, but it is important for now to 
understand why this problem prevents the extended auction and insurance scheme from 
providing “real freedom”. Dworkin’s goal of providing choice sensitivity with 
endowment insensitivity fails if Van Parijs’ contention holds. If individuals are to have 
“real freedom” then their choices must count equally. The system can only compensate 
those with legitimately unfavorable natural endowments and not those who make 
expensive choices. Van Parijs is eager to show that Dworkin’s insurance calculation does 
not use the proper criteria for legitimizing compensation. As a result, the redistribution 
of the scheme will compensate those with particular tastes rather than those who actually 
lack natural endowments in a meaningful way.
Van Parijs also argues that Dworkin and other market-based basic 
income/allocative advocates like Hillel Steiner, need the market in a deeper, non­
instrumental way.177 Van Parijs argues that Dworkin needs the market due to the 
operation of the extended auction and the procedural outcomes that happen thereafter. 
Van Parijs argues this treats the capitalist system as a necessary good, rather than a tool 
to realize optimal freedom if and when our other considerations of justice are met. Van 
Parijs argues that although “real freedom” is best provided when markets are available, 
the market is not a fundamental aspect of a commitment to “real freedom”. Van Parijs 
exemplifies his argument that “real freedom” can be realized in certain non-ideal 
circumstances by instituting socialism.178 The “real” aspects of freedom are resource 
based and as such, the market may frequently but not always provide an optimal set of 
“real” opportunities in a fair and equal way. As we have discussed, this position is 
already problematic. The idea of socialism is used by Van Parijs to refer to a mode of 
distribution in the sense mentioned here rather than of ownership, which was his initial 
description of it. If it was not optimal ideally, this was for a reason and Van Parijs never
176 This conception is most clearly stated on IBID, p. 59
177 Van Parijs, Philippe: ‘Egalitarian Justice, Left Libertarianism and the Market’, pp. 145 -162
178 Van Parijs, Philippe: Real Freedom for All, What (if anything) can Justify Capitalism, pp. 7 -11
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uncovers this. The distributive aspect here need not devolve into socialism but rather in- 
kind provisions. The market is clearly a needed aspect of such a position because we 
require a way to formalize choices and the opportunities and tastes these choices 
represent.
Van Parijs wants to provide the same choice sensitivity that Dworkin argued for 
and institutionalize a form of extended auction. The UBI can act as a tool that provides 
for individual needs but does not ascribe what these needs or ideally preferences are. The 
UBI works in a subordinate space that Van Parijs feels Dworkin gives his auction but this 
does not mean there is no role for such a process. The UBI builds in the choice 
sensitivity that Van Parijs argues Rawls lacks when describing the proper ordering of a 
property-owning democracy. The UBI is just a consequence of the commitment to “real 
freedom” being implemented in a typical, yet precise context. The difference between 
Dworkin and Van Parijs is how deeply they feel they need to amend the Rawlsian project 
to create the needed sensitivity to choices.
Dworkin and Van Parijs recognize the problem choice poses in material wealth at 
one end of the egalitarian spectrum and provision of need at the other end of the same 
spectrum. Both answer this question in similar allocative way but place this idea in 
distinct theoretical and institutional contexts within their theories. Choices count for 
each, but in different measure because they place its actions in different places within 
their accounts. Van Parijs places this consideration after the actions of the difference 
principle much like Rawls. Dworkin places them into the apparatus that arises directly 
after the veil because everyone is projected the ability to make choices. The conceptions 
are similar in intent but not in scope. Dworkin is arguing that justice is secured through 
an allocative process because we can make this assumption about individuals. 
Subsequently, the distributions that occur are ambition sensitive because choices count 
appropriately. Dworkin argues that this is still a hypothetical/abstract process and one 
largely in keeping in many respects with Rawls project.
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For Dworkin, the only way to reflect choices and autonomy in a liberal system of 
justice is to modify the veil of ignorance and use this modification to develop a just 
allocative thought experiment in the auction and insurance schemes. This ensures 
individual freedom because the choices made are in a fair and equal environment. The 
consequences of these choices are an aspect of individual autonomy that ought to have no 
bearing on redistributive calculation if and only if the distribution is endowment 
insensitive. The need for endowment insensitivity creates the insurance scheme, which 
attempts to address it as well as constrain the level of distribution. These create the 
institutions of background justice for Dworkin.
The commitment to justice and scope of individual freedom for Van Parijs is on a 
very different level. Theoretically, Van Parijs does not argue for a distinct recalculation 
of Rawls’ processes or the aspects present within it. In order to do this, Van Parijs argues 
we should accept an allocative system if and only if it allows for a maximined set of 
resources because these allow opportunities and hence choices. Van Parijs will 
ultimately draw up a standard to compensate those with poor natural endowments to 
bolster his position, which we will explore in detail later in this essay. The use of this 
device appears, although not explicitly stated, to acknowledge the need to allow choices 
to count in outcomes. However, if they are to count, Van Parijs will need to challenge 
Rawls’ conception of the difference principle in a profound way given our discussion 
thus far of Rawls. Though this may lead us to believe that Van Parijs is questioning a 
foundational premise of the larger Rawlsian project that has deep implications, Van Parijs 
is arguing instead that we can get the needed results and changes simply by rethinking the 
implications of our maximin reasoning. Instead of this leading to a Rawlsian difference 
principle, it leads instead to Van Parijs’ argument.
For Van Parijs, creating the background justice, which is the principle-driven 
basic structures of a fair society, appears in large part to mirror many of the commitments 
of Rawls. For Van Parijs the provision of this structure is the first step towards justice 
and ensuring individual freedom. In this way, Van Parijs wants to adopt endowment 
insensitivity in this practice of providing justice because it is a fundamental part of
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providing individual freedom. However, individual freedom is reliant on background 
justice, which Van Parijs believes cannot be constituted by a market device, like 
Dworkin’s, to determine what is and is not a just distributive outcome. In short, choices 
should count, but not at this juncture. What is left as a difference between the 
conceptions of Dworkin and Van Parijs is a matter of arguing over the institutions and 
theoretical practices/commitments that best realize a commitment to liberal justice in 
balancing the issues of individual choices and circumstances.
In assessing whether Van Parijs’ argument is compelling, particularly in terms of 
choice sensitivity, it is crucial to see what role his ideal UBI is to play and how it is 
intended to work in society. The UBI is essentially a form of allocation but one that 
avoids the prescriptive pitfalls Rawls argues characterizes such a system. The UBI acts 
in many ways like Dworkin’s clamshells in the extended auction but places the auction in 
a different place within the progression of our decisions about justice. The presence of 
such a market system is to provide self-valued items of need/preference. The value of 
objects available in this market place is a matter of self-definition and in sanctioning their 
acquisition, the state is conferring legitimate entitlement for the respective bidder. 
Dworkin and Rawls also seemingly allow this sort of societal space for the market within 
the eventual institutions of the extended auction and insurance scheme or within a 
property-owning democracy respectively.
For allocative solutions in particular, the processes of allocation and transaction 
are fundamental. An allocative account of justice must then institute its egalitarian 
commitments in a way sensitive to the market processes and individual rights within 
these processes, which yield the unequal results. Van Parijs argues the UBI works in the 
confines of the market aspect of a property-owning democracy. “Real Freedom” requires 
commitments to equality, liberty and opportunity that Van Parijs argues must occur prior 
to the use of a market device. This is a clear point of departure in approach between 
himself and Dworkin, even if they seem to share the same Rawlsian conception of justice. 
Freedom requires structures of justice first, including maximin principles of some type 
prior to the legitimate use of the market device. Van Parijs argues that, for Dworkin, the
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market is integral to ensuring choice sensitivity in the selection of primary goods and as 
such plays an a priori role injustice and individual freedom.
At this point, it is clear that Van Parijs has a distinct relationship with the ideas of 
Rawls. It is clear that Van Parijs feels “real freedom” does meet these considerations of 
liberal justice in developing Rawls argument. However, I will argue that we can see 
whether Van Parijs is correct about these assertions in inspecting how the UBI works in 
his ideal scenario. If it requires developments to the ideas of Rawls in a deeper way, the 
decisions about why we accept a UBI or “real freedom” are going to be very different. I 
will show that this is indeed the case. The reason will be that choices are more 
fundamental than Rawls or Van Parijs allow because it is a capacity held by everyone. 
Whether Van Parijs’ painting of Dworkin is fair is yet another matter I intend to revisit 
subsequently but it is important first to explore what more we can say about the UBI as it 
operates in the subordinate/instrumental space Van Parijs argues it belongs.
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4,2 Ambition-Sensitivitv. Choices and A m ending Property Rights
As we have discussed, Van Parijs adopts a flexible theory of individual 
entitlement. This is a conception that is sensitive to the constraints and considerations 
institutions of justice place on certain resources and subsequently the liberty these 
resources provide. Van Parijs is concerned, like Rawls, in the provision of background 
institutions of justice.179 Absolute or disproportionate acquisition of some resources 
would adversely affect the availability of fair and equal sets of opportunities and in turn, 
the equal value of individual liberty.
To put the problem that is come plainly, market structures imply rights. Claim 
rights are in fact what changes hands from one actor to another through the market.
These legitimate transfers happen through choices formalized through market procedure. 
If these aspects are not retained, the market mechanism does not provide choices, 
selections or opportunities appropriately. Nozick’s theory drew rights too broadly, 
strictly and irrespective of the actual opportunities individuals need to be free. 
Nevertheless, a market does not appear to be a market in any freedom producing sense if 
it does not honor a coherent conception of property rights. Yet, people need access to 
resources in order to exercise any right or to act at all. Therefore, the balance that must 
be struck is to provide both in a coherent manner.
It is important to revisit what we have asserted about our markets. The proportion 
of the share can be constrained comparatively prior to entering the market (literally what 
is available for sale) but once it is sold, the process can only seemingly be sensitive to 
affect others shares in what opportunities they have in terms of resources, not the 
size/value created from the purchased bundle of resources. It is at this point that we see 
the importance of asserting our Fair Shares Proviso. We have qualified and subordinated 
these claims but if we give them space to work, they have to mean something in 
considering our market. This is because individual choices and labor do play a role in
179 Rawls, John: Political Liberalism, pp. 265 - 268
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material distributions. So our consideration is what people should have at the starting 
line given this is a moving target. This ongoing consideration implies redistribution, 
considerations of internal/natural endowments, and constant revisitation based upon our 
consideration of fairness, but onee this has all taken place the resulting property/claim 
rights have to mean something and place constraints on what our legislators and 
discussions of contextual politics can say or do (justly) about the results of market 
practices.
For Rawls in particular, property was a political claim but one that retained 
importance. Rawls does not intend this to prevent property rights or the privilege of 
private ownership. Rawls affirms these are important aspects in providing for individual 
self-respect and he clearly allows market systems space in his theory to operate. Our 
unbundling of why this privilege is important has led us to question Rawls account of 
choices and why they must be strictly constrained due to natural endowment 
considerations. It is precisely this space that Van Parijs sees his UBI operating in. This 
means the outcomes of the market are subordinate to the constraints of the equality and 
opportunity measures of a Rawlsian account of justice. This reasoning is cogent in so 
much as the basic structure needs to be provided. Particular acquisitions are clearly 
going to violate rights and equal liberties required by justice. However, Rawls 
redistribution had major conceptual issues that so far Van Parijs has not addressed. To 
see if our balance between choices and circumstances is met by Van Parijs, we need to 
explore the operation of the UBI. The UBI is intended to meet our concerns about initial 
equality in the market. This inspection will be important in assessing whether to accept 
Van Parijs’ development of Rawls, both theoretically and in terms of his institutions.
It is important to first explore what the UBI actually is and does. The UBI is a 
regular equal disbursement of currency to each and every citizen. Van Parijs argues for 
two important aspects of the UBI. Firstly, he argues that a coherent basic income must be 
unconditionally provided to every citizen and that it must be provided at the maximin 
level possible. Secondly, he argues that basic income ought to be universal so as not to 
privilege any individual over another. He believes the freedom of and opportunities for
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individuals must be provided in an equal and ongoing way if the application of “real 
freedom” is to be coherent. This is a direct refutation of the means-tested or conditional 
forms of support welfare or even other basic income models. For Van Parijs, the 
application of “real freedom” requires unconditionality when distributing basic income 
due to the background considerations of justice.
The universality of basic income is buffered for Van Parijs by actions to 
sustainably maximize the amount of UBI that is to be distributed to each individual. Van 
Parijs urges the unconditionality of a basic income on its own is not enough. The UBI 
should be maximized in a way that provides a leximin set of opportunities to individuals, 
while allowing these individuals to use the income to select the actual opportunities they 
wish to avail themselves of.180 Though Van Parijs is quick to establish that the 
maximization cannot come at the expense of in-kind provisions, basic welfare through 
actions to compensate those with physical disabilities, actions of gift and bequest, or 
other calculations of utility, he insists throughout that the UBI must be maintained at the 
highest level that is sustainable in the given society.
Van Parijs further states that the UBI must be disbursed in even and frequent 
amounts.181 Van Parijs argues that the state must show a concern for the conditions of 
individuals over the course of a full life. Because of this, the decisions they could 
undertake with some other conception of basic income, like a lump sum, must be 
protected against. Van Parijs argues this is the sole way to provide equal concern for 
individual opportunity sets in an ongoing way in societies that can sustain “impure” 
capitalism. These commitments mirror Rawls in that they provide everyone with all­
purpose means through the UBI and that these means are maximined to provide a leximin 
set of opportunities. This is a parallel drawn by Van Parijs, as it is his claim that basic 
income capitalism and “real freedom” are the embodiment of a property owning 
democracy properly formulated. Van Parijs argues the reason these systems work in the 
way that they do is because of the commitments a proper liberal account of justice
180 Van Parijs, Philippe: Real Freedom for All, What (if anything) can Justify Capitalism, p. 25
181 IBID, p. 45
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requires. These aspects of the UBI flow directly from the Rawlsian underpinnings of the 
project at hand.
This brings us to the other side of our coin, where is the UBI coming from and 
how is it raised if we are striking a balance between the claims at hand. Because of the 
principles used to motivate redistribution, Rawls adopts maximin redistributions that 
allow only material inequalities if these inequalities improve the condition of the worst 
off. This led to problems in that the reciprocal commitment such a principle applies is 
not appropriately sensitive to the choices individuals make as Dworkin noted in critiquing 
Rawls. This crucial difference in how a liberal commitment to redistribution ought to 
work is extremely important but despite its existence, both Rawls and Dworkin ultimately 
exercise redistribution through wealth measurement in much the same way. The 
argument for this is premised on the lack of neutrality in talents, as they are at least in 
part unequal and arbitrary and on the premise that material inequalities harm the basic 
structure by depriving other individuals of equal condition. Dworkin wants choices to 
matter but because he believes it is impossible to know whether choices have truly 
yielded certain outcomes, end results end up being our “second best” option for 
envisaging taxation. In the next section, I will put Van Parijs’ answer to how we provide 
endowment-insensitivity under specific scrutiny. However, for now I ask you to assume 
that this issue can be resolved harmoniously with commitments to endowment- 
insensitivity and ambition-sensitivity. We are left to assess whether the wealth-based end 
result measurement of redistributive obligation still makes sense.
Van Parijs gives us yet another way to consider taxation. Van Parijs argues for 
the institution of “resource rents”.182 These rents generate the income needed to fund the 
UBI and the other actions of the state including in-kind provisions and basic welfare. 
These are essentially taxes on the resources provided by the basic structure that 
individuals use or appropriate. As these resources are provided by the basic structure, 
they are political privileges afforded to individuals by our system of mutual cooperation. 
Van Parijs argues, much along the lines of Rawls’ argument, that this feature of these
182 IBID, p. 89
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resources makes them the legitimate focal point for taxation to provide the basic structure 
that affords them in turn to society. Many resources would appear to fall under this 
conception but uniquely Van Parijs argues that jobs should be a taxable resource assessed 
by this fund raising device. Van Parijs argues that a job is a resource, in relatively scarce 
supply. It is an opportunity to undertake labor and by accepting the employment, the 
individual has used a resource that other individuals could plausibly use. The result is a 
disproportionate acquisition of a resource, which makes the job liable for a resource rent. 
Certain jobs will be rarer or have smaller fields of potential qualified employees, and Van 
Parijs argues these factors will affect the level of rent. Van Parijs asserts that the 
compensation an employee receives for a job reflects these factors and hence acts as a 
convenient measure by which to levy taxation. The resource rent is further intended to 
ensure that individuals are free to make choices in what opportunities they utilize, but in 
doing so pay appropriate rental values back to the basic structure that provides the 
opportunities. The end result is that Van Parijs’ argument uses a Rawlsian justification 
for taxation of resources but uses a different thought device to legitimize redistributive 
obligation. The measure implied by this method is the use of the resource. This appears 
at harmony with our Fair Shares Proviso account of what is required to legitimize 
qualified market transactions. It simply expands the definition of what counts in the 
provisions of the device.
Why we redistribute is clear from our Rawlsian account of justice. What has 
remained unclear is what we should tax to get these redistributive resources while 
honoring choices and outcomes appropriately. All of our developments of Rawlsian 
justice have so far argued that we should use distributive end results as our measure. For 
resource rents to make sense, we have to establish why resource rents work to fulfill 
something end results do not. Resource rents redistribute based upon the use of resources 
pursuant to the effect their use has on those who have equal claim to the resource. This 
returns us to our Fair Shares Proviso from the first chapter. Our claim, is that once we 
have entered the remit of our market system, we can allow disproportionate outcomes if 
and only if our access to the shares of what was initially available are either afforded us 
or we are compensated for their use. Resource rents fulfill these criteria but perhaps
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more importantly, we appear to need this argument in order for their use to yield us 
anything different from naked end results, which would be an unadulterated means 
argument. This does not contradict the idea of taxation, but rather qualifies who pays it 
and how much it should be based upon a specific kind of calculation.
Those with the most valuable resources and jobs pay the most rent. For Van 
Parijs we can tell if these resources are valuable based upon the end result wealth people 
achieve filling these roles. As a result, those with the most wealth pay the most tax. This 
is because the result-based redistribution argument is still powerful and one Van Parijs 
uses in much the same way Rawls did even if he claims not too. The reasons for Van 
Parijs will boil down to how we appraise resources and a concern that individuals who 
use fewer opportunities should not pay as much tax. Van Parijs will work to legitimize 
why this conception boils down to such a calculation but it is in part derived through 
Rawls so it is important first to quickly appraise Rawls more detailed aspects of market 
moderation.
Rawls’ answer to this in Justice as Fairness -  A Restatement appears to be that 
the actual remit of the procedural system of justice, what is a legitimate amount or facet 
of wealth, is a legislative matter. This means that the Property Owning Democracy 
will have institutions of legitimate democratic input that can adjudicate the limits/scope 
of the market, distributions of wealth and by extension who gets taxed for what. For 
Rawls, as long as these decisions are guided by the principles of justice, including the 
difference principle, they will be just. This may be true insofar as the state in question 
would have to have these sorts of institutions in keeping with the equality and liberty 
principles of justice.
Surely, a comprehensive account of distributive justice must be able to tell us 
something about what is and is not off the table in terms of wealth and distribution aside 
from allowing a legislative process to determine parameters within context. If apples and 
oranges are valued differently as resources then our calculations kick in. This is not a
183 Rawls, John: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 182
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problem as oranges are not apples, apples are not oranges, and we cannot determine the 
value of either without context. However, if we all have oranges and these oranges are in 
all meaningful ways the same, a legislator should be constrained from claiming 
otherwise. In order to say this we must be guided by a principle of fairness in our market 
device like our Fair Shares Proviso and the allocative practices it implies. The fact that 
you may do great things with your orange, and I may not, does not give me a legitimate 
claim to your success given your success does not affect my ability to use or access my 
orange or the basic structure we share. My claim is not about the results, it is about the 
pre-conditions and what it takes to sustain them in an ongoing way.
Van Parijs’ argument is giving a different measure than Rawls. This measure 
implies such a standard. The comparative use of resources legitimizes the level of 
taxation and this is a matter of justice. The resource rent device appears to give us 
exactly what our properly expanded Fair Shares Proviso would ask of us. The 
affirmation of the basic structure is predicated on the resource impact individuals have 
upon one another over time. It would seemingly limit or at least qualify what a 
legislative process could legitimately tax or value in a calculation of redistribution. The 
implication here is even greater than simply a legislative trump. A resource rent implies 
that naked material wealth cannot be the legitimate measure of redistributive obligation. 
Instead, it has to be predicated on the resource value or scarcity of the resource being 
acquired or used. The use of a non-scarce resource to accrue wealth would still only 
gamer the obligation that came with the use of the resource. Conversely, the use of a 
valuable resource would gamer a larger redistributive obligation even though an 
individual may not be wealthy from having made the choice to rent this resource. These 
were the reasons Van Parijs gave us in moving us to an “impure” form of capitalism and 
as such, they have to be drawn appropriately.
Van Parijs, by invoking the use of resource rents, has given us a tool not yet 
articulated in our discussions of liberal justice. It is a tool that provides a measure our 
previous discussions have led us to endorse as appropriate. Nevertheless, at the same 
time Van Parijs has painted himself into a bit of a theoretic comer if he is to accept
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Rawlsian principles of justice. The resource rent account of obligation precludes using 
Rawls’ argument for redistribution based on end-results to maximin the conditions of the 
least well off. This does not impugn the concept of redistribution, but rather changes the 
criteria for doing so.
This paradox is clear to Van Parijs as well and he attempts to take us away from 
this conception of resource-based obligation. Van Parijs does not want the kind of 
property rights that would stem from an account of justice that was purely allocative.
Van Parijs ultimately falls on the side of measuring redistributive obligation through a 
calculation of salary as value. Van Parijs writes,
‘First, because the proposition that workers are the creators of the whole product, 
on which their right to the entire product is usually supposed to rest, is either tautological 
and irrelevant or plainly false. And secondly because-—contrary to my firm intuition and, 
I should hope, yours—the recognition of such a right would justify inequalities, however 
large, that stem, for example, from the fact that unequally fertile soil makes workers 
unequally productive. ’184
The first part of this argument follows with our reasons for redistribution and 
market subordination. However, this only establishes redistribution. To go beyond this, 
Van Parijs argues that resources are not all created the same. As a result, some 
individuals arbitrarily receive a better lot of the same relative resource. These uneven 
resources allow some individuals to prosper to a greater degree and derive a greater 
salary by virtue of good fortune. Van Parijs argues this is unfair and legitimizes salary- 
based redistribution to fund the UBI, a straightforward income tax.
This example at first is palpable when talking about land or other natural 
resources and the products produced from them. However, I would urge that such 
deviations would imply that one was an apple and the other an orange not that two 
resources are the same, yet somehow different. Nevertheless, our argument need not go
184 Van Parijs, Philippe: Real Freedom for All, What (if anything) can Justify Capitalism, p. 133
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to this level of irreducible skepticism. The argument becomes even less convincing when 
we discuss vocations or jobs which Van Parijs also asks us to place a rent upon. As an 
example, let us take two professors both tenured at the same institution in the same field. 
All of their appreciable resources in the position are the same, research money, class­
load, vacation time, etc. We must also bear in mind that Van Parijs will present a way to 
neutralize/compensate natural/internal endowment inequalities, so they are effectively 
removed. One is an excellent teacher, prolific writer and excellent advisor. The other 
received tenure and then put his/her academic mind into cruise control. If the industrious 
professor ends up earning more through a full/distinguished professorship promotion 
and/or a good book deal, Van Parijs argues he owes more rent as his resource, the 
job/position, was uneven. Van Parijs has to argue that the job/position advantaged 
Professor 1 over Professor 2. However, this clearly is not the case as the other professor 
had the same opportunity and simply did not utilize it in the same way. Their rent for the 
social resource should be the same but Van Parijs, because of his Rawls-like position on 
this aspect of taxation, cannot allow an allocative account of redistributive obligation.
The implication of this is that our taxation may be from income, but it is not 
predicated legitimately from income as a measure. A resource rent has to be the rent 
owed based upon the inability of others to use the same resource. This is what our Fair 
Shares Proviso urged and explains why it has such importance as a subordinate claim in 
our development of the liberal argument. The fact that someone does well with an equal 
share compared to someone else does not mean that they owe more rent. The same 
resource has to gamer the same rent. Legislators can make the distinctions of sameness 
but the standard by which they must make such a judgment and treat it fairly is a matter 
of justice. It may be hard to tell the value in absolute terms of some natural resources 
(though I would conjecture this is not impossible). However, when two resources are 
clearly the same, like our two professorships, the rent has to be the same based upon the 
resource that is being utilized. The value of a resource may frequently be corollary to the 
salary paid, but this is not always the case. This shows why it is so important to accept 
our Fair Shares Proviso rather than utilize the end-result systems of Rawls, Dworkin and 
ultimately Van Parijs present.
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Though Rawls and Van Parijs may have fallen short on this point, Dworkin does 
acknowledge this paradox.185 Dworkin argues that we must accept redistributing from 
the affluent to the least well off as determining what elements of ambition are natural and 
which are created through the social aspects that come with the affirmation of the basic 
structure is impossible. The best solution would be to determine how much these 
elements mattered and determine the resulting reward accordingly. Since this is not 
possible, the “second best” solution is to redistribute based on the end results. However, 
if individuals all have access to the same resources through the affirmation of the basic 
structure and the natural aspects are removed through endowment-insensitivity, the use of 
resources as a measure of redistributive obligations would negate Dworkin’s argument 
for the pragmatic use of naked end-results. The admission that something better is 
possible exists within his own argument. He simply fears that it is unattainable or easily 
misconstrued. Still, by redrawing the Rawlsian project, Dworkin lays the groundwork for 
ascertaining fair resource based distributions that Rawls and subsequently Van Parijs do 
not. The re-direction of the project proves extremely meaningful when we consider the 
sensitivities I have thus far argued need to be built into conceptions of choice and 
autonomy even if the pragmatic assertion of where the redistribution comes from is 
problematic.
A greater wealth of initial opportunities is problematic but the wealth accrued 
after a sustained distribution of these, given natural endowments are appropriately 
treated, appears to be a different matter. The systematic answer ought to be based on the 
use of more than a fair initial share of resources given our now more expansive account 
of what resources are. If this is the alternate choice, a resource account, we can say 
something even more important systematically about market claims than Rawls, Dworkin 
and Van Parijs have. End results are not going to honor our choices and moral agency 
well enough. We still have a need to redistribute and to provide resources. So our 
account must be based on resource use. This precludes end-result taxation simply
185 Dworkin, Ronald: Sovereign Virtue: The Theory o f Practice in Equality, ( Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2002) p. 73
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because resource use does not cause better or worse end results without individual 
choices. It would be unjust to tax people based upon the decisions they made with their 
equally endowed moral agency.
Unlike Rawls and Dworkin, Van Parijs’ system of UBI and subsequent account of 
resource rents can allow this market consideration, although Van Parijs does not 
articulate that it can or should. It needs to if it is to take choices and autonomy seriously, 
given these are aims espoused by “real freedom”.
The institution of resource rents by Van Parijs creates an interesting apparatus 
from which to derive the funds for redistribution. Resource rents essentially calculate the 
relative scarcity of a resource and measure the redistributive obligation from this 
measurement. The scarcity is not a measure of utility as such, although the scarcity in 
question will frequently point to a corollary relationship. If something is scarce it is 
typically going to be more valuable compared to another option that is more plentiful.
The difference between this sort of calculation and a pure end-result calculation is very 
important as it distinguishes what was used and the effect on the basic structure, not the 
result of market actions alone. Van Parijs argues that the result of a resource rent 
calculation is very similar to that of the Rawls and Dworkin end-result principle. This is 
true insofar as scarce resources, particularly jobs, will be scarce because they yield more 
benefits and income. Thus, resource rents may look like an income tax, but it is not so 
straightforward. It is a development in the conception that I argue is needed if we are 
going to honor choices in our society appropriately. Importantly, this drags us away from 
some of the arguments Van Parijs is using to justify his system. The implication is that a 
different account of justice is going to be needed if we are to legitimize rents in a way 
that is coherent with providing individual freedom and a just basic structure.
The concept of a resource rent matches our considerations of justice but it does 
not appear the measurement and application of this aspect of Van Parijs theory is in 
keeping with why a resource rent system is preferable. Van Parijs’ position becomes
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even odder when we consider Van Parijs’ stance on “means testing”.186 Van Parijs 
argues for the unconditionality, maximization and disbursal of the basic income, all on 
generally Rawlsian principles. His argument mirrors that of Rawls in Justice as Fairness 
-  A Restatement that individuals should be provided for equally over the course of a full 
life.187 Each of these arguments has attracted criticism explored in the subsequent 
sections of this chapter. Here we will focus solely on Van Parijs’ argument as to why 
means testing should not be a consideration of receiving basic income. Van Parijs argues 
that the basic income must be unconditional and universal in order to properly conceive 
individuals as equals. The UBI would give individuals an equal set of opportunities 
compared to everyone else receiving the income. Anything earned over this amount 
would be the result of the use of opportunities, which is an act of autonomous choice 
and/or ambition. Ergo, the UBI ensures that individuals have a baseline set of maximin 
opportunities over time.
The unconditionality of the basic income ensures that everyone, no matter how 
poor or on the other end how rich receives one. For Van Parijs this is an acceptable result 
because the opportunities afforded by the UBI must be equal even if some individuals 
may possess the means to realize these opportunities without the UBI. This implies that 
the UBI is to provide a leximin set of opportunities that is not sensitive to the increased 
liberties that greater material distributions afford. This sort of implication is perfectly 
acceptable if the judgment of redistributive obligation is predicated on the use of a 
resource in some way rather than the resulting wealth that comes from the choices and 
ambitions of the individuals in question.
Nevertheless, this result is not Rawlsian by any stretch of the imagination. The 
liberties afforded by increased resources have to be relevant as the equalization of 
opportunities must be a maximin endeavor even under the leximin variant. The results 
are relevant for Rawls because they equate to an increased value to an individual’s liberty 
from one person to another. If individuals already have the means to possess or resources
186 Van Parijs, Philippe: Real Freedom for All, What (if anything) can Justify Capitalism, p. 95
187 Rawls, John: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 200
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to directly constitute a comprehensive set of social primary goods, they do not need a 
further distribution to secure them.188 Rawls’ process yields us this conclusion directly 
from the veiled impartiality of the original position. In order for the differences of the 
difference principle to change in terms of resource distribution levels, the argument must 
come from the sensitivities that yield the difference principle rather than a change to the 
actions and sensitivities of the difference principle.
Van Parijs never gives us this explanation. Instead, Van Parijs continues to use 
aspects of this principle to motivate parts of his theoretical argument and subsequent 
institutions. The arguments and institutions Van Parijs is asking us to accept through 
these same theories directly compromise the aspects of these theories that Van Parijs 
continues to lean on as justifications. This sort of theoretical to institutional contradiction 
appears several times in considering Van Parijs’ arguments and, as we will see in the 
upcoming sections, creates a fertile battleground for his critics. This is because he is 
trying to squeeze his theory and system into the theoretical shoes of Rawls’ property 
owning democracy and correct the ills of many other conceptions of distributive justice 
rather than state clearly and comprehensively an account of justice. These warring 
intuitions tear Van Parijs into two directions that are never reconciled with one another.
In doing so, he leans on many different singular arguments, which never quite meld 
together into a comprehensive argument. This is why I have suggested so far that some 
of Van Parijs’ arguments have a great deal of credibility while others are problematic and 
that because of this A and B do not seem, at times, to support each other.
Van Parijs relies on the choice aspects of a UBI to provide greater individual 
freedom. To do this, the UBI has to amend something more critical than just how the 
difference principle operates. Instead, the UBI needs to amend what is subject to 
redistribution and to what level in a resource-based way. Properly honoring choices and 
individual autonomy in an appropriate way has led us to reconsider a major section of
188 The issue here mirrors the critique levied by Block, Fred: ‘Why Pay Bill Gates? A response to "A Basic 
Income for All" by Philippe van Parijs’ in Boston Review, New Democracy Forum: Delivering a Basic 
Income, 2000, website: http://bostonreview.net/BR25.5/block.html
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Rawls’ argument. It has further led to considerations on Dworkin’s modified example, 
given the ambitions of the handicapped. As I have just stated in this section, we need 
also to move away from end-result wealth based redistributions if Van Parijs’ rent device 
is to take choices as seriously as “real freedom” and a UBI need them to. Van Parijs has 
to question the fundamental pre-suppositions that motivated Rawls’ property owning 
democracy in the first place, rather than simply slot it into this part of Rawls’ existing 
theory with a relatively minor adjustment.
One might argue this fact does not just pose a problem for the application of 
resource rents but also the maximization aspect of the UBI. The specific issues of this 
case are discussed in the upcoming sections but it is important here to discuss the 
theoretical differentiation that will make this critique unfounded. Rawls used the 
maximin principle to provide fair liberties to the least well off through the difference 
principle. If we were to interpret Van Parijs as using a leximin variant of the maximin 
principle in this way, the argument that Van Parijs falls prey to the same critique Rawls 
does would have a great deal of merit. However, the maximin aspect of the UBI is 
theoretically sustainable if it comes from the resource calculation properly conceived, not 
the end result calculation. The issue is simply drawing the resource calculations 
appropriately to reflect this. Van Parijs’ use of income as a measurement blurs the larger 
conception and gives this critique of his aims power, but as we have suggested this sort of 
measurement critique is contradictory to the apparent aims of his apparatus. Maximin 
principles are only troubling if their redistributive sensitivities are not drawn correctly.
Van Parijs bounces back and forth between objectives without a systematic 
account of justice. The attempt to address the ills of other conceptions leads him to a 
liberal approach in a relatively clear way. However, from this point the argument 
becomes far more convoluted. To critique Rawls through arguments yet rely on concepts 
and principles that stem directly from Rawls’ larger argument without an explanation of 
how they all work in concert is a major problem for Van Parijs. It is a problem in one 
respect because we are left to wonder how Rawlsian concepts such as maximin reasoning 
even in a leximin variant, a conception of redistribution that amends but largely mirrors
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the difference principle, result based redistribution, and initial understandings in the 
original position through the veil of ignorance, which remain much as Rawls describes 
them, can be squared with the conception of individual freedom and a resource-based 
account of distribution that Van Parijs wants to institutionalize. Van Parijs’ use of Rawls 
extends into the defense of his theory against Dworkin but it is an account of Rawls that 
invokes troubling selectivity.
Van Parijs’ objection to the insurance scheme is discussed in the next section 
extensively and this relies far less on Rawls’ argument than it does Van Parijs’ own 
critique of Dworkin and Van Parijs’ device to provide endowment-insensitivity. The 
objection to the extended auction device is a different matter. Dworkin uses this device, 
in tandem with a modified veil of ignorance and the insurance scheme, to argue a 
different way of conceiving liberal distributive justice through just allocations. Aspects 
of the difference principle were not reflective of autonomous choices and reciprocal 
burden in a fair system of cooperation. The importance of this aspect of Dworkin’s 
argument is that it develops how a liberal account of justice can be appropriately sensitive 
to choices, even if Dworkin’s eventual taxation technique and insurance compensation 
need development. Dworkin shows how the problem with the difference principle 
actually stems from a problem in the impartiality device used by Rawls. As a result, his 
theory starts from this point in reworking an account of distributive justice.
Van Parijs rejects this proposal because he argues Dworkin is reliant on the 
market system to yield just results and that cannot be reconciled with a coherent concern 
for background justice.189 This criticism mirrors Rawls’ argument against pure 
procedural justice. However, Van Parijs shares aspects of Dworkin’s argument, namely 
choice-sensitivity and the role of the market to affirm this. This is because they are 
developing liberalism and are motivated to do so by similar deficiencies they saw in 
Rawls initial argument. Van Parijs argues “real freedom” is the “hybrid” account of 
liberal justice that builds in the choice sensitivities and individual responsibility argued 
for by Dworkin but in a way that provides for individuals in an ongoing way. This is
189 Van Parijs, Philippe: ‘Egalitarian Justice, Left Libertarianism and the Market’, pp. 145 -162
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because Van Parijs is concerned with providing individuals with the freedom to do what 
they might want to do over the course of a full life. Van Parijs’ argument, aside from 
critiquing the role of the insurance scheme, relies on the argument that Dworkin’s use of 
the market is premature. The institutions of background justice require a deeper 
commitment that ensures access to a set of means in an ongoing way. Van Parijs argues 
that Dworkin uses the market to determine if distributions are just as it asserts this 
through the envy free results of the auction device. Van Parijs notes that the concern is 
not with the auction device itself. As Van Parijs writes,
‘Dworkin initially seemed to offer a dual conception of distributive justice, with 
the competitive auction covering impersonal resources, and the hypothetical insurance 
scheme covering personal resources. He subsequently moved the auction to the 
background and subjected both personal and impersonal resources to the insurance 
device. The approach developed in Real Freedom for All could be characterized as doing 
exactly the opposite. It amounts to expanding dramatically the scope of the auction, 
while relegating a functional analogue of the insurance scheme to a shrunk residual role. 
What motivated this move? Fundamentally the conviction that the opportunities we are 
given in life cannot adequately be conceptualized, as they are by Dworkin and in most 
liberal-egalitarian approaches to distributive justice (though not Rawls’s), in terms of our 
endowments in personal and impersonal resources.’190
Van Parijs is arguing that the auction device cannot fulfill a commitment to 
background justice. As long as distributions meet the envy test through the auction 
device they are acceptable according to Dworkin. Van Parijs is concerned that in reality 
the sanctioned distributions may not actually provide a proper or equal set of “real 
freedoms”. Dworkin’s answer is to use the insurance scheme to do the work of providing 
background justice in tandem with the auction. The separation and ordinal role that Van 
Parijs suggests exists in Dworkin’s scheme are misleading. Envy is removed from both 
sides of our account, through insurance (internal/natural) and the auction (external). 
Nevertheless, Van Parijs argues that the insurance scheme is not drawn with appropriate
190 IBID, p. 159
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sensitivities. Because it fulfills the role it does within Dworkin’s development of Rawls, 
it becomes necessary for the auction to operate justly. However, because it has 
sensitivity problems, Van Parijs argues Dworkin allows too many claims to be legitimate. 
Van Parijs argues our approach should be instead to provide access to the market 
(auction) in a more robust and ongoing way and to have a much more minimal 
commitment to claims of welfare (insurance).
What Dworkin does give us for background justice is a system of redistribution 
that funds the insurance and an argument for corrections/re-runs of the auction itself. The 
re-visitation aspect of this argument is important to note for our purposes here as it acts as 
a trump over the outcomes of the market device. Dworkin changes the criteria from those 
argued for by Rawls. Dworkin uses this change to invoke the envy test as the measure 
through which individuals can contest the results of the auction. Should a resource, 
which at first appeared equal prove to be unequally valuable, the citizens have recourse to 
re-running the auction and recalculating the obligations of the individuals involved. 
Therefore, the auction plays a distributive role, but it happens only after pre-conditions 
and qualifications are met. Van Parijs does question the use of envy as a measure of 
distribution but this is largely in terms of natural endowments versus expensive tastes. 
The aspect of the argument Van Parijs will ultimately argue with is the envy motivations 
of the insurance scheme rather than the auction. The discussion above highlights 
precisely how important it will be to compare and contrast the commitments to 
endowment insensitivity each argue for and why they argue they fall where they do in 
conceiving a system of distributive justice.
Van Parijs’ argument has little effect on the actual legitimacy of the auction 
device in itself. Van Parijs is concerned that Dworkin’s criterion of justice through the 
auction assumes a measurement of distribution that is not sensitive to providing for 
individuals in a fair and ongoing way. Their choices may be just procedurally by 
Dworkin’s account but are not just in a liberal/fairness sense if they result in distributions 
that harm their real freedoms. Van Parijs is arguing we must allow access to the auction 
of resources, the market, in an ongoing way to legitimize the device of a market itself.
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This argument is intuitively compelling but there is no reworking of the Rawlsian 
project to back it up. It is instead a liberal intuition pulled directly from Rawls’ thought 
in justifying the difference principle that Van Parijs is arguing stands alone or in keeping 
with some loosely Rawlsian/liberal argument that is not articulated. Because of this Van 
Parijs’ argument for a Rawlsian conception of background justice to run over the course 
of a full life in a robust ongoing way, and further that Dworkin’s approach does not allow 
this to happen appropriately, is put in a precarious theoretical position. It is never 
explained at all and if Van Parijs were to work through the role he gives to choices versus 
the justifications for the Rawlsian actions he wants to keep, these arguments would 
conflict.
The market device is necessary for the UBI to do what Van Parijs claims it does 
ideally, which is provide greater opportunities and in turn allow greater choices. The 
result is that Van Parijs’ argument against Dworkin will be reliant on his argument 
against the insurance scheme and the use of envy by Dworkin. In its place, we will need 
to accept the institution of “undominated diversity” and the use of some other sensitivity 
in terms of choices discussed in the next sections. Van Parijs will have to use this 
argument to undermine the sensitivities built in prior to running the auction by Dworkin 
through insurance rather than the use of the market as a part of the institution of the 
auction itself. It is unclear now, and it will be even less clear as we continue forward, 
how these arguments are tied together in a comprehensive way.
The argument Van Parijs wants us to consider is “hybrid” in that he is bringing 
various aspects of different theories together into a development of Rawls project. 
However, he wants us to fuse together arguments that are in direct conflict with each 
other. However, it is clear that if it can be motivated through some liberal account, this 
account is unlikely to be as simple as fusing other arguments together under a liberal 
umbrella. The ultimate result of considering “real freedom” is that it is less a complete 
account of justice than it is an account of how best to consider certain structures and 
commitments of liberal justice in keeping with providing optimal individual freedoms.
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The development of Rawls requires that there is an engagement from the bottom up with 
his theories and justifications in order to assess where our development must come from. 
Van Parijs instead simply tweaks the principles that exist at the end without addressing 
why these same changes arise from our larger Rawlsian project. Van Parijs accepts 
pieces of Rawls’ argument wholesale while amending others. These amendments, when 
we extrapolate them, lead to inconsistencies between Van Parijs and Rawls that remain 
unexplained or undefended. Van Parijs accepts Dworkin’s motivations for seeking to 
develop a Rawlsian account but argues we must go in a different direction. Van Parijs is 
attempting to take these motivations and develop them more closely to Rawls thought 
through a principle amendment. However, the idea of choice sensitivity cuts far deeper 
into the Rawlsian project than Van Parijs believes it does. The result is that Van Parijs’ 
institutions look counter-intuitive to a Rawlsian account of justice because he has not 
developed anything more fundamental in Rawls thought. This causes a deep tension 
between the espoused commitments of “real freedom” and the very basic structural ideas 
Van Parijs wants us to accept based upon this same principle. In order to Van Parijs’ 
argument as a whole, it is important to continue into his account of endowment- 
insensitivity through “undominated diversity” and then to explore what decisions and 
choices ought to mean in an account of justice that uses the devices Van Parijs argues for.
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4.3 Endowment-Insensitivitv. Circumstance and Instituting IJndomlnated Diversity
In the last section, we discussed briefly “undominated diversity” by name but 
with no greater detail. Van Parijs argues this is the solution to the problem of equalizing 
condition for individuals with disadvantages in natural endowments. However, we left 
much of Van Parijs’ exposition about this point out of that discussion. This is because 
the role undominated diversity plays in Van Parijs’ theory is a separate matter from how 
it acts to fulfill the philosophic commitment Van Parijs places on it. For the 
consideration of undominated diversity as part of a scheme of justice, it was only 
necessary to discuss what it was intended to correct, rather than how it corrected it and if 
this correction produces just consequences. Through this discussion, some details of the 
argument were revealed, including how important this argument ends up being in arguing 
against Dworkin’s reworking of the Rawlsian project. Van Parijs must show that 
Dworkin has failed in some way to provide the background justice needed for the market 
of the auction to produce just outcomes. If this were the case, the device of the modified 
veil and the auction would not produce just distributions and in turn would undermine the 
liberal values of Dworkin’s project. The insurance scheme plays a crucial role in this 
argument, as it is the apparatus Dworkin uses to achieve the endowment insensitivity 
prior to the auction in his project.
Van Parijs describes the commitment to the justness of endowments as follows, 
“The distribution of endowments is unjust in a society as long as there are two people 
such that everyone in the society concerned prefers the whole endowment (both internal 
and external) of one of them to that of the other. It can only be just if this is not the case, 
that is, if there is undominated diversity.”191 Undominated diversity is a concept 
developed by Bruce Ackerman. Van Parijs explains that it works by compensating those 
whose natural endowments cannot be seen as advantageous by other members of society. 
The intent is to compensate those who have unfavorable natural endowments. Should
191 Van Parijs, Philippe: Real Freedom for All, What (if anything) can Justify Capitalism, p. 59
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one individual be able to argue rationally that an internal endowment is favorable then 
compensation is unwarranted.
Van Parijs argues that this commitment must come prior to the maximization of 
UBI within the ideal state embracing “real freedom for all”. It acts as a form of initial 
welfare for the disadvantaged that in turn legitimizes the market actions that follow. The 
goal is to put everyone on the starting line prior to letting the market do what it does.
This is because the commitment to undominated diversity is a constraint (along with in- 
kind provisions) on the maximization of UBI. It is worth mentioning here that in-kind 
provisions do exist along with the UBI as we discussed earlier in this chapter). These 
along with the actions of undominated diversity fall prior to the maximization of the UBI. 
These provisions intend to provide infrastructure and preserve basic resources. Van 
Parijs argues that much like undominated diversity these actions will end up being 
nominal in relative terms. In some cases, in-kind provisions may place a meaningful 
constraint on the maximization of the UBI but the kinds of items that can be legitimately 
provided this way have to meet a relatively strict standard, which should reduce their 
scope. The idea is that these things can only be provided if providing them in kind to 
everyone if it is cheaper to provide these things in-kind given the value ascribed to it by 
the most dispassionate user of the resource. Van Parijs’ explains,
‘The argument is not that everyone attaches the same importance to clean air, uses 
streets to the same extent, or finds a safe walk equally essential to her well-being, but that 
even the least intensive air breathers, street users or walkers can have no less of what they 
want as a result of in-kind provision: they get cleaner air, or better streets, or quieter 
footpaths for a cost (in forgone cash grant) that does not exceed what they would have 
had to pay—administrative costs (in cash and bother) included—for what they would 
have chosen to consume in the absence of in-kind provision.’192
This may be a larger caveat than Van Parijs lets on, but for our discussion here, it 
is important to note that this kind of commitment is not going to yield us much in terms
192 IBID, p. 44
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of provisions for the handicapped, which I have argued we need. Undominated diversity 
will need to do this work.
Undominated diversity aims to decrease the amount of individuals who are owed 
compensation. Van Parijs argues the sensitivities of Dworkin’s insurance scheme 
legitimize claims of natural endowment compensation that it should not, which we will 
discuss shortly. Undominated diversity is intended to limit these claims, as the legitimate 
and reasonable claims of a few to a particular endowment would lead to far fewer natural 
endowments being considered unfavorable. Van Parijs wants to separate the claims of 
the merely untalented from those who are legitimately handicapped so that compensation 
is geared wholly to those who deserve/need it. This is why Van Parijs argues that his 
sensitivities to endowment insensitivity and ambition sensitivity in a commitment to “real 
freedom” are inversely weighted to the roles of the apparatus given by Dworkin. Van 
Parijs argues that Dworkin is heavily dependant on the wide actions of insurance while 
the auction plays a smaller role in distributive action. Van Parijs argues that 
undominated diversity, by virtue of its much smaller claims, places more emphasis on the 
market/auction aspects of distribution that follow through the UBI. By virtue of this 
smaller remit, this standard also allows for a greater level of UBI and thus opportunities. 
It acts to screen out tastes in the endowments one “wants” versus the endowment one 
“needs” to a greater degree. With the existence of the UBI in an ideal situation, Van 
Parijs argues that there is no need to be concerned with the fundamental welfare of the 
individual with expensive internal endowment tastes as their basic needs are met by the 
UBI.193
Van Parijs argues this is favorable because it removes subjective measures from a 
calculation of compensation. This commitment is favorable to that of an insurance 
scheme because of the potential subjective decisions that could warrant compensation.
He believes that Dworkin’s use of an aggregate system of insurance opens the door for 
these kinds of claims as the information needed to make them is allowed into the process 
by Dworkin’s modified veil. Dworkin allows individuals knowledge of their talents but
193 Van Parijs, Philippe: ‘Egalitarian Justice, Left Libertarianism and the Market’, pp. 145 -162
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not their value through the modified veil. Van Parijs argues that this results in 
individuals making claims about these known talents being the result of natural 
circumstance and hence deserving compensation. Van Parijs is concerned that Dworkin 
legitimizes compensation to people based on the wrong grounds. As Van Parijs writes, 
“[t]he very notion of counterfactual insurance opens up the possibility that two people 
with identical internal endowments but different tastes will be entitled to unequal 
compensatory external endowments precisely because of these differences in tastes.”194 
Van Parijs argues this is the result of Dworkin’s insurance as it allows the lack of a 
particular natural endowment to be relevant because of tastes. Van Parijs argues this 
gamers compensation even when another individual with the same endowment does not 
feel the endowment hinders their preference schedule.
As critical as Van Parijs is of the concept of the insurance scheme, he does mirror 
it in one key respect. Van Parijs believes the application of undominated diversity should 
be buffered “for example by stipulating that an ‘imperceptible’ improvement in a 
dominated endowment should not be achieved at the expense of a ‘massive’ shrinking of 
other endowments.”195 Undominated diversity, although more stringent than the 
insurance scheme, can rule people into the dominated group whose needs maybe so great 
that some sort of reciprocal cap is needed to ensure the level of redistributive obligation 
does not rise too high. This stipulation is intended to act as a device to limit the potential 
reciprocal costs through redistribution the society faces much like Dworkin’s insurance 
scheme.
Van Parijs states that the commitment to undominated diversity could disclose 
legitimate disabilities instead of compensating a lack of desired talents and natural 
endowments. Van Parijs argues further that his commitment would not impose too much 
or provide too little distribution to the naturally disadvantaged. Van Parijs raises an 
interesting point in terms of Dworkin’s example, namely how would one calculate their 
insurance when they are unaware of their preferences outside of the modified veil of
194 Van Parijs, Philippe: Real Freedom for All, What (if anything) can Justify Capitalism, p. 59
195 IBID, p. 60
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ignorance. The insurance is calculated upon the effect of a malady upon potential 
outcomes. Van Parijs argues this would taint the apparatus from acting to do what 
Dworkin needs it too because the only way to discern such a standard is to know of one’s 
taste for an outcome. If the calculation did not take these outcomes on in the decisions of 
insurance, the actors would have no gauge by which to decide how to compensate 
themselves outside of the veil.
In dissecting Dworkin’s scheme in chapter three, I argued that our conclusion 
should be different from what Dworkin states are the outcomes of this device. I argued 
that if we follow this line of thought the outcome would be that individuals would act to 
insure their access to certain ends through provisions of adaptation given the effect 
internal endowments might have on their ability to select and use bundles they may or 
may not want, the Principle of Just Access. These adaptations are still constrained.by the 
insurance device and in doing so retain the proper level of reciprocal redistributive 
obligation over the actors in question. However, Van Parijs does not make this needed 
development due to a deeper problem he has with Dworkin.
I suggested that given the market system Dworkin used that it was important to 
respect the ability of individuals, even when handicapped, to participate in this system. 
The processes of Dworkin’s theory would lead us to agree upon acting to provide access 
to legitimate bundles of goods given that embodiment malady X prevents use of bundle Y 
and this can be remedied with Z. A society committed to principles of justice such as 
Dworkin’s would act to provide Z to individuals with X if they chose to purchase X in 
the auction given that Z did not prevent individuals from having equal liberties due to the 
cost of providing Z. The Principle of Just Access allowed flexibility in the system that 
made even the handicapped accountable for their tastes, while compensating them 
through provisions of accessibility to an appropriate set of legitimate ends. For Dworkin 
this is an important amendment if his system is to conceive ambition sensitivity equally. 
The freedom to be optimally ambitious is an important aspect of autonomy that Dworkin 
needs to provide for his conception of individual freedom to be compelling.
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For Van Parijs, the problem is much the same. If undominated diversity is to be a 
compelling account of how a system of justice concerned with individual freedom ought 
to work, his institutionalization of it must meet this same general challenge. For Van 
Parijs, the goal is to provide leximin opportunity sets through the UBI. Since the 
Principle of Just Access removes at least in part the criticism Van Parijs has of the 
insurance scheme, his institution of undominated diversity must be capable of meeting 
our judgments about how we determine the allocation of resources through the guidelines 
provided by Van Parijs’ principle. Undominated diversity as characterized by Van Parijs 
appears to be able to take the Principle of Just Access on board, although it does not do 
so directly. It needs too in order to appropriately conceive the moral agency of the 
handicapped. Van Parijs is equally as guilty of not making such a commitment explicitly. 
Nevertheless, his theory can accommodate it as it is constructed. The issue is really how 
this standard decides who is owed compensation and to what level. Once the standard of 
undominated diversity is applied, the Principle of Just Access can work after this process 
takes place. The question we have to ask changes about considering these schemes. We 
need to determine if undominated diversity decides who and what to compensate 
appropriately. This is because Van Parijs claims undominated diversity and the insurance 
scheme work in different ways to determine who should be compensated for what.
The way that Van Parijs utilizes the commitment of undominated diversity can be 
boiled down to an inverse envy test.196 Individuals are compensated if and only if no one 
else can rationally see their natural endowment as advantageous. This standard does not 
preclude the use of the Principle of Just Access but it does limit whom it could act for. 
The problem with this conception becomes clear when we consider the situation in which 
someone not being compensated simply because someone else, with a different set of 
potential preferences, feels their natural endowment is not a handicap given these 
potential preferences. The deciding factor would be that individuals would have to either 
use their probability taste driven preferences to adjudicate such a standard (ala Dworkin) 
or remain wholly ignorant of their potential preferences or likelihood of having one (ala
196 Inverse envy test is a term my advisor Peri gave me to express this idea as a handy piece of shorthand, I 
cannot take credit for it.
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Rawls). On the first account, whether a frailty is advantageous or not demands 
knowledge of probabilities of external preferences and tastes. On the second account, 
undominated diversity would at least have to be amended because individuals would all, 
on Rawls’ view, come to the same impartial agreement about what compensation was 
needed or appropriate. The ability for one person to rationally object would not be 
possible on a strict Rawlsian account of an impartiality device. There could be no single 
dissenter. Ergo, you would have to modify the veil in some way to get to a point where 
undominated diversity could utilize its operating assumptions. In doing so, this would 
commit the same sin that Van Parijs accuses Dworkin of, just in reverse. Therefore, 
some greater set of sensitivities has to be let into the account. Dworkin does this but 
rather than utilizing this approach, Van Parijs discards it due to a mis-charactization of 
Dworkin’s argument.
Van Parijs wants undominated diversity to reward those who amend their 
preferences and to limit insurance claims to natural endowments such as eye color or skin 
tone that he argues Dworkin’s insurance has to take seriously. As I have alluded to 
already, it is my position that this line of thought makes a crucial error in examining 
Dworkin’s position. Dworkin lets in the knowledge of talents but the removal of 
knowledge about their value means that individual tastes cannot be determined. It may 
be that Dworkin needs greater clarification or development on the details of this 
argument. But by being generous to the argument, I believe we can see its power. If 
tastes come from value, then Dworkin’s argument has ruled this factor out of our 
compensation discussion. If this argument, or some plausible modification of it holds, 
then what individuals base their insurance on is not tastes as Van Parijs argues but simply 
a calculation of having X talents due to natural endowments and then Y resulting courses 
of action. The greater the handicap an individual has, the less the value of Y will be, so 
the individual will act to compensate themselves appropriately for the lack of options 
while being unaware of their value and their tastes for them.
The aggregative effect Dworkin’s insurance scheme will have removes Van 
Parijs’ claims about certain natural features being compensated for. Individual claims for
Balancing Choice and Circumstance -  Fair Shares and Just Access in Liberal Justice 201
and against being blue-eyed or brown-eyed abstractly offset each other due to the 
information veiled in and out of Dworkin’s modified position. The potential value of 
having either of these endowments and the bundles each allows or precludes would 
negate an insurance claim to accessibility provisions or compensation. This is because 
having one or the other would have little effect on the value of Y and individuals would 
be unaware of whether they wanted something that either endowment would have gotten 
them as they do not know the value associated to what they have been naturally endowed 
with. The only way such claims would count is if it were truly disadvantageous to be 
some degree of one or the other. It would not be possible to know the social value or 
individual value of the talent/ability in question. Therefore, it would be impossible to 
state that eye color or skin tone had any negative effect for which one would wish to 
lodge a claim. It simply becomes a matter of seeing how many talents/bundles you could 
use prior to knowing which ones you might want to use. Being comatose or blind would 
have a clear effect on the numbers of bundles you could use and would gamer claims. 
Van Parijs overstates the problem an insurance calculation causes, as many of the 
conditions he argues would be compensated for would not have legitimate claims on 
insurance compensation. In cases where the value of something is less clear, Y is a lesser 
set of bundles but not a minimal set of bundles, the aggregative calculation of insurance 
works to iron out these claims and reach a bipartite level of compensation rather than 
deny it. .
By instituting undominated diversity Van Parijs opens the door for the inverse 
problem, which is one individual claim removing the legitimate claims of a large section 
of the population. Van Parijs argues this would not happen, as the claims have to be 
reasonable. The ability of one individual to fulfill their preference sets minus their hands 
and feet does not mean those without hands and feet are not due compensation. This is 
because by Van Parijs’ account it cannot be reasonably seen to be advantageous to have 
no hands and no feet. It is important to note first how much work reasonable standards 
have to do in adjudicating a just claim. It is doing work, nebulously and in an undefined 
way, which Dworkin’s scheme addresses directly. Perhaps more worryingly, if the 
standard of reasonableness commits an error in providing opportunities that ought to be
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reciprocally available to someone, the argument defeats the aims of “real freedom”.
“Real Freedom” is the ability to do what one might want to do. For Van Parijs, greater 
resources through UBI, ensures the currency to make this account work. However, for 
some people, this claim requires more than just a maximized UBI. Van Parijs’ claim 
would have to work in one of two ways. It would either have to allow other individual’s 
claims about their conceptions of the good to override someone else’s legitimate claim to 
compensation, which Van Parijs argues we should not do due to our commitments to 
liberal justice. Alternatively, this standard will have to exist in such a frame of reference 
that its decisions will end up the same as Dworkin or Rawls due to the information 
withheld from its operation. The only way forward is to amend or specify undominated 
diversity by adopting a conception of what is and is not a rational objection to a particular 
endowment. This is what Dworkin’s insurance is meant to do, actually give a standard 
by which we can decide what claims are legitimate, which are not and to what degree we 
ought to compensate. Van Parijs’ use of undominated diversity does not answer this 
question and it needs to in order to work at all.
Dworkin argues that the insurance scheme ought to work by compensating 
individuals to the degree they would reach given a veiled judgment in a situation of 
unknown individual taste and outcome but knowledge of talents, obstacles in natural 
endowment and the outcomes that could result. This requires the same rational decision 
about what is advantageous and by extension what is not, outside the initially veiled 
position. The difference is that Van Parijs’ system takes the claim of one in this sense 
seriously whereas Dworkin takes an aggregative approach to determining the value of the 
claim. The end-result of the two commitments, when investigated, has to be very similar 
if undominated diversity is going to work. Van Parijs is simply arguing that Dworkin is 
not doing what he says he is by allowing too many people claims to compensation. The 
question is whether one is allowing too many people to be compensated (Dworkin) or 
conversely if the other (Van Parijs and Ackerman) are allowing too few to be 
compensated. They are both saying there are conditions we will or ought to be 
indifferent toward. Van Parijs is arguing that this category will be bigger under 
undominated diversity than Dworkin’s will be under his insurance scheme. Van Parijs
Balancing Choice and Circumstance -  Fair Shares and Just Access in Liberal Justice 203
believes this is legitimate. If this claim is true for Van Parijs, then we can conclude that 
undominated diversity is not working to ensure justice for the legitimately handicapped 
as it refuses to take nominal but important claims seriously. If we apply these standards 
coherently, they are intended to screen in and screen out the same individual sets of 
natural endowments. As a result, undominated diversity is not an advance on Dworkin’s 
argument and in fact is troubling simply because it has not worked out the processes that 
Dworkin has in his insurance scheme. By extension, neither precludes the adoption of 
the Principle of Just Access and both clearly need this amendment for the same reasons.
In this light, any minimal aspect of Van Parijs’ commitment to undominated diversity by 
comparison to the insurance scheme is unlikely if this standard is to be coherent with Van 
Parijs’ espoused commitments.
It is my position that given the aims of an ambition sensitive system of justice, 
which both Dworkin and Van Parijs endorse, we need to adopt the aggregative insurance 
process rather than allowing one claim based on an undefined standard of reasonableness 
to offset the claims of those with a particular malady. Van Parijs never elaborates on the 
sort of veil of ignorance that would guide the endowment insensitive measurement 
process. However, he clearly uses an approach similar to Rawls and does not question, as 
some critics of Rawls do (like Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum)197, the transcendental 
institutionalism of such an approach. We are left to assess the options. The first is if the 
veil is complete in much the same way Rawls described it. If individuals were 
completely veiled and ignorant as Rawls ascribes, the result would be that all individuals 
would reach the conclusion or bargaining consensus about an endowment not just one 
person. This would in fact be an aggregative process of bargaining and compromise at 
the original position. The alternative is a Dworkin-esque account of the veil and the 
original position. If the relationship between potential talents and potential endowments 
is let through the veil, the claims of one could be rational (my set is Y-7) but would not 
be universally applied due to the aggregative calculation of insurance (most everyone else 
has Y-9). An individual veto on the value of an internal endowment must be avoided, as
197 See -  The relevant works of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum on the Capabilities Approach are 
located in the bibliography. In expanding on the Principle of Just Access, (as I hope to in the future) it is 
my intention to take on their work directly. I simply do not have the space to do so here.
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this individual would reciprocally privilege their account of the good through a particular 
opportunity set instead of allowing a fair reciprocal amount of access or compensation to 
those who did not want to use this same opportunity set. The aggregative device works 
to offset claims against each other and then decides the level of compensation, those with 
the most invasive endowment claims receiving the most insurance support.
As Van Parijs never stretches the arguments presented here to the level of 
exposition we have just had, it appears that part of the reason he is unconcerned with a 
potentially small remit for insurance/welfare actions is that the UBI is constructed as it is. 
The actions of undominated diversity are purely compensatory. The UBI takes on the 
role of providing leximin opportunity sets rather than the actions of the welfare 
calculation. Van Parijs equal access to opportunity sets is granted through the UBI. 
Given that everyone universally receives the UBI, including the handicapped, the . 
handicapped need not provide labor in order to provide themselves with a meaningful 
standard of living. For Van Parijs, the conditional equality of the UBI, a set of all­
purpose means, provides the access for individuals to do what they might want to do. 
Nevertheless, what they want to do is constrained by their choices and tastes given their 
natural endowment. So the UBI is perhaps more correctly described as allowing 
individuals to do what they want and are able to do. The fact that the latter of these two 
claims could have drastic consequences is not truly addressed or corrected. By assuming 
that a lack of natural endowment leads to a conception of the good that is appropriate (not 
laboring), Van Parijs assumes that the handicapped will value this conception of the good 
over laboring ineffectively or with great difficulty. The welfare calculation present in 
Van Parijs simply compensates people for the opportunity sets they cannot utilize and 
could gain further income from. Therefore, they are granted income, instead of access to 
the desired and potentially attainable laboring position.
Given our discussion of the agency of the handicapped, this simply does not treat 
the agency of the handicapped appropriately. Access to the market system without the 
actions needed to allow individuals to access goods would not be an appropriate solution. 
As we noted with Dworkin’s answer to this problem, merely providing compensation as a
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greater allocative share is not enough to ensure fair conditions either. To treat taste 
sensitivity comprehensively, all liberal conceptions of justice need the Principle of Just 
Access. The constraining actions of undominated diversity are even more concerning 
when they allow even less remit for the Principle of Just Access to operate. If “real 
freedom” is to be sensitive, in an appropriate way, to the tastes and ambitions of the 
handicapped and disabled while constraining in some way the actions of compensation, 
the justifications that underpin the commitment to “real freedom” must apply to those 
with unfavorable natural endowments. Solely compensating them monetarily, due to an 
assumption of what income other bundles could have yielded them, is an inappropriate 
commitment in the same way it was for Dworkin.
Let us expand our compensatory measures for a moment. Dworkin noted that 
providing compensation in an allocative scenario simply by providing a greater amount 
of initial clamshells would not ensure that individuals had the same liberties because of 
the preclusion of certain bundles due to a handicap. This same argument holds the same 
weight in discussing a UBI system as it works in the same fundamental way. If the 
commitment that needs to be undertaken is the Principle of Just Access, the provision of 
compensation cannot be reasonably expected to come from within the procedural 
marketplace. A greater income to supplement the UBI does not fulfill the commitment 
that is needed out of an endowment insensitive calculation of compensatory action.
The problem with expecting a greater allocative share/UBI to properly 
compensate individuals in keeping with the Principle of Just Access is three fold. The 
first issue is that the right to accessibility coming prior to the maximization processes of 
the UBI presumes that the needs of accessibility, for instance specific action Z, is what 
the handicapped individual has a right to. Providing them with more money instead of 
the actual good means that they may alternatively choose to use the UBI in some other 
way rather than gaining the access the extra endowment was for. Such a scenario would 
not only fail to provide the access needed to make the commitment to justice coherent, it 
would also violate the principles that compelled the distribution in the first place.
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Nevertheless, let us say that perhaps, through some system of monitoring, this 
objection could be avoided, the second objection cannot be. These material needs must 
be provided and if they come from the marketplace, they are subject to market volatility. 
Van Parijs was adamant that the role of the market in providing welfare was problematic. 
The capitalist market place is intended to provide taste sensitivity through the self- 
definition of ends. Although the handicapped are also largely capable of exercising these 
same distinctions in taste, the goods required to access a given social bundle cannot be 
seen as a taste, but rather a need. The marketplace is also taste sensitive in what the seller 
provides as much as the taste of the buyer. Individuals should not be forced to spend 
more than their allocation to provide the access they are owed by an insurance calculation 
simply due to market fluctuations in production. Ideally speaking, this would not happen, 
but one would be hard pressed to find a method of institutionalization that could act to 
grant more endowment the instant the cost of the needed item rose.
Perhaps of most concern is the third consideration of provision over time.
Imagine if an individual 1 spent their access share at point A on technology B to do X. 
Over time B became outdated and individual 2, who was handicapped in the same way 
but arrives several years after point A and also wished to do X, got a share that bought 
the superior technology C. We could not say that 1 and 2 are equal because 2 has 
superior accessibility options to 1. The share was spent and how it was spent was an act 
of contextual freedom, but if the need is not addressed in an equal way over time, 
handicapped individuals will not be equal to each other if they exist in the same relative 
time slice. If the market is to be utilized but properly subordinate, their mode of 
compensating the handicapped needs revision if we are to take the agency and 
opportunities of this group seriously. These issues further underline the need for the 
Principle of Just Access and what issues it must address in institutionalization. Simply 
providing compensation through greater UBI to the non-ideally endowed does not satisfy 
the needs of equality within the allocative marketplace nor between like individuals.
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Richard Ameson and Andrew Williams raise concerns about undominated 
diversity in their critiques of Van Parijs as well.198 As we have discussed, Van Parijs* 
conception requires a great deal of amendment but we have shown how a different 
commitment could work, namely an insurance calculation in concert with the Principle of 
Just Access. With these ideas roughly sketched now, it is important to inspect the critical 
arguments against Van Parijs and see if they are addressed through our proposed 
amendments. Ameson raises many claims about welfare and Van Parijs’ model and one 
particularly strong one will be addressed in the next section. For now, though, it is 
important to address his issue with undominated diversity specifically. Ameson claims 
undominated diversity does not do enough to be a substantive account of justice.
Ameson states that under Van Parijs’ explanation, if one person can see a condition as 
advantageous it does not gamer redistributive actions.199 To add to these concerns about 
the operation of undominated diversity Williams, in his Eva and Eve example200, raises 
the problem of delineating legitimate handicaps as well. He postulates a scenario where 
two infertile women, Eva and Eve, have the same internal endowments and exist in a 
system of undominated diversity as proposed by Van Parijs. The first of these women, 
Eva, sees her malady as a benefit as she is not burdened by pregnancy and finds it 
morally better to adopt. Eve, on the other hand, is socialized to believe that infertility is a
0C\ 1“personal catastrophy” and thus wishes to be compensated for her inequality compared 
to other women in natural endowment. Williams argues that Van Parijs’ account would 
compensate Eve based upon her preferences but not compensate Eva evenly despite their 
equal natural endowment. Aside from the preferences of Eve and Eva, there is no 
physical disparity between them, but Williams argues Van Parijs’ explanation of 
undominated diversity will make an unequal distinction about compensation between 
them.
198 Ameson, Richard J.: ‘Should Surfers Be Fed?’, review of Real Freedom for All by Philippe Van Parijs, 
in Reeve, Andrew and Williams, Andrew (eds.) Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van 
Parijs, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), pp. 95 - 108; Williams, Andrew: ‘Resource 
Egalitarianism and the Limits to Basic Income’ in Reeve, Andrew and Williams, Andrew (eds.) Real 
Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs, pp. I l l  - 135
199 Ameson, Richard: Should Surfers be Fed’, p. 98
200 Williams, Andrew: ‘Resource Egalitarianism and the Limits to Basic Income’, p. 132
201 IBID, p. 132
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Van Parijs responds to these claims by urging that the goal of undominated 
diversity is not “envy freeness”.202 To put Van Parijs’ claim into the context of Williams’ 
example, Van Parijs argues that the envy of Eve to possess the ability to procreate is not 
known in an a priori sense. The only thing we can abstractly reflect upon is the physical 
condition of Eva and Eve, not their preferences or their envy of one another given their 
preferences a posteriori. This means their compensation must be equal if, in abstraction, 
their condition of embodiment is deemed not to be rationally/reasonably advantageous. 
Given our discussion of what Van Parijs’ position has to be on this point, his answer to 
Williams is salient. Eve and Eva cannot have knowledge of these tastes within the 
abstract exercise even if they are aware of their natural endowment/talent. The tastes 
being screened out leaves a simple impartial decision that would yield an unbiased 
outcome, ideally speaking, about the value of infertility as a handicap. This argument is 
convincing in that the conception of the good is to be screened out through the veil, even 
if potential preferences, handicaps and the effects of each on each other are known in a 
modified sense. The compensation would have to be equal even if Van Parijs’ standard 
of undominated diversity dictated they receive nothing at all. Our insurance suggestion 
would deal with this critique in much the same way but use a different measure of the 
compensatory action. The outcome would be equal in respect to Eve and Eva. The two 
standards, if operating properly, will come to the same conclusion on this point.
Ameson’s concern reflects the argument I have lodged earlier against Van Parijs, 
namely that if a lone objector could rationally object to the compensatory claim, it would 
be refuted by this abstraction. Ameson goes after Van Parijs in a slightly different way. 
Ameson argues that the abstract individual could not know of their preference to have 
disability X and thus could not legitimately object upon becoming aware of their 
preferences. Thus, the a posteriori envy for a particular form of embodiment cannot be 
the legitimizing factor in the decisions of undominated diversity. Ameson is essentially 
arguing that Van Parijs’ stated criterion requires knowledge that Van Parijs’ use of Rawls 
account of the veil removes. This is a major problem for Van Parijs as his account flirts
202 Van Parijs, Philippe; “Hybrid Justice, Patriotism and Democracy: a Selective Reply” in Reeve,
Andrew and Williams, Andrew (Eds.); Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van Parijs; 
Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan, 2003,
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with two competing liberal conceptions of the veil without adopting one or the other or 
presenting a new one. However, Ameson’s criticism is not a problem if we accept our 
developed account of Dworkin, as we have to make no such claims about a single actor 
vetoing compensation. Our argument has to be not that Eve and Eva have to agree about 
a condition nor that they have to be ignorant of what having a condition could mean for 
their preferences. If a conception of compensation is going to be coherent, it must take 
all of these aggregative consequences in and determine compensation through this 
process in order to ensure proportionate compensation. This requires a position like 
Dworkin’s that modifies the veil and applies aggregative insurance. Ameson and 
Williams both highlight problems in Van Parijs’ argument which he attempts to resolve 
through an account that directly contradicts itself. The veiled impartiality device cannot 
maintain ignorance while applying a standard that takes singular individual claims as a 
veto. If it allows the knowledge of talents/abilities in but not their value/taste, then it is 
Dworkin’s modified veil and it requires aggregation and different commitments to liberal 
justice than Rawls or Van Parijs express.
However, even if our amended suggestion to these objections is convincing, Van 
Parijs’ claim revealed in his response to them of his test not being a measure of “envy 
freeness” is not. Van Parijs’ claim is only true in a semantic sense in that undominated 
diversity is a test of inverse envy ffeeness. As we have argued, there is really no 
difference in the results of this idea worked out coherently from the “envy ffeeness” of 
Dworkin’s auction and insurance scheme. Van Parijs will need to realize this for the sake 
of his argument, and it underlines the deep tensions caused in his theory due to the lack of 
a comprehensive account of how an appropriately impartial and abstract process yields 
his institutions and commitments.
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4.4 Welfare. Contributory Negligence and Equality
We have now assessed the commitments present in Van Parijs’ work prior to the 
operation of the UBI. The argument that remains relatively unexplored thus far is 
perhaps one of the most crucial to the entire exercise, namely asserting that a UBI is an 
appropriate and indeed optimal institution of a liberal commitment to justice. Van Parijs’ 
argument has been based on providing individual freedom in a package that he argues is 
better than other liberal alternatives. It has been precisely upon this point that critics of 
Van Parijs have lodged some of their most powerful critiques of his theories. Van Parijs 
has to answer criticisms about the fairness and reciprocity of his particular system and 
why he allows the conditional outcomes that a UBI can clearly result in through negligent 
use. Given the lack of a comprehensive account of liberal justice and the incoherencies 
that have so far been uncovered, it is important to work through this larger idea of UBI to 
see if the thrust of Van Parijs’ suggestion can be a plausible liberal reform. We will 
begin by discussing in more detail some of the specific aspects of UBI that Van Parijs 
argues are necessary before assessing the criticisms raised of his conception of basic 
income.
The role of the UBI within Van Parijs’ theoretical model is clear. For Van Parijs, 
this is the clear extrapolation of a property owning democracy in keeping with justice as 
fairness, only with a slightly amended conception of the argument for primary goods. 
However, to fulfill this role, Van Parijs builds the UBI in a very precise way that 
separates it from other forms of basic income and welfare systems. This has effects on 
the operation of a UBI. The UBI is a regular equal disbursement of currency to every 
citizen. Van Parijs argues for two important aspects of the UBI, namely that it must be 
universal and unconditional by being provided to every citizen and second that it must be 
provided at the maximin level possible. The basic income ought to be universal and 
unconditional so as not to privilege any individual over another. He believes the freedom 
of and opportunities for individuals must be provided for in an equal and ongoing way if 
the application of “real freedom” is to be coherent with the liberal project.
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This is a direct refutation of the means-tested or conditional forms of support 
welfare and the maximin actions of the difference principle as Rawls constructed it 
initially in A Theory o f Justice. The action is one of providing for individuals over the 
course of a complete life at the level necessary to provide a set of leximin opportunities 
rather than some measurement of maximin condition that proved problematic for Rawls. 
At the same time, these principles drive Van Parijs’ project away from basic income 
models that we will discuss later in this section. For Van Parijs, the application of “real 
freedom” requires a universality principle when distributing basic income due to the 
background considerations of justice. Van Parijs argues that our liberal precepts dictate a 
concern for the condition and opportunity sets available to individuals over a full life. 
This requires the universal and unconditionality aspects of a basic income and these stem 
from a liberal commitment to justice.
These aspects of basic income are buffered for Van Parijs by actions to maximize 
the amount of UBI that is to be distributed to each individual. Van Parijs urges the 
universality of a basic income on its own is not enough to secure “real freedom”. The 
UBI should be maximized in a way that provides a leximin set of opportunities to 
individuals with the least set of opportunities, while allowing these individuals to use the 
income to select the actual opportunities they wish to avail themselves of.203 Though 
Van Parijs is quick to establish that the maximization cannot come at the expense of in- 
kind provisions, actions of gift and bequest, or other calculations of utility, he insists 
throughout that the UBI must be maintained at the highest level that is sustainable in the 
given society. Van Parijs further argues that the UBI must be disbursed in even and 
frequent amounts in order to accomplish the liberal commitment of providing for 
individuals over the course of a full life.204 Because of this, the decisions they could 
undertake with some other conception of basic income, like a lump sum, must be 
protected against. Van Parijs argues this is the sole way to provide equal concern for 
individual opportunity sets in an ongoing way. Though Van Parijs concedes this is a
203 Van Parijs, Philippe: Real Freedom for All, What (if anything) can Justify Capitalism, p. 25
204 IBID, p. 45
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paternalistic approach, it is the appropriate one due to the problems that negligent use can 
cause. The arbitrary nature of distribution and paternalism of disbursal are compromises 
that must be accepted in reconciling a conception of justice with a mechanism to enact it 
in society.
Acting paternally, Van Parijs argues that the state should provide a basic income 
via installments. He argues that although their distribution scheduling may be morally 
arbitrary, this is preferable to a lump sum.205 He worries that a lump sum payment may 
act in an undesired way if it is squandered upon receipt. This behavior would not only be 
undesired but could result in long-term consequential situations that are contradictory to a 
liberal concern for justice. Van Parijs argues that the state may legitimately act to 
disperse basic income more sporadically in order to avoid the complete disbursal of 
income over a short time period. Van Parijs motivates this assertion through a concern 
for individual condition over a complete life.206 Van Parijs defends the prescriptive 
nature of such a stipulation stating, “a mildly paternalistic concern for people's real 
freedom throughout their lives, not just ‘at the start’, makes it sensible to hand out the 
basic income in the form of a (non-mortgageable) regular stream.”207 Van Parijs justifies 
state action of this type because the state assumes “a universal desire on people's part, 
when ‘in their right minds’, to protect their real freedom at older ages against the 
weakness of their will at younger ages.”208
This concern mirrors that of Rawls who used the difference principle to ensure the 
provision of a maximized set of social primary goods to individuals over the course of 
their lives.209 Van Parijs, in placing his system within the conception of a property 
owning democracy, is using the same relative motivation to justify providing individuals 
with a frequently disbursed universal basic income. The difference is that Van Parijs 
wants to avoid the problems he sees in Rawls list of primary goods, particularly the 
amended one that includes a leisure calculation. Van Parijs wants to avoid the
205 IBID, p. 102
206 IBID, Chapter 2, Section 2.5, pp. 45 - 48
207 IBID, p 47
208 IBID, p 47
209 Rawls, John: Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, p. 200
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conception of the good Rawls set of primary goods enforces and thus uses a specific tool 
to avoid this problem. Van Parijs’ commitment to freedom leads him to create a method 
of providing this idea that allows individuals to decide what set of primary goods they 
may actually want.
As we explored already in this chapter, this uses Rawls’ general argument in a 
very precise way. The argument that the state is motivated to provide an ongoing set of 
primary goods is the same. However, Van Parijs argues his method provides this, in lieu 
of Rawls saying how it should be done, through an allocative process that allows 
individuals to choose their set of resources. As a result, Van Parijs is balancing the 
commitments to liberal justice by providing an ongoing method of income provision in a 
way that minimizes through paternalism the ability of individuals to arrive in liberally 
troubling conditions. For Van Parijs, this legitimizes an allocative process through a 
development of Rawls argument. These liberal constraints act to limit the actual 
maximization of “real freedom” that could be possible through other methods of basic 
income. On Van Parijs view, the balance of providing individuals with the appropriate 
level of responsibility through their choices and yet access to a comprehensive set of 
social primary goods comes ideally, in most contexts through the implementation of a 
UBI.
Rawls argues our concern is for individual primary goods and this should not be 
left to a market device, as it is required by background justice. The need for primary 
goods is constant over a full life and since individuals cannot be responsible for natural 
endowments that make them poor decision makers with a tool used to acquire these 
goods, the goods have to be provided directly. This highlights the aforementioned 
selective relationship Van Parijs has with Rawls’ theory. However, as we have noted, 
Rawls’ conception was not without problems. So we must assess if Van Parijs’ 
selectivity is well placed given his competing account of how to provide optimal 
individual freedom justly. It is important to first inspect whether the idea of dictating the 
disbursal method as suggested by Van Parijs violates autonomy and privileges a 
conception of the good rather than the right by limiting the choices individuals can make.
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Many critics of Van Parijs have noticed this issue. We will discuss those critiques 
directly, but we must first discuss the general principle of providing a set of primary 
goods in any fashion.
The conceptualizing of primary goods privileges an account of individual needs in 
so much as it reflects the needs everyone will have no matter what else they may want. 
This is the case for the theories of Dworkin, Rawls and Van Parijs in that they all assume 
people will have needs of some kind rather than choose rationally to die and attempt to 
enforce this belief effectively through abstract bargaining and compromise. This aspect 
of our commitments to justice is not troubling. On the contrary, I have argued this is 
where much of the true power of the liberal critique of pure formal claims comes from. 
Resources clearly fall into the category of being a primary good in this way even if we do 
not agree as to how vast our conception of them is. The latter of these claims is very 
important in deciding the state structure that will fulfill the needs of the theoretical 
concept. This is in part why Rawls moves away from welfare states as he believes they 
use apparatus, which inappropriately to equalize the value of liberties individuals have 
through a set of primary goods. The one key advantage of Van Parijs’ UBI on this 
account is that the conception of what constitutes a resource-based primary good is left to 
the individual through a tool that does not entrench inequalities systematically due to its 
unconditional and maximal nature. These aspects of the UBI are built in specifically to 
satisfy Rawls’ expressed concerns with providing a comprehensive set of primary goods 
in a property owning democracy. Importantly, it shows where Van Parijs’ resource 
claims lie. Choices matter prior to the actual acquisition of these goods. This is the clear 
implication of his system and it is one at odds with how Van Parijs has constructed his 
philosophic commitments. The means to secure these goods must be provided in much 
the way Rawls argued for, which is universally, maximally and in an ongoing manner. 
Van Parijs’ only amendment is that the choices have to be legitimized due to the 
problems Rawls has in conceptualizing primary goods such as leisure. The UBI allows 
these choices and outcomes to matter within the appropriate sphere even if the actions 
individuals take with this UBI yields what would be illiberal outcomes based upon a 
more strict Rawlsian account of liberal justice. Importantly, the reason for the UBI is not
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predicated on an allocative vision of distribution but a liberal commitment to providing 
primary goods amended solely at a particular point to inculcate the results of individual 
choices.
On the other side of the coin, the disbursal method could undo the idea of not 
privileging a set of goods by curtailing the goods one can purchase in the marketplace 
due to the method employed. This is particularly an issue if “real freedom” is the ability 
to do what one might want to do. If we are asserting the legitimacy of moral agency then 
the disbursal method could be unjustly constraining this agency compared to other forms 
of basic income. A limited set of goods are available due to the size and frequency of the 
disbursement. By limiting the preference schedule available at any given point, the UBI 
could be argued to be privileging a set of goods over another. The argument runs that if 
individuals own their basic income as their way to access a distribution of resources in 
keeping with their reciprocal agreement about primary goods, how they choose to have it 
disbursed, such as over time or all at once, should be up to them. Individuals are owed a 
reciprocal allocation given their status as equal citizens and the paternalism of the 
distributive method undermines their liberty to act as they ought to be able to act with 
their endowment.
One defense of a lump-sum system is provided by Bruce Ackerman and Ann 
Alstott in their work “The Stakeholder Society”. Ackerman and Alstott suggest a one­
time lump sum grant would act effectively to enfranchise future generations of 
Americans within the United States. This sort of grant is intended to provide an initial 
distribution that will allow individuals to self-conceptualize their needs and goals, thus 
imparting greater freedom upon them. Unlike a UBI, Ackerman and Alstott argue that 
such a solution is also considerably more feasible as a practical reform as it would not 
require the constant monitoring and disbursal requisite of a UBI. The lessened 
administration results in the system being considerably cheaper to run and administrate.
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Ackerman and Alstott are not the only individuals to advocate lump-sum solutions,210 but 
their argument is one of the most comprehensive examples.
Ackerman and Alstott argue that their system would provide a generation of 
young Americans with a meaningful initial endowment, $80,000, and that such funds 
could be easily generated by taxing minimally (2% property tax) the most affluent (top 
40%) of United States citizens.211 They further argue that this plan will increase the 
opportunity sets that young Americans can access, which is ostensibly the goal of “real 
freedom”. Although Van Parijs does not mention any particular state in his work, the 
United States seems to be precisely the sort of state Van Parijs might view as a good 
candidate to adopt a UBI.212 Basic Income solutions also have precedent in the United 
States both in negative income tax experiments in the 1980’s and the Alaska Permanent
0 1 T •Fund. Furthermore, Van Parijs states that the third precept of adopting “real freedom” 
is providing leximin opportunity for individuals. A lump-sum of money, a “stake”214, 
seems to provide this optimum set better than a slow disbursal of money over time if for 
no other reason than the sheer market slice it provides. Lastly, the system posited by 
Ackerman and Alstott also seems to be capable of embracing the resource-based form of 
taxation if the definition of affluent is construed in a manner similar to Van Parijs’.215
The lump-sum endowment, much like the UBI, is given so that individuals can 
address their preference schedules. The benefit aside from ease is that this provides a 
greater account of freedom and autonomy if the ongoing value can be addressed 
somehow. The “stake” removes the paternalism from the use of the tool of distribution. 
If this is the provision that citizens are owed, then the argument is a strong one that a
210 Refer to - Dowding, Keith, De Wispelaere, Jurgen and White, Stuart: ‘Stakeholding - A New Paradigm 
in Social Policy’ in Keith Dowding, Jurgen De Wispelaere and Stuart White The Ethics o f Stakeholding, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2003), pp. 1 - 30
211 Ackerman, Bruce A. and Alstott, Anne: The Stakeholder Society, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2000), pp. 1-5 and pp. 82 - 85
212 The U.S.A. is the state in which the idea of the “stake” is set by Ackerman and Alstott. Although no 
particular state is mentioned by Van Parijs, the United States appears to be close to if not an “ideal” 
capitalist situation as alluded to by Van Parijs.
213 U.S. examples of basic income
214 Ackerman, Bruce & Alstott, Anne: The Stakeholder Society, p. 3
215 Although this is not their suggested plan, it could plausibly be amended as such to make affluence a 
measure of material possessions concurrent with Van Parijs’ construction of property rights.
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basic income state should embrace this structure instead. The account poses a difficult 
point in that the UBI removes a monetary freedom and in doing so, the paternalism 
results in paternal enforcement of an account of what is the good life.
This is a logical point one might saliently make about autonomy and moral 
agency. If choices are to count, even to the point they yield negative outcomes in terms 
of comparative distributions of resources, then the paternal constraint on the distribution 
that formalizes these distributive choices constrains unjustly the choices individuals 
ought to be able to make. However, this conception makes a key mistake. The basic 
income acts as an initial allocative distribution because it is an equal tool to actualize 
resources, not the resources themselves. If the state is to administer UBI for the 
expressed purpose of providing equal fair value of liberty in the selection of primary 
goods over the duration of a human lifetime, it seems legitimate to enforce an installment 
method because the state must assure equal value over unequal life-durations and market 
conditions. Individuals live variable amounts of time and income will undoubtedly 
fluctuate in relative value over time. The state, in ensuring that all receive competitive 
equal value within the market, can quite coherently dictate the manner in which the basic 
income is allocated. In order to ensure maximal basic income for leximin opportunity, 
the state would undoubtedly have to disburse income in installments. The point is 
simple. If UBI is to work as a tool of providing a just distribution over time, it has to 
provide the same time-slice liberties to everyone as a baseline condition. This is the 
natural extrapolation of our commitments to legitimize the market implied by our Fair 
Shares Proviso. The use of an unequal tool would be reciprocally unfair and hence an 
impossible outcome of an appropriate hypothetical process.
The deprivation of freedom argument is not as convincing as it first appears. A 
UBI may act to extend the receipt of the endowment, but it does not prevent it. The value 
of the lump sum can still be realized should one’s conception of the good motivate them 
in such a manner through proper fiscal management. The lump sum can only guarantee 
the equal condition of those individuals receiving their distribution at precisely the same 
time. The UBI works to avoid this unacceptable aspect of a fair and equal distributive
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system. Certainly, variations in UBl will occur over time and for many reasons not the 
least of which being time spent in the state over differing life spans may afford certain 
individuals greater preference schedules. The UBI provides a better tool to realize equal 
time-slice utility. A stake may not have the same socio-economic utility from moment to 
moment for individuals receiving it. Fluctuations in the market may make the value of 
the stake more useful for an individual who received it at point A compared to a person 
who received it at point B. The “stake” could of course adapt and increase or even 
decrease a “stake” subject to these fluctuations but that will not compensate or penalize 
an individual who received an unequal initial stake by virtue of the time they received it. 
The individual’s “stake” is aimed to enfranchise them equally but it is not necessarily 
equal from franchisee A to franchisee B given their potential differentiations in time 
slice. As a result, the ability to make the same level of choices afforded by individual 
agency is not the same from one person to another which results in an unfair market.
The answer I am forwarding here is clearly a different approach to this question 
than Van Parijs asks us to take. Van Parijs’ argument against these systems is that 
individuals, if given a lump sum, might make non-provisory decisions with the whole of 
their endowment. The disbursal method allows this and Van Parijs believes that they
91 ( \may later see these actions as foolish. As a result, it becomes legitimate to ensure 
individuals have a steady disbursal of their endowment over the course of their lifetime. 
Because these decisions threaten their equal contextual liberties and fair opportunity sets 
over time, Van Parijs argues the state should act to insure individuals against this 
potential outcome by using an installment system. Van Parijs’ liberal foundations require 
the provision of primary goods over a full life and cannot be secondary to the 
consideration of leximin opportunity sets that another disbursal method, like a lump sum, 
might provide, as they are needed to insure ongoing political equality.
This sentiment is affirmed in Van Parijs’ alternative arguments for other systems 
in “non-ideal” cases instituting other non-capitalist forms of political economy. If a UBI
216 Van Parijs, Philippe: Real Freedom for All, What (if anything) can Justify Capitalism, Section 2.5, pp. 
45 - 48
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could not realize actual equality or the provision of primary goods in a “non-ideal” case, 
the needs of background justice require an alternative solution. As we have discussed, 
Van Parijs’ appeal to this argument needs deeper consideration. It may be that we move 
away, based upon our liberal conception of justice, from capitalist/market distributions of 
primary goods through a disbursal of currency when the market is incapable of providing 
such things. This however does not lead us to a form of “impure” socialism. Rather, it 
simply moves us to a greater in-kind system of providing primary goods. Our individual 
agency, which Van Parijs wants to affirm, dictates that such a system will require a 
market, as we want individuals to be able to determine the value of the good they actually 
want. To be free in such a system, individuals have to be able to make choices with what 
they are given, be that money or direct goods/resources. As a result, it will not be 
socialist in any deep sense, rather a rhetorical one. Individuals may make choices within 
either “impure” system and we have to honor these and their results. Importantly, Van 
Parijs only argues for part of this argument. He argues that the concern for a distribution 
of primary goods over a lifetime dictates the disbursal method rather than a concern about 
the inequalities another disbursal method could cause. This is again a result of his 
argument being predicated on his belief that a UBI can replace at least in part a 
distribution of primary goods within a Rawlsian account of justice. However, this 
account will not yield him an appropriate account of agency based upon the motivations 
Rawls gives us for redistribution.
I believe, given what we have asserted of Van Parijs’ argument so far, that it is far 
more coherent to argue this form of distribution is required based simply upon a concern 
for equality in allocative distribution rather than a development solely of the difference 
principle sensitivities. UBI does not represent the actual set of primary goods individuals 
would need given whatever they might want, so it cannot act as Van Parijs says it will 
within a Rawlsian conception of distributive justice. If we were to employ it, as Rawls 
would suggest, the UBI would only be sufficient if it ensured this set of goods and no one 
used it in any other way. This is clearly not Van Parijs’ intent nor is it one I would argue 
we should accept.
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If we were to accept Van Parijs’ argument for installments through a purely 
Rawlsian justification ,the logic falls in on itself and highlights Van Parijs’ distinct 
theoretical problem in envisioning his liberal project the way he does. If he wants 
choices to count and even allows them to yield unequal conditional outcomes aside from 
the continued access to a UBI through an amendment to the Rawlsian project, then 
constraining choices paternally out of a concern for minimizing these outcomes is out of 
the question. These outcomes are either legitimate, as a lump sum account or allocative 
would dictate or not as a Rawlsian account would dictate. Van Parijs appears to want 
some weighting of choices so that individual actions cannot violate the provision of 
primary goods, much like Rawls. However, this is incongruous to a position that wants 
to legitimize a choice-driven tool, like a UBI, to decide the just distribution of actual 
resources. This paradox indicates the problem Van Parijs runs into when trying to 
shoehorn UBI and “real freedom” into Rawls’ conception of a property owning 
democracy. An alternative approach is needed if choices are to count and are seen as an 
important aspect of individual autonomy and freedom. Nevertheless, this does not mean 
that we are unable to defend Van Parijs’ stipulations on disbursement based upon 
different grounds.
The claim against a lump sum, or subsequently other forms of basic income217 
other than an unconditional and maximin UBI has to come from some other claim about 
justice but we appear to have an appropriate claim. On an allocative claim, such as the 
Fair Shares Proviso or the clamshells at the auction, we have a clear argument against a 
lump-sum system and for an incremental distribution of a basic income. The reason 
would be that the institutions we put in place must be intergenerational in order to 
legitimize the equal initial liberty/freedom producing share of a changing and choice 
sensitive set of resources through a market device.
217 Please refer to the reciprocity arguments of Stuart White referencing Republican Basic Income, Time- 
Limited Basic Income and Selective Basic Income in White, Stuart: ‘Fair Reciprocity and Basic Income’ in 
Reeve, Andrew and Williams, Andrew (eds.) Real Libertarianism Assessed: Political Theory after Van 
Parijs, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) and White’s other works listed in the bibliography. White 
shows how other systems of basic income can be justified given different perspectives on what he terms 
“fair reciprocity”.
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The argument for the stipulations of UBI is for Van Parijs troubling in another 
sense. If the judgment for UBI were to be predicated on conditional welfare, the system 
can fall prey to a different form of critique. One notable critique of Van Parijs in terms 
of his commitment to welfare comes from the aforementioned Richard Ameson in his 
article “Should Surfers Be Fed”.218
Ameson critiques “real freedom” as a systematic answer to distributive justice. 
Ameson argues, “... there is a deep tension between the egalitarianism of Van Parijs's do- 
the-best-one-can-for-the-least-advantaged conception of distributive justice and his insistence 
on strict neutrality on the good.”219 Ameson argues that conceptions of distributive justice 
like the one proposed by Van Parijs’ favor “good choosers” over “bad choosers”.220 This 
is because choices matter in the actual distribution of resources even if the tool to acquire 
them is equally provided. In doing so, it is not taken into account that “bad” choice 
making may not be a conscious or controllable decision. Thus, the least well-off are 
simply re-categorized and not actually provided an equal level of respective welfare. 
Those who make poor choices always end up on the bottom of society, as their resources 
are less due to these choices. In fact, the provisions Van Parijs builds into a conception 
of basic income still allows outcomes like these because a basic income, no matter how 
frequently it is disbursed, can always be squandered or misused. Van Parijs simply 
mitigates the frequency of this occurring through his argument for the structure of the 
basic income device. Ameson’s’ concern is then best understood as two pronged. The 
first issue is that an equal and ongoing distribution of basic income does not ensure 
welfare universally. This objection is raised because of Van Parijs’ espoused 
development of Rawls. Van Parijs is solely concerned with freedom. It is Van Parijs’ 
lack of articulation as to why we develop away from welfare, or his assumption Rawls 
has done this appropriately prior to where he develops the theory, that causes this kind of 
objection to arise. The second is that the disparities that arise through the operation of 
Van Parijs’ system are not a matter of consequentialism resulting from actions for which 
we can hold individuals accountable.
218 Ameson, Richard: ‘Should Surfers be Fed’
219 Ameson, Richard: ‘Should Surfers be Fed’, p. 97
220 IBID, p. 98
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This critique of a responsibility approach to distributive justice is troubling for 
any system of basic income. It is in part this concern for equal condition over a lifetime, 
which Van Parijs’ noted in his defense of installments. The argument has to run that UBI 
provides the best ongoing choice-sensitive tool to realize individual conceptions of the 
good and that this is the way distribution should be provided rather than providing 
welfare directly. To do this, we have to assert choices are more important than Rawlsian 
accounts claim.
The problem of individual citizen’s foolishly disposing of their UBI is not 
sufficiently answered merely by instituting installments. If they are owed a set of 
primary goods, then they are owed these goods rather than just a tool to get them. This 
highlights why the development of Rawls has to stem deeper than simply amending the 
sensitivities of the difference principle. Our freedom to choose our set of primary goods, 
given we meet some conception of moral agency, is paramount to actually having a set of 
them that sustains a notion of the conditions we face given the potential outcomes of 
these choices. Van Parijs never legitimizes this point. Given we can assert the 
importance of choices, a UBI provides this sensitivity even if the problem of negligent 
use persists. However, this is an account of justice incongruent with Rawls and 
subsequently Van Parijs’ project, as it would require a development of liberal justice at a 
deeper level to yield it.
There is a potential shortcoming with a UBI structure if individuals chose to 
dispose of their income foolishly. Henceforth, I will refer to this particular issue as the 
problem of contributory negligence.221 Ameson’s critique of Van Parijs is very salient 
given the argument Van Parijs has forwarded in defense of his UBI. Ameson again 
highlights Van Parijs’ reliance on parts of Rawls’ arguments that do not necessarily 
support his amendments and institutions. However, we must ask if contributory 
negligence causes a troubling and avoidable hierarchy of certain individuals based upon a 
factor that is out of their control, the ability to make good choices.
221 I would like to thank my friend, Geoffrey Bickford, for providing this legal terminology
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Ameson is arguing for a welfare calculation due to the potential of individuals 
being unequal due to choices they make, which are out of their control. This argument 
mirrors that of Rawls and why the difference principle acts as it does. As we have 
discussed first through Dworkin and now through Van Parijs, this fails to take on choice 
sensitivity appropriately. Van Parijs does not extrapolate his theory of why choices can 
legitimately count as he clearly implies they can in distributions. Ameson appears either 
to imply a standard of determinism that is troubling in its’ own right, or to fall pray to not 
taking autonomy seriously enough as Rawls did. Choices need to count and have 
tangible consequences. Ameson has to dispute this on some level for his position to 
make sense. This kind of position could be a classical liberal approach but as we have 
discussed our development away from this position is needed due directly to our need to 
build in choice sensitivity for everyone and honor the moral agency of the handicapped.
If we include these considerations into our discussion, we can see how a UBI can defuse 
Ameson’s challenge. The first point is a pragmatic one, in that the abuses of contributory 
negligence can and will happen no matter what the state provides, be it a tool or an in- 
kind resource thus causing a conditional hierarchy. Therefore, the problem of 
contributory negligence will befall any distribution and Ameson does not show how a 
welfare approach avoids this problem or approaches it in a way more appropriate than a 
basic income would.
For the argument Ameson forwards to have any power, it has to be predicated on 
the idea that the UBI state cannot compensate for the natural factors that affect moral 
agency and the choices these actors make. Deciding the natural and unchosen conditions 
that cause “bad choices” are a matter of abstract decision making. The natural elements, 
where relevant, are factored out through the actions of endowment insensitivity. As we 
have discussed, using undominated diversity to achieve this needed aspect of distributive 
justice caused problems. Perhaps the biggest implication of this measure was that many 
natural conditions would end up being uncompensated through welfare actions prior to 
the UBI. However, if the system were reshuffled to be more encompassing, as the 
aggregative calculation of insurance presented by Dworkin would be, this problem is
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adequately addressed. What remains in our calculation as a distinguishing factor is 
individual choice, but these choices now lack the moral coloring of “natural” inequality.
I have argued the choices individuals make have to be protected as a matter of individual 
autonomy and with these choices come the consequences. Natural inequalities should not 
cause us to disregard this aspect of human moral agency and autonomy. As I have 
shown, with specific developments to the liberal argument, our balance between these 
issues can be drawn in a more coherent way. The goal of providing a coherent 
conception of freedom in a fair and reciprocal arrangement of society needs choices to 
count if they are legitimate. Ameson fails to give us a compelling alternative argument 
because the critique, although valid in terms of Van Parijs argument, can be easily 
avoided with a closer systematic understanding of how a UBI must work to be reciprocal 
and fair in terms of interpersonal obligation.
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4.5 Conclusion
This brings us to a crossroads with Van Parijs. Van Parijs simply does not 
provide us with enough elaboration to see how his argument for a Rawlsian conception of 
distributive justice can be made to honor the other arguments he uses to affirm his UBI 
system. Van Parijs gives us powerful arguments for adopting a basic income. But these 
arguments lack a comprehensive account and reworking of the Rawlsian liberal argument 
to support them. Van Parijs’ intends to use Rawls’ exposition as a justification of the 
system. Van Parijs’ aims only to amend small aspects of the overall conception and 
criticizes the distributive schemes of Nozick/libertarianism, “pure” socialism, and the 
alternative process of Dworkin. However, in weaving his way between these many 
conceptions, he ultimately contradicts key aspects of Rawls’ argument without showing 
how these aspects can be justified by a developed Rawlsian account of justice.
This is because Van Parijs fails to see how deeply the development in a Rawlsian 
account of justice must be in order to yield the required changes, particularly in how 
important choices and the market are in actual distributions. Van Parijs assumes 
correctly that everyone is capable of making legitimate choices that have “real” 
outcomes. Rawls does not do this appropriately due to his overstated concern with 
natural endowments in a property-owning democracy. To get the changes in sensitivities 
Van Parijs’ advocates for requires that we question the very information that is allowed 
into and out of the original position as these are attributed to natural circumstance. Rawls 
did not draw the balance between choice and natural circumstance appropriately and the 
need for the developments of the liberal position I have argued for stem directly from this 
shortcoming. This is why the actions of the difference principle are unable to provide 
what was needed of them upon our inspection. They are predicated on a decision about 
how to attain impartial decisions about the institutions of justice that is not appropriate. It 
lacked a systematic account of handicaps and the moral agency that all human beings can 
have to some extent. This problem cannot be appropriately corrected by simply fiddling 
with the difference principle itself. It further implies that we may not come to the
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decision of using or describing, as Rawls does, a property owning democracy, which 
leaves Van Parijs in a precarious theoretical position. He must either change the account 
of the veil of ignorance or create some alternative device to ensure impartiality. Without 
such an account, his theory is left with direct conflicts between its prescriptions and the 
theoretical processes used to justify them.
The development of Rawls presented by Dworkin, Van Parijs largely rejects. In 
arguing against Dworkin’s use of the market, Van Parijs uses a Rawlsian argument to 
critique the role of the market in justice. Procedural market transactions do not constitute 
a complete account of justice as we have shown. However, if the market is subordinated 
and prefaced correctly, it is a necessary aspect of honoring our individual choices and can 
result in fair yet unequal outcomes. Rawls’ argument for a property owning democracy 
relies on this same relative point, just instituted at a different level. However, by 
prefacing the market on incorrect grounds, he did not allow it to do the work it needed to. 
Rawls missed this crucial aspect of justice, and without a substantive correction to this 
oversight, it is hard to see how Van Parijs’ resulting system can work as he says it will. 
Dworkin gives us tools that allow for the choice sensitivity that Van Parijs argues for. 
However, in rejecting his argument Van Parijs fails to explain how the Rawlsian project 
is to accept his own espoused choice sensitivity. Van Parijs does not explain how his 
account of choice sensitivity is different from Dworkin’s outside of rectifying 
calculations in the devices used by Dworkin.
Since choices are supposed to count, we have to assess clearly and 
comprehensively what the implications are of such a position. I have argued the 
considerations of justice ask us instead to inspect and rectify the conditions that exist 
upon entering the market. This is by all accounts what Dworkin is accomplishing with 
the distribution prior to the auction and insurance scheme. These are an account of 
background justice. Although I have argued for developments of this position, the 
market that follows is just by these measures, run properly and repeatedly. If the 
measures of justice have taken place, it becomes hard to see how the UBI operates on a 
different objective plain than the auction itself. The implication that follows is that Van
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Parijs will have to object to Dworkin on different grounds, namely that he fails in some 
way to draw the organizations of background justice properly. If the market were to yield 
unjust results no matter how considerations of background justice constrained the 
operation of the system, Van Parijs would have to utilize a critique that would undermine 
his own argument for a UBI. The system he proposes uses a market to create choice 
sensitivity and just outcomes.
The use of Rawls’ argument to motivate UBI or basic income in general without 
correcting the conception of choice at the heart of Rawls’ argument is extremely 
problematic. The resulting system would not allow choices to count appropriately. The 
results would be constrained based on criteria that would determine obligation from the 
resulting market consequences, not the use of liberty providing resources. The effect 
would be the deprivation of the freedom to act in a way one may want to, and ought to be 
able to, even given our concern for reciprocal fairness. Van Parijs attempts to use 
resource rents to get around this issue, but in describing them as measuring income to 
determine redistributive obligation, the theory enforces the end-result determinations that 
undermine the general premise of the resource rent idea. Equal resources employed by 
equal individuals through their moral agency can yield unequal results. When this is 
considered in terms of individual labor, it is counter-intuitive to say that the differences in 
output and the liberties these outputs afford are not just.
The calculation of proportionality must occur in a way comparative to other 
individuals upon entering the market. The results from the choices that follow must be 
honored. Rawls does not accomplish this due to the constraints of the difference 
principle, even in its amended format. Dworkin tries to do this but draws the initial 
market leveling measures incorrectly. By drawing them incorrectly, or not articulating 
them well enough, Dworkin left us with an answer to the problem of handicaps that was 
not appropriate given an inspection of the issue and left us with a “second-best” solution 
to redistribution that instituted end-result calculations. Our development of liberalism 
has a place to stand because the issues about how we balance choices and circumstances 
have become more informed but remain unresolved. This requires we assert a new way
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forward and a different conception of how to develop liberal justice. We are left with the 
task of discussing whether our conclusions of justice can be tied together. Furthermore, 
we must see if in tying them together, we still arrive at supporting a UBI or other parts of 
Van Parijs* argument, given he did not undertake the task of comprehensively working 
through an argument of liberal justice that takes on an appropriate account of choices 
himself.
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Conclusion -  Developing Liberal Justice
It is at this point that we must take stock of what our exposition has yielded. Each 
of the theorists we have successively addressed has added some aspect to our discussion. 
Through these theorists, I have argued we can see the distinct virtues of each theory. We 
can also see how our development occurs from issues each position successively faces in 
developing the liberal argument. These arguments show how we can progress through 
successive accounts of liberal justice quite naturally to arrive at the need for further 
developments and specific institutional ideas. This development is needed as the balance 
of choices and circumstances gains greater clarity and definition. These developments 
reflect what our fair balance should be between honoring individual choices while 
addressing the issues of natural circumstance that unevenly befall philosophically equal 
citizens.
I have argued that as enlightening as these arguments are, they have not 
completed the developments we need to make. There is another step we require, a 
Principle of Just Access. This step is an addition to the development of the liberal 
argument, which we have traced through this text. This lineage becomes important in 
understanding the development of the liberal argument. It represents continued 
refinement of what is needed to honor choices and provide for unchosen physical 
circumstances in a fair way. These issues ultimately drive deeper than has been explored, 
particularly where these two issues converge in the choices of individuals who are 
handicapped or disabled. The Principle of Just Access helps us make sense of this 
occurrence. It creates a guideline through which individuals can have their choices 
equally valued while fairly limiting an obligation to compensation. A clarification of the 
moral agency of handicapped individuals leads us to a distinct commitment that has been 
otherwise unarticulated. Though this is ultimately a concern for the “real” welfare of the 
handicapped/disabled, it also erodes the idea that choice related outcomes are as unclear 
or problematic as other theorists have postulated. This allows us to consider institutions
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of choice and circumstance with greater clarity and I argue ultimately leads us to support 
an Unconditional Basic Income based upon the balance the Principle of Just Access 
allows us to assert. It does the best we ought to do, fairly and reciprocally, for the 
handicapped and disabled while honoring the validity of their agency as represented by 
their choices.
Fairness is a powerful idea as the basis of constructing a liberal society. It is the 
basis for Rawls, Dworkin and Van Parijs. I would further argue it is an idea present even 
within Nozick’s dialectical approach to Rawls. However, this concept only takes us so 
far. It gives us a basis from which to think about the hard decisions of politics, society 
and economic arrangements. It requires of us to consider a position from which we can 
be impartial about the decisions that follow based upon the idea of fairness. How we 
think about these ideas systematically and how we implement political structures in a 
way that reflects these ideas is just as important as accepting fairness as a motivating 
idea. The institutionalization and extrapolation of the idea of fairness is vital to a 
political theory even if it is messy and problematic. This requires us to consider the 
proper weighting and presence of issues within our account of impartiality. Fairness only 
works appropriately if the device used to institutionalize it considers all the proper factors 
in a properly balanced way. The account of these issues is what tips our scales of justice. 
It is only from these accounts that we can arrive at principles that motivate our 
institutions in a fair and appropriate way.
Rawls gives us a device to achieve our impartiality through a hypothetical account 
of individuals, their collective bargaining and their sets of knowledge. In spite of the 
contentions critics have with the specifics of this argument, the general device and what it 
is intended to accomplish is a needed step. Rawls argument is fraught with assumptions 
and devices we may find cumbersome or insensitive to aspects of equality and fairness, 
which we expect in our fair society. The device of the original position can lead to 
troubling outcomes upon a strict reading but I would argue this is largely due to the 
details and specifics of the device. In fact, this why I argued we needed to develop
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Rawls, as Dworkin does. We need to develop these ideas in a specific way in order for 
our principles to strike an appropriate balance between choices and circumstances.
Nonetheless, if Rawls argument were taken as a stark framework, I would argue it 
is conceptually strong. In fact, I would argue it is stronger than many of his critics, 
particularly those who have based their criticisms upon device objections, have given it 
credit for. Broadly speaking Rawls point would be condensed to the idea that societies 
need to be fair and to have fair rules. These rules must be impartially created. To create 
impartiality, we remove knowledge X and Y, assume everyone’s interests are brought to 
the table and in doing so this yields certain basic but universal principles of justice. 
Though I would argue Rawls ideas of X and Y are problematic and that he perhaps has 
not done what is needed to actually represent everyone in question, the idea for how we 
create principles is still strong as a device in itself. The device, if taken in its broadest 
terms, is only a way for us to envision our decisions in an impartial way. If we remove 
the baggage from the device that arguably biases the outcomes that flow from it, it is hard 
to argue with as an abstract idea. This could be simply stated, as a fair society requires an 
abstract and impartial position from which to make decisions about the institutions of 
justice that follow.
Dworkin and Van Parijs clearly ascribe to the latter statement. They are 
developing this general premise in different ways. It could be critiqued that the device 
given to us by Rawls does not accomplish the task of being impartial given the 
descriptive aspects Rawls gives to it. However, for our purposes here, it is only 
important that a device like it, stripped of its problematic aspects, could still work or at 
least, work in an optimal and living way to formulate principles and institutions of 
justice. I believe that it can if we give Rawls a fair and close reading.
Yet again, this tells us very little about our liberal siblings. For Rawls, the 
impartiality of the original position is created by the implementation of the veil of 
ignorance. The position is a device for impartiality but the impartiality itself is only
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obtained through the application of the veil. This makes the account of the veil 
paramount to the institutional claims that follow from the original position.
It is Rawls’ account of the sensitivities allowed into and withheld from veiled 
individuals that is at the root of our need for development. Rawls works throughout the 
remainder of his career after A Theory o f Justice to amend the scope and sensitivities of 
his project as a whole. This is a direct reaction, in part, to the problems his account of the 
veil creates and the subsequent treatment his principles and institutions of justice give to 
the actions of human agency. The aspects of the veil are ultimately what motivate the 
impartial decisions that follow and why we go down Rawls’ prescriptive route to the 
principles of justice. This account acts as the arbiter of what decisions are fair as it 
screens conceptions in and out of our decisions about fairness. It sets the ground rules 
and as a result dictates the principles and institutions that come out of our thought device. 
It is the account of what is in and out of our fair decisions that has caused the resulting 
criticisms of Rawls levied by his critics, including the theorists addressed in this text.
Van Parijs is quite clear that his theoretic approach and institutions diverge from 
Rawls in some crucial ways. The departures are needed to justify the institution of a 
UBI, the use of undominated diversity and the commitment to “real freedom”. Van Parijs 
explains what these departures are, how they are to operate, how they can be defended 
and even where he believes they fall within a Rawlsian conception of justice. But what is 
this Rawlsian conception of justice? This question is never answered in a comprehensive 
way by Van Parijs. Van Parijs’ development of particular institutions is motivated by 
ideas that appear to conflict or contradict each other because his development of Rawls 
theory does not work as comprehensively as it needs too. As we have just seen, a 
Rawlsian conception says very little, but Rawls himself says a whole lot about the 
institutions of justice as these follow from a particular conception of how to envision 
impartiality within the impartial device.
Van Parijs instead attempts to fit “real freedom” and his institutional approach 
within explanations that must fundamentally change if we are to accept Van Parijs’
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developments to Rawls’ project. The principles Van Parijs wants us to amend flow from 
an account of impartiality that yields specific outcomes. It is the criterion upon which 
these decisions are made rather than the decisions themselves that require amendment or 
at least further stipulated explanation, if we are to accept them as the legitimate 
extrapolations of a Rawlsian project. The problems with Rawls flow back to this very 
basic stage of the Rawlsian project. Van Parijs is clearly motivated, as is witnessed by 
his institutions, by the intuition that Rawls has not balanced our considerations properly 
in reaching principles of justice. Without an account of how these intuitions are 
developed from Rawls, we are left with an interesting institutional argument that is 
contradicted by aspects of Rawls argument retained and undeveloped by Van Parijs.
These are the same issues, that choices should matter in an appropriate way, that 
drive Dworkin to develop Rawls as he does. Van Parijs’ same concern with choices 
requires him to do more than reconsider leisure calculations in the Difference Principle 
because this only represents one kind of choice sensitivity problem. This aspect of Rawls 
argument is indicative of the imbalance between circumstances, choices and the degrees 
of legitimacy in outcomes that occur due to problematic sensitivities in the device. To 
correct the imbalance requires that we conceptualize the knowledge of our impartial 
bargainers from Rawls account not just the value of leisure as a valid conception of the 
good. This is the only way to arrive at the kind of robust choice provision Van Parijs is 
adamantly arguing for in his institutions. Such an account is likely to take Van Parijs 
further towards Dworkin because of the importance of choices, agency and choice- 
sensitive outcomes at work in his project. If “real” opportunities come from “real” 
choices that are provided by equal streams of basic income, then these choices have to 
have equal value and equal consequences. A Rawlsian account does not allow these 
choices to have the kind of merit in determining conceptions of the good that outcomes 
represent due to the actions of maximin redistribution his ignorant parties agree too. It is 
a problem in Rawls theory that Van Parijs clearly recognizes, but it requires more than a 
change in the account of ideal political economy existing within Rawlsian side- 
constraints. It requires a change to the side-constraints themselves that Van Parijs simply 
does not give us.
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This is why Dworkin’s critique and development of Rawls is so important to 
consider. Dworkin does take the theory back to the level of the veil and works upward to 
the institutions that follow. These changes are motivated by sensitivity problems 
Dworkin saw in Rawls’ project that required amendments to the veil to fix. Dworkin 
develops Rawls and tries to place claims about the market in an appropriate frame of 
reference while taking their role in our agency more seriously. In our terms, he asks us to 
address an imbalance in how we weigh choices and circumstances in considering 
principles of justice. When these amendments were put into place, the resulting 
institutions and systems changed with them to yield the auction and insurance scheme. 
Van Parijs, in flirting with and analyzing both Dworkin and Rawls, leans on aspects of 
these arguments but they are not one in the same. All they share at a basic level is the 
liberal concern of fairness and an impartiality device to reflect fairness into the 
institutions of society. These theories from this point forward go off on different 
distributive trajectories even if they converge at certain points (rightly or wrongly) in 
institutions, scope and practices.
As large as this issue is for Van Parijs in terms of his theory, his institutions do 
work in our development of the liberal position because they are motivated by choice 
sensitivities that we ought to treat in certain ways. Van Parijs may fail to give us the 
account of how we arrive at these sensitivities and why we treat them in certain ways but 
that does not mean they are not appropriate, important and even needed ideas. It is not 
that a liberal conception of justice cannot support his arguments. Van Parijs simply does 
not give us an account that works comprehensively in support of itself. Van Parijs’ 
conception is unique and interesting in that it finds a new way to think about the liberal 
project even if the critical link between the thought device and the practices/institutions 
of justice are not fully articulated, as they need to be. Simply because these concerns 
about impartial claims and constructing a just and fair society are not described does not 
mean that these are not present. In fact, I argue that Van Parijs’ development reveals 
ideas about how a fair and reciprocal society can treat individual choices appropriately if
Balancing Choice and Circumstance -  Fair Shares and Just Access in Liberal Justice 235
we inspect what our commitments ought to be in developing the liberal argument 
ourselves.
There is, at least at the moment, a certain fear of creating a comprehensive or 
grand account of justice in the way that Rawls did. In fact, one could argue that Rawls 
himself does this to a certain degree. Instead, there is a retreat into focusing on the non­
ideal or institutional theory to motivate effective change in our world. The idea roughly 
stated being that the big picture is to hard and does far too little so let us just do 
something to move forward. Although I admire the intention and effort to bring about 
change rather than to speculate on nebulous ideas, such an approach falls prey to what we 
see here with Van Parijs and what our retreat from dealing with the “airy fairy” issues of 
political existence leads to. Critiques carry power against the institutions Van Parijs 
argues for, based upon his lack of a deeper, larger, grander philosophic argument. There 
is no non-ideal or institutional theory that exists without a larger motivational argument, 
just as there are no grand theories that do not intend to tell us things about how to 
construct and motivate just political practices. To focus solely on one or the other is to 
do a disservice to the theory and ultimately the practices it wishes us to undertake. Ideal 
and non-ideal theory may be a division that has failed to do the one thing a theoretical 
distinction ought to do, be useful in asserting some kind of transcendental difference. 
These two paradigms are inexorably linked. It may be fair to talk about oxygen and to 
talk about hydrogen when discussing water, but ultimately, if you have water, you have 
both. Therefore, I do not believe that my deep seeded belief that Van Parijs’ owes us a 
greater explanation is unwarranted. Nor do I believe that working larger grand 
philosophic principles, like the importance of choices, down to very tangible political 
systems is unwarranted either. It is coherent to do both and I hope to have shown how 
systems can result from the developments I have posed both in how we can envision the 
importance and operation of markets and how our reciprocal compensation must work to 
ordinally provide for the welfare of the handicapped and disabled.
I have argued the need for greater development is caused by an imbalance in how 
we treat individual choices and circumstance in a liberal account of justice. We saw
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through our inspection of libertarianism that taking individual agency and the choices that 
result as our sole consideration was not enough. Human agency requires security and 
resources. These require us to redistribute. Individuals do not start with the same natural 
endowments, and we need to consider this also. Even if or when we achieve these 
requirements, the market that formalizes our choices necessitates the ongoing provision 
of fair shares as dictated by our Fair Shares Proviso. We also asserted, through 
inspecting liberal claims about justice that the definition of what counts as a resource 
under such a proviso needed to be robust enough to include social rather than just natural 
resources. Although the market is important in formalizing our choices and ensuring our 
individual agency, we move quite naturally into a liberal account of justice that balances 
the issues of choice and circumstance more readily. Though we make this move 
naturally, the market retains an important role when in protecting the choices and 
conceptions of the good individuals have and the outcomes that result.
It is at this point that we can see what the argument is as a comprehensive account 
and why we begin and end where we do. The movement here is one of accepting and 
working through the role and importance of choices and circumstances in conceiving a 
just state. They both have a role to play and they both must be entered into our 
calculations. However, their roles and the degrees of inter-relation and importance 
require greater clarification. Nozick presents no balance between these issues aside from 
individual charity. Systematically speaking, Nozick’s proceduralism is based primarily, 
if not wholly, on choices, as individual circumstances are completely arbitrary and hence 
non-binding in a political although possibly moral sense. Nevertheless, circumstances 
have a direct relationship to the value and intensity of agency and the value of choices. 
The consideration must be more prominent than Nozick argues it is. However, choices 
serve to formalize our equally endowed agency even if their effect cannot be absolute in 
the sense Nozick argues for. They are still important and still create unequal outcomes.
If we are to value agency and honor the choices and outcomes that flow from it, there are 
going to be just practices and a subordinate but important role for the devices that ensure 
these choices are made equally and fairly. The market plays a subordinate role in this
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process but one we appear to need in order to work through the implications of agency if 
we value it equally for everyone capable of enjoying it.
Therefore, we are left with the need to come up with some way to balance these 
claims against each other and discern principles of justice from this balance. Rawls gives 
us a way to balance these claims through a hypothetical device that has a great deal of 
value in making impartial sense of these claims and their effect on justice. Rawls argues 
that both of these ideas ought to count when considering principles of justice. However, 
Rawls argues that circumstances drastically outweigh choices in our consideration.
Rawls argues that our choices are largely if not always contingent on the circumstances, 
both social and physical, in which individuals find themselves. On Rawls view, it is this 
contingency which individuals would use to motivate maximin redistribution in order to 
ensure equal valued liberties.
However, this is not the case because although we need to care about providing 
reciprocally constrained opportunities, this does not undermine the validity of choices 
people make with them and what effect these choices have on outcomes. People with 
equal endowments can make equal decisions with distinct and unequal consequences that 
are legitimate. Maximin principles also create an obligation to redistribution that has 
little effect on the actual opportunities some people with severe handicaps have while 
severely constraining the opportunities others have through a commitment to realize these 
incremental gains in liberty. Although Rawls device gives us a framework to work with, 
it needs to be developed to reflect the balance it requires to be fair.
We end up at Dworkin who realizes these shortcomings and attempts to address 
them through a development of Rawls project. Dworkin gives us a way of working 
through the imbalance of these issues witnessed in Rawls account while retaining the 
premise and structure of his theoretical project. In order to achieve an appropriate 
balance between choices and circumstances, Dworkin argues we must modify the veil of 
ignorance to allow in a modified set of knowledge to the original position representatives. 
The knowledge of talents but not their value (individually or socially) allows this
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development, which creates new principles from which to decide the fairness and justness 
of distributions. We move toward envy-freeness and Dworkin argues this is ensured 
using a hypothetical auction and insurance scheme.
It is when we place this argument next to the argument of Van Parijs, that we can 
see the problems Van Parijs has. Van Parijs does not undertake these veil modifications. 
Therefore, although he clearly values the development of individual choices and 
outcomes within a Rawlsian liberal framework, he does not undertake this needed 
development to balance the issues of choice and circumstance within the hypothetical 
creation of principles. This development is needed to correct sensitivity issues in the 
creation of principles not just the institutions that stem from the principles of justice.
The move towards Dworkin is needed to create the requisite balance between 
these issues that our project requires. However, if we work through Dworkin’s account 
of the veil appropriately, our understandings about handicap, compensation and 
obligation need more development than Dworkin gives them. It is this lack of 
development that I argue takes Dworkin back to largely Rawlsian outcomes in terms of 
institutions and redistribution. What we need to understand is that extreme or complete 
incapacity is only part of our discussion. In fact, I argue this is only a small part of our 
discussion of handicaps and disability. Incapacity bares consideration and Dworkin does 
well to give us a way to reciprocally constrain our commitments in reflection of this 
potential outcome.
However, most individuals with handicaps can make choices from a potentially 
robust set of opportunities. The disproportionate inequality in opportunity sets is 
something that must be weighed in our decisions about an appropriate balance between 
choices and circumstances. These would motivate us to forms of reciprocally constrained 
compensation. However, these opportunities are valuable and may actually represent 
something that the individuals may desire regardless of their endowment. Handicapped 
and disabled individuals have opportunities, which are not just equally valuable. They 
represent choices that can have outcomes and consequences, which the agency of these
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individuals creates. This may result in unequal outcomes for handicapped and disabled 
individuals in the same fashion as anyone else with a typical/average/“normar 
endowment. Therefore, our concern for condition and compensation must be reflective 
of all of the subtleties that are not expressly built into Dworkin’s account. Because they 
are not, his ideas about compensation lack vital prioritization, which can reduce the 
pragmatic conclusions of his project.
I argue these are ideas that are justly allowed in through the modified veil of 
ignorance. It clarifies the principles that would result from the impartial bargaining of 
the representatives at hand. They would understand that handicapped and disabled 
people could make valid choices. These choices are equally valuable to everyone else’s 
choices. Therefore, the concern for condition becomes a calculation of comparative 
opportunity sets. This is what our compensation amount through insurance is based 
upon. Importantly, it is compensation for a specific purpose first and foremost, to 
provide access to a greater set of opportunities that are reciprocally fair. Compensation 
in a monetary/discretionary form only becomes a consideration if and when this first 
aspect is exhausted. This nuance is not present in Dworkin or any other liberal project. It 
needs to be if the agency of the handicapped is to be treated equally and fairly.
This leads us to the Principle of Just Access. The Principle of Just Access creates 
a priority rule in the idea of compensation that accomplishes what our considerations 
would actually be if we understood the importance of agency for the handicapped 
appropriately. It formalizes our commitment to a specific form of compensation, which 
supersedes the consideration of another form of compensation. This development 
accomplishes our need for an appropriate balance in our systems because it takes the idea 
of choices and places it upon everyone. Choices are not removed by handicap and 
disability, opportunities are. Therefore, our commitment must be to make society less 
disabling to those who are handicapped rather than to simply compensate them in a way 
that does not value their ability to make choices seriously enough.
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It further clarifies our thought and has some specific outcomes for our 
considerations of justice. If choices are something that we have done our best to provide 
in a reciprocally fair way and we have provided compensation for those who need it then 
the choices that happen have to be equally valuable as are their consequences. This 
implies that a market device has to have a role in our consideration of justice. It 
formalizes these choices even if it comes after many other considerations and institutions 
of justice.
It is at this point that we must divert from Dworkin’s pragmatism because we 
have made sense of our commitments and asserted that choices are more clearly 
determinate than he believes they are. This takes us back to the development of a fair 
market device and the assumptions built into it. We require the development of the Fair 
Shares Proviso because it undertakes the presuppositional work assumed by procedural 
accounts of justice. This development is important because it shows us why Van Parijs’ 
institutions are so vital in honoring the choices people make and the opportunities they 
ought to have. We come to his systematic positions through a very different path than 
Van Parijs takes. The kind of importance Van Parijs gives to choices may require a great 
deal more development, as we have outlined, in the liberal project than he provides us 
with. However, this development is possible and because of this, his institutions can play 
a vital role in cashing out what it means to have a just market and the value this can have 
in assuring individuals have the kind of “real” freedom these choices represent.
My developments stand very much upon the theoretical shoulders of academic 
giants but they are necessary if we are going to understand to a greater degree the balance 
we ought to strike between choices and circumstances. The agency of the handicapped is 
important and it is not accomplished appropriately unless our theoretical understanding of 
these issues is comprehensive. If we apply philosophic equality, our commitments have 
to respond dynamically to these issues. This is only accomplished if we understand what 
is at stake and endow proper constituency upon all those we find in our diverse society. 
For the handicapped and disabled, this requires a far deeper understanding of their issues 
than is presently represented in liberal arguments. Though the Rawlsian liberal argument
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lends much in its structure and development to get us where we ought to be, it lacks 
nuance in this area, which leads to deep tensions. It is these tensions which if allowed to 
remain unresolved undermine the motivational ideas of the liberal project and ultimately 
lead to institutions and policies that have troubling outcomes for individuals who are 
handicapped and disabled.
These developments lead us to deeper commitments and understandings, which 
are necessary in a philosophic way to conceptualize the agency of the handicapped. They 
also allow us to reconsider choices and what is needed to honor their validity given these 
can be equally valued for everyone. This takes us to the development of fair shares 
principles in a limited, subordinate but important market structure. The institutions that 
come out of this appropriately balanced account allow us to consider the role and 
structure of such a device, which can draw us particularly to the institutions like die UBI 
of Van Parijs. These are important developments if we are to balance our commitments 
to choice and circumstance in our theories and practices of government.
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